For hours, bulldozers and heavy machinery worked to remove the rubble of a house that was struck at dawn on Tuesday in the upscale Jadriya district of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, where a group of Iranian advisers had been targeted, according to several sources who spoke to Alhurra.
A source in the Presidential Regiment responsible for protecting the compound told Alhurra: “Three bodies were recovered on Tuesday morning, and the search is ongoing for two other Iranian bodies.”
The house is located in a small neighborhood known as the “Presidential Square,” which also includes the homes of political leaders, militia commanders, ministers, and senior officials. Among them are the residence of the Shiite leader and head of the Hikma Movement, Ammar al-Hakim; the home of Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri; the residence of Supreme Islamic Council head Humam Hamoudi; as well as the homes of militia leaders, including Abu Alaa al-Wala’i, the leader of the Tehran-aligned Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada.
A source in the Iraqi Interior Ministry told Alhurra that those killed in the Jadriya strike included an Iranian adviser working with Shiite armed factions known as “Ansari,” without revealing his full name. He is described as one of the experts affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
According to the source, four other Iranians were killed in yesterday’s strike along with “Ansari.”
The source did not disclose further details about their identities because of what he described as a “blackout” imposed by the Popular Mobilization Forces regarding the incident.
However, Alhurra obtained information indicating that the targeted house had been rented by the Iranian embassy several months ago. According to the landlord, the Iranians said while finalizing the contract: “We have advisers working at the embassy who will stay here.”
An Expanding Iranian Military Role
The role of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard in Iraq is no longer limited to providing advice; it has shifted toward the direct management of rocket and drone attacks targeting Western and regional interests.
In the context of the U.S.–Israeli war that erupted on February 28 against Iran, Iraq has become a primary arena for launching rockets and drones toward U.S. interests in Iraq and across the region.
Advisers from the Revolutionary Guard reside with some Iraqi factions and work closely alongside the groups Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, both of which are designated as terrorist organizations by the United States.
Small groups from the Revolutionary Guard in Iraq are working on several operational files, according to a senior source in Iraqi intelligence who spoke to Alhurra. One of the most prominent tasks assigned to these groups is converting primitive rockets into precision-guided weapons.
The area of Jurf al-Sakhar — renamed “Jurf al-Nasr” after liberation operations in 2017 — is considered the most mysterious region in Iraq. After its residents were displaced during the war against ISIS in 2014 by Kataib Hezbollah, the area became a closed military zone containing drone manufacturing facilities and missile depots from which attacks are now launched from Iraq toward diplomatic missions and Gulf countries.
An Iraqi source who previously served as a security adviser to one of the country’s former prime ministers said that “the bombardment operations currently taking place are being run by Iranian advisers.”
He added to Alhurra: “Iraqi factions are capable of managing these operations, but the Revolutionary Guard wants to guarantee the success of the strikes, which is why advisers are present in Iraq.”
On March 1, a headquarters belonging to Asaib Ahl al-Haq in Diyala province was targeted. However, no detailed information has been released regarding the names of the casualties.
Among those killed was an Iranian adviser, according to a local official in Diyala province who spoke to Alhurra on March 7.
Sources indicate that the current operations are being managed by a complex network of officers and specialists who have been distributed across specialized units, each overseeing a specific operational file to ensure sustained military pressure while maintaining political and legal cover.
The factions overseen by the Revolutionary Guard exploit their presence within the Popular Mobilization Forces as a legal framework. Through the PMF structure, these groups obtained a fully independent legal status that allows them to manage their own budgets and purchase weapons and military equipment directly. This legal arrangement has provided Iranian officers with cover as “technical advisers” within an official security structure whose salaries are paid from the Iraqi state budget.
A Shift in Operational Strategy
Military operations in 2026 have shifted toward a model of “decentralized command” under the supervision of an Iranian leader whose name Alhurra’s sources were unable to verify, but who reportedly assists Quds Force commander General Esmail Qaani.
According to political sources who spoke to Alhurra, this Iranian general — described as possessing “a strong intelligence mindset” — has granted Iraqi faction leaders broader authority to make strike decisions, resulting in the use of unprecedented techniques in the Iraqi theater.
Information indicates that the technology used in the current bombardment operations is entirely Iranian-made, and that assembly lines for these systems have been transferred inside Iraq.
This situation confirms that Iranian officers are not merely planning operations but are also present in the field managing “direct attack cells” targeting Western nationals and vital interests, benefiting from the protection provided by factions that control key state institutions.
Available indicators suggest that the next phase will witness even greater “decentralization” in operations. Front groups are expected to continue claiming more precise and deeper strikes using both advanced and relatively simple technologies, according to statements from Iraqi militia leaders aligned with Iran.
While the Iraqi government continues to publicly adhere to a policy of neutrality regarding the war against Iran, the realities on the ground suggest that it lacks the capacity to determine decisions of war and peace.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
