Even now, Iraqis continue to share a video on social media showing a campaign event from election season last October. At the event, organized by a leading Shiite faction, a poet says in Iraqi dialect: “Do you want me to give you power and step aside… so that you can go normalize relations with America?”
Most of those who mockingly circulated the clip – including the well-known Iraqi satirical political TV program Al-Basheer Show – understood the statement as a message from the militias that currently hold power. Its addressee: The many groups in Iraqi society that want to see them disarm in response to American pressure.
Yet there is another subtext to the video that gives it additional resonance. The poet – speaking for the faction known as the Master of Martyrs Battalion – is also addressing the group’s rivals within the world of Shiite militias. The comment came against the backdrop of conflicting positions that surfaced during the 12-Day War between Iran and Israel last summer. The Master of Martyrs was one of the few Iraqi Shiite militias that took part in the fighting – or so it claims, at least – by firing several rockets at U.S. bases in Iraq as well as at Israeli targets. The video clip could be seen as a rebuke to other armed groups that stood by and watched.
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In last year’s election, the leader of the Master of Martyrs faction, Abu Alaa al-Walai (real name: Hashim Finyan Rahim al-Sarraji), succeeded in securing four parliamentary seats for his group in the current parliament. He ordered them to join the State of Law bloc of ex-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Al-Walai is part of the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework and meets with them regularly; he is clearly a member of the ruling system. In addition, Kataib Hezbollah, a Shiite militia that has been taking an especially active part in the current war, also managed to get six of its members elected to parliament.
A third group, the Harakat al-Nujaba, led by Sheikh Akram al-Kaabi, operates outside the political process and has no representatives or officials in the state. These three militias are the principal armed factions leading “resistance” operations in support of Iran in its current confrontation with the United States and Israel.
Beyond their political presence in parliament, the three factions control key nodes within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). They enjoy broad authority and freedom of movement, operating across both official and unofficial spheres. The lines between resistance activity under the umbrella of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and operations conducted under the umbrella of Iraqi state institutions are blurry.
For many years, until the widespread protests that occurred in October 2019, Shiite militias made an effort to avoid compromising the Iraqi government. These militias – the three mentioned as well as certain others – did their best to stay in the background, determined to avoid embarrassing those in power. This created a widespread belief, even among journalists and intellectuals, that there was a balance in Iraq between the power of militias and that of solid national institutions such as the Counter-Terrorism Service and Iraqi intelligence, and that the government and civil society operated within the narrow space between these two forces.
The problem is that this state is one that they have designed to benefit themselves; it is not based on a system of laws that they, too, must follow.
But this image collapsed quickly after the brutal suppression of the protests – a crackdown unprecedented in Iraq. While deaths and injuries had occurred in earlier protest waves between 2011 and 2018, usually due to clashes with security forces or operational mistakes, the numbers were limited. In the October 2019 protests, however, the militias did not hesitate to shoot to kill, methods reminiscent of those used by the Basij and the Revolutionary Guard to suppress protests in Iran.
Gradually, it became clear to everyone that militias held the upper hand. On one occasion they event surrounded the headquarters of the Counter-Terrorism Service and freed followers arrested for terrorist acts. Similar incidents have recurred in recent years – so often that they are no longer shocking.
Yet even though official security forces are stronger, more numerous, and better equipped, the Iraqi government refuses to challenge these rogue militias. The reason lies in an ideological assumption that has paralyzed the state. Shiite leaders are keen to avoid anything that might fragment the Shiite political bloc. Allowing any sort of disunity, they believe, might undermine “the Shiite right to rule.” Iraq’s Shiite elite also tends to view the Iranians as Iraq’s only sectarian ally in the region (since Iran is the only neighboring Shiite state), and is willing to allow Tehran to support its local proxies rather than alienate it.
The Shiite power structure has, over the years, constrained the Kurds and subdued the Sunni militias. It overlooks the destruction that the militias cause to the state as a whole. The dominant Shiite factions have no goal beyond remaining in power and no plans to build the state or develop its economy. They show little concern for strengthening state institutions, upholding the constitution, or protecting public rights and freedoms. So they stand by passively as the militias continue their acts of subversion. When such violations become matters of public opinion, the government rushes to issue statements promising investigations – but the public treats these plans with ridicule, since such committees have never convened nor issued any findings.
For the ruling Shiite parties, this situation is tenable as long as the two most influential forces in Iraq – the United States and Iran – are jointly sponsoring the system. Problems can always be swept under the rug, or, if they grow too large, deferred to the next parliament and government. If protestors take to the streets again, they can expect brutal suppression according to the Iranian model. Any angry young man seeking a job or services for his neighborhood will have to remember that dozens of youths who participated in the October 2019 protests were killed by tear gas canisters and live bullets, while others remain in exile, unable to return home due to arrest warrants and fabricated charges orchestrated by militias.
The cost of protesting a corrupt system has become prohibitive. Many political figures have discovered cheaper and less embarrassing tools, such as issuing judicial warrants against those who comment on Facebook posts or criticize political figures. Even the current outgoing prime minister, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, has used this method against journalists who appeared on satellite channels and criticized him.
The regime’s grip is strong, intimidation is effective, and mass government hiring – far beyond institutional capacity – has absorbed another segment of the public and silenced it. Reports indicate that Sudani’s government has granted more than one million jobs, distributed among political parties and factions to allocate to their supporters.
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Despite reporting on the deterioration of government finances in recent months, the average citizen is unconcerned with these figures or the serious risks ahead. Things appear comfortable for everyone except a few critics in the media and on social platforms. Even these critics are accused of opposing the system because they did not receive “a piece of the cake,” or simply branded as agents of America, Zionism, or the Gulf.
The current war has abruptly ended this complacency. The two sponsors of the system are now at odds. Their conflict allows only for a victor and a loser, with no return to comfortable times. The U.S. Deputy Secretary of State has stated clearly: “We demand Baghdad immediately begin procedures to dismantle armed groups loyal to Tehran.”
But wait – does he mean only the three factions mentioned above? Or all armed groups that supported Iran in the recent war, including those that remained silent or neutral?
In reality, aside from factions linked to the holy shrines – which take their orders from Iraq’s own Shiite religious authority – and Saraya al-Salam, the armed wing of Muqtada al-Sadr, all other armed groups are loyal to Iran. The deputy secretary’s ambition is broad. Lethargy and inertia fill the entire Shiite political body, and now he is asking it to sprint in an Olympic race.
Kataib Hezbollah kidnapped American journalist Elizabeth Tsurkov and later released her as a “favor” to the prime minister – not as an act of compliance with the law. The prime minister was expected to say “thank you,” and not to arrest the kidnappers. This illustrates the limits of what the government and the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework can do: These militias are part of the government itself. How can you ask a government to dismantle itself, or to sever the arm that protects it?
The survival of some form of the Iranian system – and its ability to influence Iraq – remains a key factor in shaping Iraq’s political trajectory. It would mean that the next prime minister will wear two masks: one for the Iranian political actor and another for the American one.
This current system is not the one formed after 2003; rather, it emerged from the May 2018 elections, when factions that had participated in the war against ISIS converted their victory into electoral seats. They then seized control of the government in partnership with Muqtada al-Sadr, who was under intense pressure from the late Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force. At the time – and many still repeat this – the militias expressed the view that the state had collapsed in June 2014, under attack from ISIS, and that they restored it. Therefore, they claim, they are the sons of the state, not outsiders. The problem is that this state is one that they have designed to benefit themselves; it is not based on a system of laws that they, too, must follow.
In their narrative of war and victory, they completely ignore the American role and the international coalition against ISIS, as well as the efforts of official armed forces, the Counter-Terrorism Service, the federal police, and more than 350,000 coalition air sorties.
This power structure suffered a major shock with the 2019 protests. Then came the surprise announcement by Muqtada al-Sadr after the 2021 elections that he would abandon sectarian alliances and build a tripartite alliance between his parliamentary bloc, the Sunni bloc of former Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Masoud Barzani. Even so, the Iran-dominated Shiite power system managed to overcome this challenge. Sadr withdrew from politics and his MPs resigned. The old Shiite elite succeeded in forming Sudani’s government, and, as noted, everything became calm again, with no serious threats to what they call “Shiite governance.” Even the 12-Day War between Iran and Israel ended quickly, and its effects were absorbed.
So now, like a thunderbolt, come the demands of the Trump administration – which seem to aim at nothing less than a return to the period before 2014, when then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki legalized militias, opened state weapons depots to them, and placed them under state patronage.
This is a massive leap that the sluggish body of power cannot make now, especially as Shiite parties are not yet certain that the Iranian regime has fully collapsed. They are waiting for the outcome of negotiations or a renewal of war. The survival of some form of the Iranian system – and its ability to influence Iraq – remains a key factor in shaping Iraq’s political trajectory. It would mean that the next prime minister will wear two masks: one for the Iranian political actor and another for the American one.
Given the gravity of this factor, political parties in the new Iraqi parliament have trampled on constitutional deadlines, surpassing three months without selecting a president or prime minister.
Even with the selection of Ali al-Zaidi – an obscure figure with no political history – for the premiership, indicators do not suggest that he will actually move forward. His nomination may merely be a trial balloon to gauge American approval.
The regional and international sponsors are in conflict. So will they reconcile and share influence in Iraq? Or will America decide to dominate the Iraqi scene on its own – the nightmare that some Iraqis have feared for so long?
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks.
Ahmed Saadawi
Ahmed Saadawi is an Iraqi novelist, poet, screenwriter, and documentary filmmaker.
