A few weeks after the ceasefire, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) returned to showcasing missiles in cities and speaking openly about restoring launch platforms and replenishing its drone stockpile.
While attention is turning to what remains of the nuclear program after U.S. and Israeli strikes, Tehran is trying to assert that its missile arm—along with its drone network—remains a central part of its deterrence equation.
But behind this display, the scale of what Iran can restore within a month of ceasefire remains uncertain. While Iranian and opposition sources say the IRGC is working to rebuild its stockpile and upgrade some capabilities, experts believe what is happening may be closer to reopening tunnels and damaged storage sites rather than large-scale production of new missiles.
On April 19, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported that the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, Brigadier General Seyed Majid Mousavi, posted a video on his account on the platform X, which he said shows comprehensive maintenance work and reconstruction of missile and drone stockpiles.
Alongside the video, Mousavi wrote: “During the ceasefire period, our speed in updating and filling missile and drone launch platforms was greater than it was even before the war.”
Through these messages, Iran is trying to suggest that U.S. and Israeli strikes, despite their intensity, did not paralyze the IRGC’s ability to reorganize its missile structure. However, it does not reveal the size of the remaining stockpile, the actual production rate, or whether Tehran is manufacturing new missiles or reactivating what survived the war.
Israeli researcher on space and strategic missile affairs, Tal Inbar, believes the situation is more complex than Iranian statements suggest.
Inbar told Alhurra that there is, so far, no publicly available information confirming Iran’s ability to produce new missiles at a large pace at present.
According to Inbar, what can be observed after the ceasefire relates more to engineering work at storage sites and tunnels rather than necessarily the production of new missiles. He adds: “Iran used the ceasefire to remove large amounts of debris that had blocked the entrances of tunnels where missiles and related equipment are stored—what the Iranians call ‘missile cities.’ This engineering work is being carried out using bulldozers.”
Inbar says that Iran’s “missile cities” were subjected to intense bombardment during the war but were not necessarily penetrated internally. In his assessment, U.S. and Israeli strikes caused landslides around these facilities, hindering the movement of missiles and equipment into and out of the tunnels.
In this sense, a significant part of what Iran is doing during the ceasefire may be related to reopening entrances, repairing storage sites, and redistributing equipment, rather than serving as conclusive evidence of a resumption of large-scale missile production.
In this context, leaders in the Iranian opposition told Alhurra that the IRGC may have retained a significant portion of its missile and drone production capabilities, despite strikes targeting military sites during the war that erupted in late March.
These sources link this to what they say is the distribution of some manufacturing and storage facilities within fortified “missile cities” in rugged mountainous areas—information that is difficult to verify independently but aligns with a known Iranian pattern of concealing parts of its military infrastructure underground.
Batin Moloudi, a military leader in the opposition Iranian Kurdistan Freedom Party, believes the ceasefire gave Tehran an opportunity to reorganize part of its military capabilities, repair some damaged depots, and work on introducing new or upgraded missiles and drones into service.
Moloudi told Alhurra that Iran has focused in recent weeks on developing its missile program, particularly by upgrading existing missiles and improving their accuracy, maneuverability, and targeting capability.
He added that Tehran is also working on developing solid-fuel technologies, which, in his assessment, would reduce the time needed to prepare and launch missiles and make them more difficult for defense systems to detect in advance.
According to Moloudi’s information, which he says is based on his party’s networks inside Iran, Tehran has over the past two weeks transferred suicide drones and disassembled missiles—transported as separate parts to be assembled later—to its allies and affiliated groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.
These claims cannot be independently verified, but they fall within a broader question of whether Iran is using the ceasefire only to repair its sites, or also to rearm itself and its allies in the region.
Iran’s missile program dates back to the 1980s, when Tehran began building a domestic missile capability during its war with Iraq. In the 1990s, Iran expanded this program by benefiting from expertise and technology from North Korea, Russia, and China.
Over time, Iran developed a diverse arsenal that includes short-, medium-, and long-range missiles, alongside significant expansion in drone production, especially suicide drones.
However, possessing a large missile base does not necessarily mean the ability to quickly compensate for wartime losses.
Strategic expert Alaa Al-Nashou says that Iranian leaders’ promotion of producing and developing new missiles and drones during the ceasefire involves clear exaggeration.
Al-Nashou told Alhurra that U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran limit its ability to import advanced military components or equipment.
He added: “Even if Iran manages to circumvent sanctions and obtain some materials, they would be in limited quantities that do not meet the necessary development needs, nor are they sufficient to shift the military balance of power in Tehran’s favor, given the deterrence levels possessed by the United States.”
Al-Nashou stresses that producing or developing ballistic missiles is not a process that can be accomplished in a few weeks, as it requires advanced industrial infrastructure, complex technical expertise, and highly sensitive materials, especially solid fuel.
He explains that this type of fuel is subject to precise calculations related to its chemical, physical, and technical properties, in addition to the need for repeated testing that begins with the launch process and includes measuring the accuracy of navigation and guidance systems.
Over the past years, Iran has presented its missile program as a defensive one and has adhered to a declared ceiling for the ranges of some of its missiles. But the recent war with Israel and the United States has brought this issue back to the forefront—not merely as a technical matter, but as part of Iran’s deterrence equation.
Unlike the nuclear program, which is the subject of ongoing diplomatic debate, Tehran refuses to include its missile program in any negotiations with Washington.
On April 20, a senior Iranian source told Reuters that Iran’s “defensive capabilities,” including its missile program, are not up for negotiation with the United States—another indication that Iranian authorities consider this issue a red line.
Since the ceasefire was announced, the IRGC has continued showcasing its ballistic missiles in nighttime gatherings organized by the Basij inside Iranian cities under the banner of “support for the Islamic Revolution.” Official Iranian websites, especially those close to the IRGC, have published images and videos of these displays in Tehran, Bushehr, and other cities.
These displays do not provide evidence of the size of the remaining arsenal or Iran’s ability to compensate for its wartime losses. But they reveal that Tehran wants to send a clear message: even if upcoming negotiations or pressure focus on the nuclear file, missiles and drones will remain at the heart of its defensive and regional calculations.
The question, after a month of ceasefire, is no longer whether Iran is interested in rebuilding this capability, but to what extent it can do so quickly under the pressure of sanctions, monitoring, and strikes that have affected part of its military infrastructure.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
