As tensions in the Strait of Hormuz continue to disrupt global energy markets, China is reassessing one of the most sensitive equations in its energy strategy: its heavy reliance on discounted Iranian crude versus the need for more secure and stable supplies — even at a higher cost.
Since the outbreak of the confrontation involving the United States, Israel and Iran in late February, the issue for Beijing has evolved beyond the price of a barrel of oil. Chinese policymakers are increasingly focused on supply security and the country’s ability to shield its economy from sudden shocks in global energy markets. In that context, American crude — including shale oil and supplies from Alaska — has emerged as an alternative carrying not only economic, but also geopolitical implications.
For years, Iranian oil formed a central pillar of China’s energy strategy. Beijing benefited from steep discounts offered by Tehran under the weight of Western sanctions, with experts estimating price cuts of between $8 and $10 per barrel.
Amir Imam, editor in chief of Oasis Media Collective Group, told Alhurra that Iran had been exporting roughly 1.4 million barrels per day to China through 2025, accounting for nearly 13 percent of Chinese oil imports. According to his estimates, the Chinese market absorbed about 87 percent of Iran’s oil exports, making Beijing the primary lifeline of Iran’s economy.
But the Hormuz crisis has altered those calculations. What once appeared to be a profitable and inexpensive source of energy has, amid mounting regional tensions, become a strategic liability. As risks to maritime traffic increase and insurance and shipping costs climb, Iranian crude becomes less attractive — even if it remains cheaper than competing supplies.
Against that backdrop, early signs have emerged that energy is once again becoming central to relations between Washington and Beijing. Following a summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping on May 14, four American liquefied natural gas tankers set sail for China in a move analysts viewed as carrying significance beyond a simple commercial transaction.
New Lines Institute Senior Director Kamran Bokhari said geopolitical pressures had pushed China beyond narrow commercial calculations into a broader geoeconomic dialogue with the Trump administration. Purchasing American energy, he argued, gives Beijing leverage in negotiations over larger issues ranging from tariffs and technology to investment restrictions.
That does not necessarily make American oil the cheapest option for China. But it offers three advantages Iranian crude cannot provide during a crisis: diversification away from the Strait of Hormuz, an improved negotiating position with Washington, and a signal to Tehran that its largest customer is capable of pursuing long-term alternatives if Iranian supplies become a security burden.
For Washington, China’s shift represents a dual strategic gain. On one hand, it opens a wider door for American energy exports to the world’s largest oil importer. On the other, it increases economic pressure on Iran by weakening its near-exclusive dependence on the Chinese market.
American Foreign Policy Council Senior Fellow James Robbins said the United States and China appeared to share an unspoken interest in one key objective: keeping the Strait of Hormuz open to global trade and preventing any regional actor from using it as a lasting tool of coercion.
The implications of the shift extend beyond Iran. Gulf states are watching developments with growing concern, given that China imports a substantial share of its oil from the region. If Chinese demand gradually shifts toward American crude or other sources less dependent on Hormuz, it could reshape market shares across Asia’s energy landscape.
With Brent crude prices climbing above $107 a barrel, Gulf producers face a difficult paradox: higher prices generate larger revenues, but they are driven by instability that threatens the region’s ability to export oil smoothly through the strait.
The Gulf states also differ in their ability to absorb the shock. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates possess relatively stronger alternatives, including the Saudi East-West pipeline to the Red Sea and the UAE’s Fujairah pipeline, which partially bypasses the Strait of Hormuz. Kuwait and Qatar face greater logistical constraints, while Iraq remains especially vulnerable because of its limited export alternatives and its complex geographic and political proximity to Iran.
Imam said Gulf concerns are not limited to a temporary disruption in the strait but also center on whether the crisis could leave a lasting imprint on global oil trade. Policymakers in Gulf capitals are increasingly asking whether China will return to its previous purchasing patterns once the crisis subsides, or whether Beijing will use the current moment to fundamentally redraw its energy map.
Ultimately, China does not appear to be buying American oil simply to offset an immediate supply shortfall. Rather, it is using energy as a balancing instrument among three overlapping priorities: reducing risks tied to Hormuz, preserving its complicated relationship with Iran, and opening a sensitive economic channel with Washington.
The central question, therefore, is not how many American tankers are heading toward China, but whether those shipments represent a temporary response to the Strait of Hormuz crisis — or the beginning of a deeper transformation in Beijing’s oil strategy, away from cheap Iranian crude and toward energy security regardless of cost.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
