A discreet Egyptian military presence near the Ethiopian border has quietly come to an end, exposing the shifting alliances and mounting geopolitical tensions reshaping the Nile Basin as Egypt struggles to safeguard its strategic interests in the face of Ethiopia’s rising influence and the continuing fallout from Sudan’s war.
Days after media reports surfaced claiming that South Sudan had requested the closure of an “Egyptian military base” in Pajok near the Ethiopian frontier, an Egyptian government official told Alhurra that the force stationed there consisted of roughly 260 personnel tasked with technical support, military training, advanced surveillance operations and logistical coordination.
Pajok, located in South Sudan’s Upper Nile State, derives its strategic significance from its proximity to the shared border triangle linking South Sudan, Sudan and Ethiopia, as well as its closeness to Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region, home to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
Regional analysts view the closure as part of a broader political realignment unfolding across the Nile Basin.
Fawzi Ashmawy, a former Egyptian assistant foreign minister, said the facility was not a military base in the conventional sense, but rather an “advanced forward position” near the Ethiopian border that gave Egypt operational flexibility and access to one of the most sensitive areas tied to its national security and historical share of Nile waters.
The Egyptian official, who requested anonymity, said Juba’s decision to shut down what he described as the “Egyptian point” had been building for some time and was driven by four overlapping strategic and domestic shifts.
The first, he said, was South Sudan’s gradual alignment with upstream Nile states. Juba’s signing of the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) at the end of 2024 marked a break with Egypt’s longstanding position defending downstream water rights and signaled South Sudan’s open alignment with countries seeking to redistribute Nile water shares.
The second factor involved South Sudan’s search for alternative oil export routes. The war in Sudan and damage to traditional export infrastructure pushed Juba closer to Addis Ababa in pursuit of new options. The Gambella–Pajok–Floj corridor, the official said, has increasingly become a strategic artery supporting South Sudan’s oil fields through Ethiopian territory.
A third consideration was growing concern that South Sudan could become entangled in escalating tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia. According to the official, Juba sought to eliminate any pretext that could turn its territory into an arena for proxy confrontations or drone warfare between rival regional actors.
The final factor was domestic politics. South Sudanese President Salva Kiir, the official said, used the decision to project sovereign authority before both rivals and allies, including Taban Deng and Riek Machar. At the same time, worsening economic conditions caused by declining oil revenues made the idea of “expelling foreign forces” a politically advantageous message for the ruling establishment.
Ashmawy argued that Egypt’s loss of the base, despite its direct operational importance in monitoring water levels and activity at the GERD, does not paralyze Cairo’s broader regional strategy for 2026.
“Egypt’s national security vision in Sudan, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea is built on an integrated framework,” he said, adding that Cairo continues to insist on international legal mechanisms aimed at excluding Ethiopia from any future Red Sea security arrangements.
He also pointed to Egypt’s efforts to deepen its strategic alliance with Eritrea, preserve Somalia’s territorial unity, support the Sudanese army while rejecting engagement with armed militias, and strengthen coordination with Sudan as the two downstream Nile states seek to pressure Addis Ababa into complying with the 2015 trilateral agreement governing the GERD dispute.
The closure of the Pajok position places Egypt’s regional monitoring strategy before a new reality. But the contest does not end at Sudan’s southern frontier. Intensifying diplomatic and security activity by both Cairo and Addis Ababa in Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Uganda suggests the region may be entering a new phase of shifting alliances and strategic repositioning.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
