Perched atop the walls of Beaufort Castle, the raising of the Israeli flag was more than a declaration of control over a strategic position. The fortress has long been associated with the conflict with Israel and with Hezbollah’s emergence as a military force in the 1980s.
As Israeli military operations have expanded and border towns that for years formed a core part of Hezbollah’s defensive network in southern Lebanon have fallen, a broader question has emerged beyond immediate battlefield calculations: Is the group experiencing another temporary setback, as it has in the past, or is the current war undermining, for the first time, the foundations on which its power was built?
The debate has been fueled by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s remarks on May 29, when he declared that “Hezbollah is collapsing.”
Hezbollah, however, insists it retains its military capabilities, pointing to its continued attacks on Israel through rocket launches and drone operations.
Analysts say Hezbollah’s strength cannot be measured solely by the number of rockets it fires or the positions it controls. Rather, it rests on an intertwined network of political, military, organizational, financial and social pillars.
To understand the challenges facing Hezbollah today, it is necessary to revisit the 2006 Lebanon war. Despite suffering extensive military losses and widespread destruction in its areas of influence, the group rebuilt its capabilities in the years that followed because its core foundations remained intact. Its leadership structure survived, supply lines through Syria remained open, Iranian support continued uninterrupted, and its social base remained cohesive enough to absorb the costs of war.
The current conflict, by contrast, is placing simultaneous pressure on every one of those pillars, making recovery far more difficult than at any previous stage.
Leadership and Arsenal Under Fire
The killing of Hezbollah’s longtime Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah marked one of the most severe blows in the organization’s history. Israeli strikes have also targeted numerous first- and second-tier commanders, as well as experienced field operatives.
Mustafa Amin, an expert on militant organizations, told Alhurra that ideological groups possess mechanisms to replace fallen leaders. However, while such losses affect operational effectiveness, they are “not by themselves sufficient to cause an organization’s collapse.”
Beyond eliminating senior figures, Israel has carried out sustained attacks on Hezbollah weapons depots, military facilities and tunnel networks since October 2023.
At the same time, Lebanon’s domestic political landscape has shifted. The government has reaffirmed that weapons should remain exclusively under state control and has deemed any independent military activity by Hezbollah illegal.
The issue of Hezbollah’s arsenal has also become central to negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, increasing the political and security pressures confronting the group.
According to estimates by the Alma Research and Education Center, Hezbollah possessed roughly 25,000 rockets shortly before its March 2 attack on Israel, the majority of them short- and medium-range, along with hundreds of advanced systems including precision-guided missiles, cruise missiles and air-defense platforms.
The group was also believed to possess around 1,000 loitering attack drones, although the full extent of its unmanned capabilities remains unclear. During the current war, drones have increasingly become one of Hezbollah’s principal operational tools.
Retired Brig. Gen. Yarub Sakhr, a researcher specializing in national security and strategic affairs, said Israeli strikes during the 2023 and 2024 conflicts reduced Hezbollah’s capabilities by between 70% and 80%, adding that the current war is “eroding what remains of its strength.”
Losing Territory and Deterrence
Hezbollah’s power has long been tied to its control and influence across broad areas of southern Lebanon.
The current conflict, however, has seen it lose significant territory amid Israel’s continued advance. From Khiam to Bint Jbeil and dozens of towns south of the Litani River, Israeli forces have established extensive operational control and created what they describe as a security zone known as the “Yellow Line,” before expanding northward.
Sakhr said Israeli forces have extended their presence on both sides of the Litani River, reaching the outskirts of Nabatieh and areas including Yahmar, Beaufort, Debbine, Eastern and Western Zawtar and Qaqqaiyat al-Jisr.
Israeli operations have also moved toward Kfarhouneh and Jabal al-Rayhan in an effort to sever logistical links between southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa Valley—corridors that long served as key supply routes for Hezbollah.
For years, Hezbollah also relied on a deterrence equation that enabled it to establish rules of engagement limiting Israeli military operations inside Lebanon.
Political analyst Ahmad Ayash told Alhurra that this deterrence framework has been significantly eroded during the current conflict. Hezbollah, he said, has shifted “from imposing the rules of engagement to focusing on containing losses and limiting their consequences,” reflecting a diminished ability to shape the course of the confrontation.
Sakhr likewise argued that Hezbollah’s drone attacks have produced only limited tactical effects, while Israel has pursued a broader strategy centered on territorial gains and expanding its operational footprint.
The Social Base Under Pressure
Behind Hezbollah’s military power stands a broad social constituency that has provided popular support and manpower. That base is now facing an unprecedented test.
The consequences of the war extend well beyond military losses, affecting hundreds of thousands of civilians who have endured repeated displacement, destroyed homes, lost livelihoods and growing uncertainty about the future.
As a result, criticism has surfaced on social media and among displaced residents, with some blaming Hezbollah for dragging Lebanon into conflicts unrelated to its national interests.
Official figures indicate that the number of displaced people has surpassed one million.
Shadi Abdullah, secretary-general of Lebanon’s National Council for Scientific Research, said 230,436 housing units were destroyed or damaged, either partially or completely, during the 2023–2024 war and subsequent hostilities. An additional 61,056 units sustained damage between March 2 and May 8, 2026.
Those figures do not include destruction caused by military operations carried out after that period, suggesting the final toll will continue to rise as fighting persists.
Nevertheless, Amin argues that Hezbollah’s social base remains one of its principal sources of strength, viewing the organization as a political, social and security authority.
He said weakening that role would require the Lebanese state to fill the resulting vacuum by expanding public services and strengthening state institutions in those regions—a process that would require considerable time and greater political stability than Lebanon currently enjoys.
The Challenge of Rebuilding
Syria represents one of the clearest differences between the 2006 war and the current conflict.
For years, Syrian territory served as the principal corridor linking Iran to Hezbollah and facilitating the transfer of weapons and financial support. The fall of the Assad government has significantly reduced Hezbollah’s ability to rebuild at the pace it did after previous wars.
Hezbollah’s diverse financial resources historically enabled it to sustain its military operations, but the current conflict has opened a new front of financial attrition.
In addition to tighter U.S. sanctions that have constrained its funding channels, Israeli strikes have targeted institutions linked to Hezbollah’s economic infrastructure, including branches of the Al-Qard Al-Hassan financial association and other affiliated facilities. Meanwhile, the cost of compensation and assistance for tens of thousands of affected families has risen sharply.
These pressures come as Iran—Hezbollah’s principal backer—faces mounting economic strain following its recent military confrontation with Israel and the United States, alongside intensified international sanctions.
Is Hezbollah Collapsing?
Despite the breadth of the blows inflicted on Hezbollah’s core pillars, experts disagree over whether the organization is collapsing.
Retired Brig. Gen. Sakhr argued that little remains of Hezbollah’s military, security or financial infrastructure, saying “only its political wing remains.”
He believes the ongoing military campaign represents the final phase of the confrontation, with negotiations now becoming the primary arena shaping the next stage and Hezbollah no longer capable of significantly influencing events.
Amin, however, contends that the indicators typically associated with the collapse of armed groups—including the inability to preserve organizational cohesion, manage operations, secure financing and supply lines, direct personnel or formulate strategic decisions—do not currently apply to Hezbollah.
He argues that Israeli air and missile strikes alone are insufficient to eliminate the organization. Achieving that objective, he says, would require a large-scale ground invasion and full control over Lebanese territory, a scenario he considers unlikely under current regional and international conditions.
Security analyst Badie Qarhani shares that assessment, saying Hezbollah still retains political, media, organizational and military structures that enable it to survive and adapt.
Although the group has suffered severe setbacks, he argues, its situation differs from organizations such as al-Qaeda or ISIS after they lost most of their leadership and territorial control in Syria and Iraq, even as remnants continued to pose security threats.
Ayash likewise believes it is premature to speak of Hezbollah’s collapse, describing the current phase instead as “a struggle for survival.”
He argues that while the group can be weakened militarily, resolving the issue of its weapons ultimately requires a political process led by the Lebanese state and supported internationally—one that would allow Hezbollah to transfer its arsenal to state authorities without appearing defeated, an outcome military operations alone cannot achieve.
Ultimately, the central question may not be whether Hezbollah survives this war, but what kind of Hezbollah emerges from it.
The battle it is fighting today is not merely about preserving its existence. It is about preserving the foundations that made it a regional power—and that may prove to be the most difficult challenge the organization has faced since its founding.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
