Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council sparked controversy on Friday after saying that defendants in corruption cases could benefit from reduced legal measures or lighter sentences if they voluntarily return misappropriated public funds, within the limits allowed by the constitution and the law.
The statement came days after authorities concluded the first phase of an anti-corruption operation dubbed “Dawn Assault,” which officials said resulted in the arrest of 47 senior officials. Those detained included lawmakers whose parliamentary immunity is being lifted over allegations of illicit enrichment and acts that harmed the national economy.
Images released following the arrests showed stacks of Iraqi dinars and U.S. dollars, gold bars and luxury watches that authorities said were recovered from hiding places behind walls, beneath swimming pools and inside drainage systems.
The judiciary’s statement shifted the focus from the scale of the seized assets to the legal fate of those accused, prompting questions over whether returning public funds could pave the way for amnesty or reduced penalties.
The Supreme Judicial Council said its approach to financial and administrative corruption cases rests on two objectives: holding offenders accountable and recovering state funds. It added that legal procedures or penalties could be reduced for defendants who voluntarily return public money, where permitted under Iraqi law.
The council cited the tax trust funds case, widely known in Iraq as the “Heist of the Century,” in which businessmen and officials were accused of embezzling roughly $2.5 billion in tax revenues.
It said the case’s main defendant, Noor Zuhair, had been released on bail after agreeing to return the funds. He repaid 365 billion Iraqi dinars out of approximately 1.618 trillion dinars owed by his companies before leaving Iraq and halting further payments. The judiciary subsequently sentenced him in absentia to 10 years in prison and launched extradition proceedings.
The council added that Zuhair’s request to be covered by Iraq’s amended Amnesty Law remains pending, awaiting approval from the Finance Ministry on a mechanism to settle the remaining balance.
Twelve employees of the General Commission for Taxes have been sentenced to prison in the case, while former officials received prison terms in absentia and courts ordered the confiscation of assets and real estate belonging to several convicted individuals. The council also said an investigation involving a former prime minister—whose identity it did not disclose—was closed because of insufficient evidence.
It added that other corruption cases, including one involving the North Refineries Company, could be eligible for the same legal mechanism if the offenses were committed before the amended Amnesty Law took effect and the funds were returned. Crimes committed after the law entered into force would not qualify for amnesty, it said.
Iraqi political analyst Yahya al-Kubaisi criticized attempts to place sole responsibility on the Amnesty Law for the possible release of corruption suspects.
“One of the most absurd arguments I hear is that it is the Amnesty Law—not the judiciary—that will free corrupt officials, as if the law were sacred and untouchable,” al-Kubaisi told MBN. “If Ali al-Zaidi and Faiq Zaidan are serious about fighting corruption, why don’t they ask parliament to amend the Amnesty Law so that it no longer applies to corruption cases?”
Repeated Campaigns, Limited Results
The current campaign is far from Iraq’s first attempt to establish an exceptional framework for combating corruption.
Since 2003, successive governments have created new councils and committees whenever public anger over corruption intensified. Most of those initiatives, however, ended without fundamentally strengthening oversight institutions or improving the state’s ability to recover stolen assets.
In 2007, then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki established the Joint Anti-Corruption Council. The period nevertheless saw a rise in so-called “ghost projects” and a deterioration in Iraq’s standing on international corruption rankings.
In 2016, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi sought to reorganize government anti-corruption efforts through the Supreme Council for Combating Corruption as part of a broader reform package that eliminated the positions of vice presidents and dismissed several senior officials. Those reforms, however, met resistance from political parties that controlled key state institutions.
Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi reactivated the council in 2019, pledging to treat corruption as a threat no less serious than ISIS.
A year earlier, however,Hassan al-Yasiri, then head of Iraq’s Integrity Commission, resigned, saying political authorities were shielding suspects and that the judiciary had failed to act on most major corruption cases referred to it.
Despite the mixed record of previous efforts, Iraqi security and political analyst Fadel Abu Ragheef said the current campaign stands apart.
“This time is different,” he told MBN. “There are genuine determination and political will from the government, backed by the Supreme Judicial Council, to fight corruption. The challenges are significant, but serious work is underway, and I believe the campaign will expand.”
The Legacy of “Committee 29”
Iraq’s anti-corruption drive took on a more security-oriented character under former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who in 2020 established the Higher Committee for Investigating Major Corruption Cases and Exceptional Crimes, widely known as Committee 29, headed by Lt. Gen. Ahmed Abu Ragheef.
The committee arrested several businessmen and officials, including Jamal al-Karbouli and Bahaa Abdul Hussein, and said it had recovered billions of dinars for Iraq’s pension fund.
In March 2022, however, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court dissolved the committee, ruling that its creation violated the constitutional separation of powers and encroached on the authority of the Integrity Commission and the judiciary.
A subsequent investigation by The Washington Post alleged that members of the committee had used torture and sexual violence to extract confessions from detainees.
After Mohammed Shia al-Sudani became prime minister in late 2022, his government established the Higher Anti-Corruption Authority, supported by a team led by Abu Ali al-Basri, the former head of the Falcons Intelligence Cell, who later became director of Iraq’s National Security Service.
The campaign, however, lost momentum in late 2024 after authorities uncovered an alleged espionage and wiretapping network operating inside the prime minister’s office. Several individuals were later sentenced to prison in connection with the case.
A New Council, Familiar Questions
On May 30, 2026, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi established the Supreme Sovereign Council for Integrity, Oversight and Recovery of Public Funds, bringing together the heads of several oversight and judicial institutions.
The council received political and parliamentary backing, including support from Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, but also drew legal criticism over combining the prime minister with bodies responsible for overseeing the executive branch.
Critics argue that having the prime minister chair a council that includes the Integrity Commission and the Federal Board of Supreme Audit could undermine the independence of those institutions, which Article 102 of Iraq’s constitution designates as independent bodies.
Iraq’s oversight system is divided among several institutions. The Federal Integrity Commission investigates corruption cases and monitors officials’ financial disclosures, while the Federal Board of Supreme Audit reviews government accounts and evaluates institutional performance but lacks arrest or enforcement powers.
Government ministries also once included inspectors general, established in 2004 to provide internal oversight. Those offices were widely criticized because they were administratively and financially subordinate to the ministers they were meant to supervise.
Parliament voted to abolish the inspectors general offices in 2019 under Law No. 24, a decision later upheld by the Federal Supreme Court, which ruled that establishing or abolishing such offices falls within parliament’s legislative authority.
A Test for the Current Campaign
Supporters of the new campaign argue that coordination among the government, the Supreme Judicial Council and the Integrity Commission, combined with investigations targeting senior officials and influential figures, reflects a level of political commitment absent from previous efforts.
They also point to Iraq’s improved ranking in the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, which saw the country leave the bottom 10 for the first time in years.
Skeptics, however, argue that corruption in Iraq has evolved beyond isolated misconduct by individuals into networks of political influence and financing tied to political parties, armed groups and state institutions.
They also note that recovered funds remain limited compared with the scale of public money believed to have been wasted or stolen since 2003, and that previous campaigns were often used to settle political scores or halted when investigations approached well-connected figures.
Writer Ahmed al-Sheikh Majid argued that allowing defendants to receive reduced sentences in exchange for returning stolen funds creates unequal treatment between those who can negotiate with the state and those who cannot.
“When the state accepts replacing punishment with financial restitution, it effectively institutionalizes the privatization of justice, making the law adaptable according to a defendant’s ability to pay,” he told MBN.
“The law is applied with maximum severity against an ordinary citizen who steals out of necessity because he has nothing to bargain with,” he added. “Yet it becomes more flexible toward those who possess enough wealth to negotiate settlements that reduce the consequences of their crimes.”
Ultimately, the significance of the current campaign will depend on whether the arrests lead to prosecutions, final convictions and the recovery of public funds—or whether, like previous campaigns, they end in settlements and procedural measures that leave intact the networks of influence that protected those accused.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
