International and U.S. oil companies operating in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region halted production amid conflict in the region – making them the latest casualties of a conflict in which the Kurds have declared themselves neutral. Since the beginning of the Iran war, the Kurds of northern Iraq had been attacked over 800 times by Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.
The attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan expose the inability of the region to defend itself and resist entanglement in regional conflicts. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), barred from acquiring air defenses without Baghdad’s approval, has no way to fight back.
The competing demands of Iran, which aims to maintain its influence in Iraq, and the United States, which is striving to minimize Tehran’s presence, have left Baghdad and the Iraqi Kurds exposed, with few options for boosting defenses in the country’s Kurdish-dominated north.
Iran’s Kurdish Vendetta
Tehran regards Iraqi Kurdistan, and Kurdish self-rule more broadly, as an existential threat rather than a peripheral concern.
For decades, the Iranian regime has strived to undermine the Kurdistan Region’s political project, driven by fear that a functioning autonomous Kurdish entity next door could inspire or embolden similar ambitions within Iran itself. Iran’s Kurdish minority makes up 10 to 15 percent of the country’s total population. Tehran’s attacks fit a broader pattern Iran has followed since the war began in late February: It has generally targeted Washington’s regional partners, not just active combatants.
The Kurds’ relationship with the U.S. encompasses decades of military, political, and economic cooperation, making them one of America’s most established allies in Iraq and the wider region.
The Kurdish peshmerga — the KRG’s main security forces — have been a key U.S. ally in fighting the Islamic State.
Iranian state media frames its attacks against Iraq Kurdistan as opposing “terrorist” or “separatist” infrastructure there.
Wladimir van Wilgenburg, an Erbil-based reporter and analyst specialized in Kurdish affairs, said that Iran fears Kurdish involvement in the regional war. “There were also a lot of reports in the international media that the U.S. and Israel were planning to support Iranian Kurdish opposition parties to take areas in western Iran and Iranian Kurdistan, but in the end the plan was canceled due to Turkish opposition,” Wilgenburg said. Ankara, which has its own substantial Kurdish minority, shares with Tehran a reluctance to allow any sort of opening for separatist aspirations.
Iranian Kurdish opposition groups have operated from the Kurdistan region of Iraq for decades and voiced support for Iranian protesters rallying against the regime.
MBN previously reported that Iran is likely using the war to eliminate the Iranian Kurdish opposition and weaken the Kurdistan region. Iran has accused the opposition groups of attacking Tehran and supporting Western interests.
A Problem of Air Defense
The central problem for Erbil is its lack of air defense capabilities, which make it vulnerable to persistent Iranian attacks.
The Kurdistan Region has just three air defense systems in place, and none of them belong to the KRG itself. All three are American, and are operated by the U.S.-led international coalition against ISIS to protect U.S. diplomatic staff and coalition military personnel.
Those systems have managed to intercept most Iranian attacks on Erbil so far, but they were never built to shield the wider region. Iran’s targeting has expanded well beyond military sites to airports, residential neighborhoods, markets, and energy infrastructure.
That gap points to an urgent need for the Kurdistan Region to develop its own air defenses. Wilgenburg said that the problem also lies in the KRG’s fraught relationship with Baghdad.
Wilgenburg said the Kurdistan Region has requested air defense systems but, lacking sovereign status, needs Baghdad’s approval to acquire them — approval Baghdad has promised for oil field protection but never delivered. Even when the KRG obtained a system for the Khor Mor gas field, he said, it couldn’t be activated without sign-off from both London and Baghdad.
Baghdad’s Paralysis
Baghdad finds itself in a difficult position regarding the attacks on northern Iraq. Its ability to respond is constrained by its own close ties to Tehran, which sponsors armed militias as well as influential politicians and other elites who control many levers of government.
This includes the Popular Mobilization Forces, a Shia-dominated grouping of militias backed by Iran.
Dr. Yerevan Saeed, nonresident senior fellow with the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council, says that Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi lacks power to confront this influence.
“The PMF groups have become a part of the political system through elections. They control important joints of the government,” Saeed said. “They are the ones that indicate who becomes the prime minister.”
“Therefore, the power of the prime minister has been very limited, and not by law — but by the fact that [he] has been appointed by them.”
Al-Zaidi recently visited Washington, signing a flurry of business deals and vowing to disarm Iranian-backed militias in the country.
Saeed said that this performance may satisfy the Trump administration, but it is unlikely to address the roots of Iraq’s crisis.
“The administration thinks, ‘Okay, the the prime minister, we helped him to get the job, and he’s working with us. He was in Washington. He signed all these memorandums of understanding with U.S. companies. He met President Trump. He made lots of lavish promises, but you know the reality is completely different on the ground,” Saeed explained.
“These militia forces also attacked Saudi Arabia. Previously, they attacked other GCC countries. So, they are really a menace for Iraq as well as for the for the neighboring countries.”
Washington’s Options
The U.S. has spent years pressuring Baghdad to rein in militias and increase state authority. Saeed argues that this pressure is crucial to dealing with attacks against Iraqi Kurdistan.
“The most critical policy option or lever the U.S. has been the dollar lever,” Saeed explained. “If the Iraqi government doesn’t tackle the militias, the U.S. can decide it’s not going to release the oil revenue that comes into a protected Federal Reserve account in New York. That is really number one.”
In April 2026, the Trump administration stopped transferring the funds from the New York account to pressure Baghdad to distance itself from Iran. The policy was reversed early this month.
There is also a contradiction in U.S. policy towards Iraq — namely that the U.S. pushes Baghdad to reform while the Iraqi government continues to provide support to militias.
“As we are speaking, the militia groups that are attacking U.S. interests in the region get their salary without delay from the Iraqi government,” Saeed said. “The more time is given to these militia groups, I think the more difficult it will be for the U.S. and also for any future Iraqi government to tackle them.”
Regarding air defense systems, Saeed argues that the U.S. can pressure Baghdad to approve defense system sales to Iraqi Kurdistan.
“The U.S. in a very good position now, probably more than ever, to pressure Baghdad to allow the U.S. legally to provide air defense systems to the Kurdistan region,” Saeed said.
By September, U.S. forces are slated to withdraw from Iraq entirely, including from the Kurdistan Region, removing what has functioned as a deterrent against more direct Iranian pressure. Saeed said that pullout will likely intensify, not ease, the campaign against Kurdistan.
“If that security deterrence is removed completely, I think the Kurdistan region will come under more pressure militarily, security-wise,” he said, predicting Iran will escalate strikes to extract concessions from Kurdish leadership once the American buffer is gone.
Asked whether the situation might improve, Saeed was blunt: “I don’t think so. It has gone [on] for years, and there is no light at the end of the tunnel.”
