The central question is not whether Hamas may agree to disarm. It is what such a decision would mean.
For Hamas, weapons were never simply instruments of war. They formed the foundation of the movement’s political identity, the source of its legitimacy, and the organizing principle of a project that has defined it for nearly four decades. Any agreement to relinquish them – even gradually or partially – would therefore represent far more than a military concession. It would amount to a political and ideological acknowledgment that the strategy built around “armed resistance” has reached the end of its course.
Political movements do not abandon the instruments that deliver victory. They abandon the ones that history has shown cannot achieve their objectives.
From its inception, Hamas presented itself as the antithesis of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Fatah. It argued that the Oslo Accords were an act of betrayal, that negotiations amounted to surrender, and that only armed struggle could liberate Palestine, defeat Israel and bring an end to the Jewish state. That promise became the movement’s central claim to legitimacy, attracting tens of thousands of young Palestinians who believed the rifle offered the shortest path to Jerusalem.
Perhaps the greatest loss extended beyond Gaza itself. It lay in the collapse of the narrative that had been built around Hamas over many years – one that portrayed the movement as a successful model of resistance, that it was steadily approaching victory over Israel, and that time was on its side.
If Hamas now agrees to disarm, it will in effect be acknowledging that this promise was never fulfilled. Israel was not defeated. The Jewish state did not collapse. Nor was a Palestinian state established.
Instead, Palestinians themselves paid an unprecedented price. This is not a political opinion but the cumulative record of four decades. History has little mercy for ideologies that collide with reality.
The Palestine Liberation Organization did not embrace negotiations because it suddenly became committed to peace. It did so after concluding, following decades of conflict, that however powerful the symbolism of armed struggle, it could not alter the international balance of power. That realization led it from demanding the full liberation of Palestine to recognizing Israel and negotiating with it.
People may disagree over the legacy of Oslo, but few would dispute that the PLO leadership undertook a strategic reassessment after confronting the limits of military force.
Hamas rejected that lesson. Instead it chose the opposite path.
It aligned itself with Iran, tying Gaza’s future to a regional strategy that did not necessarily serve the Palestinian national project so much as it advanced Iran’s geopolitical ambitions, while continuing to draw on the ideological framework of the Muslim Brotherhood. It insisted that armed struggle could accomplish what politics could not.
The outcome is now visible to the world. When Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, the territory was presented with a rare historic opportunity to become an economic and political model capable of strengthening the Palestinian cause internationally.
What followed instead? Gaza became one of the Middle East’s largest militarized enclaves. Billions of dollars were poured into tunnels, rockets and military infrastructure. Development stalled. The economy deteriorated. Talent emigrated. Society became captive to a permanent state of war.
Then came Oct. 7. Every student of military history learns the distinction between tactical success and strategic victory. Japan achieved a tactical success at Pearl Harbor but lost the war. Napoleon won dozens of battles before losing Europe. Germany overran much of the continent within months in 1940, only to see Berlin destroyed in the years that followed.
Military operations are ultimately judged by their final outcomes, not by their opening hours. Oct. 7 was a tactical success made possible by a major Israeli intelligence failure. It never became an existential threat to Israel. Instead, it evolved into the greatest strategic catastrophe Gaza has experienced in decades.
Entire cities were destroyed. Tens of thousands were killed. Millions were displaced. The Palestinian national project was pushed back by years.
Amid the devastation, Hamas built an important part of its political narrative around portraying the humanitarian catastrophe as a factor in the battle for global public opinion. At the same time, Israel, along with various organizations and experts, repeatedly accused the group of using civilian areas for military operations – allegations Hamas has denied or attributed to the realities of fighting in one of the world’s most densely populated territories. Whatever the legal or political debate, civilians bore the greatest cost of the war.
Perhaps the greatest loss extended beyond Gaza itself. It lay in the collapse of the narrative that had been built around Hamas over many years – one that portrayed the movement as a successful model of resistance, that it was steadily approaching victory over Israel, and that time was on its side.
History shows that nations prevail when they choose the tools that bring them closer to their goals – not when they cling to strategies that consume lives, only to return, after immense sacrifice, to the negotiating table they once rejected.
Arab media outlets – most notably Al Jazeera – played a significant role in reinforcing that story for millions of viewers. It was also embraced by broad segments of activists in the West who portrayed Oct. 7 as the beginning of Israel’s decline.
But what remains of that narrative if Hamas itself agrees to disarm? How can the world be persuaded that armed struggle is the path to liberation when the movement that championed that doctrine abandons it?
That question alone undermines years of political messaging. If Hamas agrees to disarm, it will not simply be another provision in a negotiated agreement. It will mark the end of an entire idea – the idea that armed struggle, as practiced and promoted by Hamas, could by itself achieve the Palestinian national project.
None of this means that the Palestinian cause has become any less just, or that Palestinian rights have become any less legitimate. It means only that the justice of a cause does not make every method pursued in its name successful.
History shows that nations prevail when they choose the tools that bring them closer to their goals – not when they cling to strategies that consume lives, only to return, after immense sacrifice, to the negotiating table they once rejected.
If Hamas does disarm today, the defining event will not be the laying down of its weapons. It will be the collapse of the narrative that, for four decades, insisted that only the gun could lead the way.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect MBN’s editorial stance.
