Washington and Tehran are still exchanging messages, but increasingly those messages are landing in public, not passing quietly through mediators behind closed doors. The question is no longer just whether the two sides are negotiating. It’s whether the public statements themselves, aimed at markets and audiences as much as at each other, have become part of the negotiation.
Washington appears to be betting that Iran’s economic pain becomes intolerable before America’s political and strategic costs do. Tehran appears to be betting that disruption in the Strait makes waiting increasingly expensive for Washington and the global economy. Both sides have reasons to negotiate. Both also have reasons not to look too eager to do it.
President Donald Trump told Axios that the United States was “only semi-negotiating” with Iran. That same week, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said a deal on the Strait of Hormuz could come within days. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said progress was being made and an agreement was expected “very shortly.” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi responded publicly on X that there were no direct negotiations, only an “exchange of messages,” and that “intermediaries are still trying to create the grounds for negotiations again.” The Strait remained closed to unauthorized traffic.
None of this was confined to a negotiating room. All of it was addressed to cameras.
Senior U.S. officials signaled that an agreement was close. In an interview with CNBC, Bessent suggested Iran could reach a deal to open the Strait of Hormuz. Rubio said progress was being made. Trump spoke of the parameters of a deal. Commercial navigation remained severely restricted, while U.S. forces continued preventing vessels from accessing Iranian ports and Iranian forces continued threatening or targeting shipping moving without Tehran’s authorization. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said that Washington has deployed more than 20 warships to the Middle East as it enforces a blockade against Iran, while U.S. forces have redirected 55 commercial vessels.
Trump, for his part, said Washington was “low-keying it.” He pointed to Iran’s inflation and declining revenues, calling the standoff “a chess game.”
That is where “semi-negotiation” becomes useful language. A State Department official said to MBN that “semi-negotiation is allowing [the U.S.] to remain diplomatically engaged without declaring that it is sitting across from Tehran negotiating concessions. And it allows economic and military pressure to continue while waiting to see whether Tehran’s position shifts.”
Iran is playing its own version of the same game.
Its public position goes well beyond reopening shipping lanes. Iranian officials have demanded an end to U.S. military operations and threats, the lifting of the blockade and sanctions, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Persian Gulf, reparations, and the release of frozen Iranian assets. Meanwhile, Iran’s parliament is reviewing a draft navigation plan that would ban U.S. and Israeli vessels from the Strait entirely, impose mandatory transit fees on commercial shipping, and require financial indemnities from nations Tehran considers hostile. But staying at the table with Oman lets Iran project the image of a pragmatic partner still striving to find a reasonable solution, even as it pursues its maximalist agenda in parallel. That, too, is semi-negotiation.
What “Semi” Actually Describes
Washington is not pressing for an immediate formal resolution. It is managing multiple simultaneous pressures: energy markets, munitions stockpiles, allied relationships, domestic political timelines, and a diplomatic channel it does not fully control. The Oman track keeps an exit door open. The public statements manage markets and audiences. The naval blockade maintains economic leverage. The strikes resume when Iran’s proxies cross a threshold.
It is not a negotiation in the traditional sense. It is not a war in the traditional sense either.
