After years of confrontation on the battlefield, Hezbollah and Syria’s new leadership appear to be sending increasingly clear signals that they may be willing to sit down at the same table.
The latest signal came from Hezbollah days ago, when its Secretary-General Naim Qassem said he saw no obstacle to holding a public meeting with Syria’s new leadership when the timing is right for both sides.
Qassem’s remarks appeared to respond to an earlier opening from Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who said he was open to the possibility of dialogue with Hezbollah if the interests of Syria and Lebanon required it.
Hezbollah, which is designated by the United States as a terrorist organization, fought for years in the Syrian war in support of Bashar al-Assad’s government, engaging in fierce battles against rebel factions that now form the core of Syria’s leadership.
The fall of Assad in December 2024 came at a heavy cost for Hezbollah. It lost a close ally in Damascus as well as a strategic corridor linking it to Iran.
The new Syrian authorities, meanwhile, have made asserting control over the country’s territory and borders a top priority.
Syrian People’s Assembly member Yasser al-Shahada sees Qassem’s initiative as a shift in Hezbollah’s rhetoric toward the new Syria and a message that the group is prepared to move from a period of estrangement toward the possibility of political dialogue.
But Damascus, he said, does not view a meeting as an end in itself, but rather in terms of whether it would produce tangible benefits for Syria and Lebanon.
So far, there has been no publicly disclosed information about direct channels of communication between Damascus and Hezbollah.
According to Shahada, it is difficult to confirm the existence of indirect messages or mediation efforts unless they are officially announced.
Qassem’s statement came at a difficult moment for Hezbollah, which is still engaged in a fierce war with Israel that has inflicted heavy military and political losses on the group.
The group, which is designated as a terrorist organization by several countries, is also under pressure over the future of its weapons inside Lebanon after the Lebanese government decided that arms should be held exclusively by the state.
Political analyst Khaled al-Hajj told MBN that “Hezbollah feels it is in a weak and sensitive position,” and is therefore seeking to reopen relations with Damascus.
He believes the group may ultimately be seeking a relationship that would allow it to use Syria again as a conduit for weapons and money.
That prospect, however, runs up against Damascus’ firm position against allowing Syrian territory to be used for arms smuggling.
After Assad was ousted, Damascus announced that it had foiled weapons-smuggling operations involving arms destined for Hezbollah. In May, it also announced the dismantling of a cell linked to the group that was allegedly planning activities inside Syria. Hezbollah denied any connection to the cell.
Shahada sums up Syria’s current priorities as securing the Syrian-Lebanese border, stopping weapons and drug smuggling, and preventing Syrian territory from being used as a transit route for any military or security activity outside state control.
Syrian political analyst Milad al-Atrash, meanwhile, argues that Hezbollah needs Damascus at a time when Damascus has little interest in returning to the past.
In his view, the group is dealing with a Syrian government seeking to restore full sovereignty over its borders and territory and may need to maintain contact with it “to manage security and border issues and avoid miscalculation.”
Damascus, by contrast, does not need Hezbollah as a military force and certainly does not want to recreate the relationship that existed under the previous regime.
That extends to the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, which Damascus regards as an internal Lebanese matter to be addressed through state institutions. Syria, in its view, has no role in intervening militarily in Lebanon to disarm the group.
Sharaa has reiterated that position on several occasions, despite statements to the contrary from U.S. President Donald Trump.
Trump has previously suggested that the Syrian president could take on a role in dealing with Lebanon. In a July interview with Fox News, he said Sharaa would be more precise than the Israelis in dealing with Hezbollah, according to his account.
Sharaa responded to those suggestions by saying Syria would not intervene in Lebanon unless requested by the Lebanese government, rejecting interference in the country’s affairs.
Since taking power, Sharaa’s government has sought to reorganize ties with Lebanon through official state institutions.
In August 2025, Sharaa said he had chosen not to respond to Hezbollah despite its actions in Syria. In March, he voiced support for President Joseph Aoun’s efforts to place all weapons under the authority of the Lebanese state.
The shift was followed by a series of visits and contacts between the two countries, most notably a May meeting between Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Sharaa in Damascus, and a July visit by Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani to Beirut, where he met with the country’s three top officials as well as political figures known for opposing the Assad government.
The developments suggest that Damascus wants to define its relationship with Lebanon on a state-to-state basis. If it eventually engages with Hezbollah, that contact would likely be limited to issues requiring it, without allowing the group to supplant the state.
But another factor looms large: Syria’s collective memory. Hezbollah fought alongside Assad’s forces during the war, and the legacy of its intervention remains deeply embedded in the memories of many Syrians.
Al-Atrash says Hezbollah’s actions in Syria cannot simply be treated as though they never happened. But he argues that Damascus cannot allow the past alone to determine its foreign policy.
Iran is another key factor in determining the scope of any rapprochement. Hezbollah is a close ally of Tehran, while Syria’s new leadership is seeking to pursue a regional policy distinct from that of the Assad era.
Al-Hajj adds another player to the equation: Turkey. He notes that some regional calculations could lead Damascus and Ankara to view Hezbollah as a card that could be used to keep Israel occupied, or as leverage in future negotiations and regional arrangements.
For now, there is no announced date for a meeting between Hezbollah and Syria’s leadership. Shahada says talk of a comprehensive reconciliation is premature. A more realistic starting point, he argues, would be managing the rivalry: security understandings, tighter border controls, confidence-building measures and, eventually, conditional political dialogue.
Even so, he believes the prospect of a meeting is now greater than it was months ago. Statements by Sharaa and Qassem have, at least in principle, removed the political obstacle to contact. What remains are questions of timing and circumstances.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
