The Israeli security cabinet is set to convene on Sunday to discuss the reopening of the Rafah crossing, a move that signals the issue’s shift from the realm of estimates and leaks to the table of formal decision-making.
The meeting comes amid growing recognition within Israel’s political establishment in Jerusalem that Washington is no longer prepared to accept further delays, and that the continued closure of the crossing constitutes a central obstacle to implementing the second phase of the understandings related to Gaza, according to Haaretz.
In this context, Israel’s Channel 12 reports that the country is effectively preparing to reopen the crossing in both directions, possibly within days. The channel notes that prevailing assessments in Tel Aviv hold that the U.S. administration views the opening of Rafah as a fundamental condition for advancing the second phase of the “Gaza Peace Plan,” prompting Israel to reconsider a number of its previous red lines. As part of this shift, the report quotes a political source as saying that the linkage between reopening the crossing and the return of the body of hostage Ran Gvili is no longer in place, signaling a retreat from one of Israel’s leverage points in this file.
Based on this understanding, Channel 12 outlines Israel’s proposed framework for operating the crossing, which would involve reopening it under stringent inspection measures. These would include barring the return of Gaza residents except in limited humanitarian cases, alongside the adoption of an Israeli monitoring system, overseen by the Shin Bet security agency, to track outbound movement from the Strip, without a direct Israeli presence inside the crossing itself. Entry into Gaza, by contrast, would take place without an Israeli presence, while an Israeli checkpoint would be established nearby to conduct inspections and prevent the smuggling of equipment and materials classified as sensitive.
This picture is further reinforced by reporting from Israel’s public broadcaster, Kan, which goes further in describing the level of readiness, asserting that the decision to operate the Rafah crossing has effectively been settled. According to Kan, the crossing could be opened within 48 hours of formal approval, suggesting that the debate is no longer about principle but about the final implementation formula.
Kan adds that Israel intends to establish an additional crossing near the existing one, to be known as “Rafah 2,” which would fall under direct Israeli responsibility and be aimed at thwarting smuggling and infiltration attempts. At the same time, the main crossing would be operated by the European Union Border Assistance Mission (UBAM), with the participation of the Palestinian Authority’s General Intelligence Service. Lists of those entering Gaza would be transferred to Israel for security screening by the Shin Bet.
Despite these arrangements, Kan’s report highlights potential challenges, citing a senior Palestinian source who said that some members of Hamas’s military wing who left the Strip for medical treatment might be able to return via the crossing, without Israel having the ability to prevent this. The account underscores the limits of Israeli control even under tightened screening mechanisms.
Israeli political analyst Eli Nissan told the Alhurra website that the decision to reopen the Rafah crossing was the outcome of an accelerating international process, leaving Israel with limited room for maneuver. “Following the announcement from Davos, Israel had no alternative but to agree to opening the crossing,” he said.
Nissan noted that Israel would retain additional oversight tools, adding: “There will be what could be called a small Rafah crossing — an additional Israeli inspection — so that everyone entering through Rafah undergoes another layer of scrutiny, to ensure that no weapons or prohibited materials are brought in.”
Regarding the case of hostage Ran Gvili, Nissan said the government agreed to reopen the crossing despite not recovering his body, considering the separation of the two tracks to have become a fait accompli.
As for the striking silence within the governing coalition, Nissan described it as a political indicator in its own right. “It is notable that none of the ministers, especially the right-wing ministers, has come out with public criticism,” he said, adding that this behavior reflects the balance of power within the government. “This means that Netanyahu controls them and can impose his decisions even on sensitive issues like this.”
This interpretation aligns with broader political developments after Ali Shaat, head of the technocrats committee tasked with administering Gaza, announced during a meeting of the “Peace Council” in Davos that the Rafah crossing would open next week in both directions. The announcement reinforced the impression that reopening the crossing has become part of a fast-moving international trajectory that goes beyond Israel’s internal calculations.
Inside Israel, the development has not passed without sharp political reactions. Avigdor Lieberman, leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu party, launched a scathing attack on the government, arguing that the reopening of Rafah is taking place while the “October 7 government is surrendering,” and accusing it of weakness and incompetence — rhetoric that reflects the intensifying opposition as a decision draws closer.
In a broader analytical assessment, Haaretz places the reopening of the Rafah crossing within a wider context of Israel’s shrinking room for maneuver in the face of the U.S. plan for Gaza. The newspaper argues that a series of U.S. announcements in Davos — from reopening the crossing to proposing a seaport and an airport in the Strip, and assigning the task of disarming Hamas to the technocrats committee — reflects the erosion of the Israeli government’s ability to shape the course of events.
Haaretz adds, citing informed Israeli sources, that the government was not genuinely surprised by these developments, despite its critical public rhetoric, and that some of the stated objections are aimed more at managing domestic public opinion than at altering the trajectory. In this context, the paper notes that Netanyahu’s announcement of joining the “Peace Council” effectively constitutes Israeli acknowledgment of the proposed plan, even if it is being marketed domestically as one that has been “imposed.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
