Outside one of the registration centers run by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Beirut, dozens of Syrian families stand in silent lines. No one here speaks of a “dream” or a “future,” but rather of two questions that have been repeated for years: Is staying possible? And is returning safe?
This scene, repeated daily in more than one Lebanese region, encapsulates a broader predicament that goes beyond the fate of refugees as individuals and the living conditions surrounding their continued stay in Lebanon—where nine out of ten Syrians live in extreme poverty, according to UNHCR. It also reflects a clash of policies and approaches amid the absence of a genuine, comprehensive, and sustainable solution.
A Crisis Ongoing Since 2011
Fourteen years have passed since Lebanon began hosting more than approximately 1.8 million Syrians, according to estimates by Lebanese authorities. Only about 880,000 of them are officially registered with UNHCR, making Lebanon the country with the highest refugee-to-population ratio in the world, given that its population does not exceed 4.04 million people, according to government data.
Lebanese officials say the country is no longer able to bear the economic and social burden resulting from the worsening Syrian displacement crisis, noting that Lebanon’s infrastructure and basic services were not designed to accommodate such a large number of users.
While United Nations figures indicate that nearly one million Syrians have continued to reside in Lebanon as refugees since the outbreak of the war in 2011, human rights reports show that they, in turn, are suffering from severe living conditions in the country. Dalal Harb, spokesperson for UNHCR in Lebanon, confirmed to Alhurra that “as of now, UNHCR’s funding in Lebanon has reached only about 10 percent of the total required support, with major challenges looming on the horizon for 2026.” She noted that funding cuts in 2025 had led to serious consequences: “More than 15,000 children lost access to education support. Over 64,000 refugees were unable to receive emergency cash assistance for protection. Some 347,000 refugees were removed from the cash assistance program. Cash assistance for shelter was reduced by 90 percent, leaving 83,000 refugees without support. Forty thousand refugees lost access to primary health care, and 45,000 are no longer receiving support for secondary health care.”
Lebanese–Syrian Coordination
In June 2025, the Lebanese government announced a new, multi-phase plan for the return of Syrians to their country. In this context, Lebanon’s Minister of Social Affairs, Hanin Al-Sayyid, announced in early January 2026 that more than half a million displaced Syrians had left Lebanon in a safe and sustainable manner during 2025, and that their names had been removed from UNHCR records.
Sources at the Ministry of Social Affairs told Alhurra that the ministry, through the government committee overseeing the implementation of organized and sustainable returns in 2026, is working on “coordination with the Syrian government and international partners to ensure safe return that preserves the dignity of returnees and serves Lebanon’s national interest.”
The sources indicated that the Lebanese government is relying on official figures showing that more than 80 percent of Syrian refugees do not have legal residency, due to the cost of fees and the complexity of procedures—leaving a large segment exposed to security crackdowns and deportation.
While human rights organizations consider that the policies imposed by the Lebanese authorities to regulate refugees’ presence—through stricter residency requirements and security raids—constitute indirect pressure pushing refugees to return even in the absence of safety guarantees. Ministry sources stress the “Lebanese state is unwillingness to resort to forced deportation.” They affirm that “illegal Syrian presence complicates the accurate counting of returns, while the ministry is working to secure organized returns, particularly after the changes that have taken place inside Syria.”
In this context, UNHCR’s official spokesperson in Lebanon told Alhurra that “the agency facilitates voluntary return in close coordination with the Lebanese authorities.” This voluntary return is also coordinated with UNHCR teams in Syria and with Syrian authorities, who receive returning families and provide them with support and guidance. This includes cash assistance of $600 from UNHCR, which may be granted to the most vulnerable families.
The Position of the “New Syria”
For its part, Syria’s new government has escalated its rhetoric calling for the return of refugees, arguing that “the military action phase has ended” and that the country has started on a path to recovery and reconstruction.
Authorities in Damascus have stated that “the state is ready to receive all of its citizens,” promising to facilitate administrative procedures and ensure a minimum level of services.
However, UN and human rights reports indicate that large areas of Syria continue to suffer from extensive destruction, economic collapse, and shortages of basic services, in addition to security and legal concerns—making the issue of return far more complex than political rhetoric suggests.
In this context, Harb emphasized that “despite many families feeling relief upon returning, reintegration conditions in Syria remain extremely difficult due to widespread destruction, lack of job opportunities, damaged infrastructure, and weak provision of services and education.” She added that “after 14 years of conflict, there is an urgent need for large-scale investments to support early recovery, reconstruction, and economic revival in order to ensure sustainable return and prevent renewed displacement.”
After December 2024
“New arrivals”—this is the term the Lebanese official bodies agreed upon with UNHCR.
Although public debate in Lebanon has traditionally focused on the presence of Syrians opposed to the regime of Bashar al-Assad since the start of the conflict in 2011, Syrian inflows into Lebanese territory have continued despite the fall of that regime in December 2024.
Information from UNHCR in Lebanon indicates that “since December 8, 2024, around 115,000 Syrians have arrived in Lebanon. Many of them came under extremely difficult conditions and with acute humanitarian needs after fleeing under duress.”
At a time when Lebanese authorities are organizing safe return operations to Syria, data show that the new influx does not always fall under UN registration mechanisms, making official estimates subject to change as population movement across the border continues. Reports also indicate that cross-border movement between Lebanon and Syria remains high, while observers who monitor this issue fear political motives may lie behind this new influx.
Alan Sarkis, a writer and expert on displacement, told Alhurra that “the primary concentration of camps for the new arrivals is in Hermel and Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley, along the eastern border with Syria.”
Given that these areas are overwhelmingly loyal to Hezbollah, Sarkis conveyed concerns about what he described as “suspicious activity inside camps not subject to state oversight.” He noted that “the displacement camps established since 2011 were under strict security monitoring, whereas the new camps built by Hezbollah remain outside state control—especially amid reports of political activity inside them by supporters of the former Syrian regime aimed at destabilizing Syria and fomenting incitement against the new regime.”
According to Sarkis, the crisis in Lebanon will continue in the absence of clear and well-considered Lebanese steps regarding displaced Syrians. He argues that “the Lebanese authorities have not taken control of the situation on the ground and remain lax on the displacement issue, while international organizations continue to assist Syrian refugees, amid the lack of any major launch of reconstruction in Syria.”
Based on all of the above, experts believe that the debate over refugees’ stay or return will remain an internal Lebanese political card rather than a viable plan—while the crisis, in all its dimensions, continues with no solution in sight.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
