In late 2025 and at the beginning of this year, the Gulf position toward the escalating tensions between the United States and Iran was defined by a refusal to allow the use of Gulf airspace or territory for any military action against Iran. This stance was paired with active diplomatic efforts and direct and indirect communication with both Washington and Tehran to contain the situation.
This approach reflected the Gulf states’ attempt to maintain a delicate balance: preserving their longstanding security partnerships with the United States while avoiding involvement in an open confrontation with Iran.
On June 23, 2025, Iran targeted Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar as part of the “12-Day War.” In response, several Gulf states temporarily closed their airspace to civilian aviation. Official statements issued at the time expressed support for Qatar, condemned the Iranian strike, and called for de‑escalation, restraint, and the prevention of a broader regional conflict.
This incident served as an early, practical indicator of the potential repercussions any war between the United States and Iran would have on Gulf countries that host U.S. military bases—despite their efforts to distance themselves from such a confrontation
In January, as regional tensions escalated ahead of today’s strike against Iran, media reports indicated that Gulf states — including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman — clearly informed Washington that they would not allow their airspace or military bases to be used to launch attacks on Iran. This included refusing the use of their airspace for refueling operations or any logistical support related to potential strikes.
Their refusal to support strikes on Iran was accompanied by mediation efforts — led particularly by Oman and Qatar — to facilitate communication channels between Tehran and Washington. These efforts were part of a broader regional approach aimed at preventing tensions from escalating into a wider confrontation, with repeated Gulf assertions that regional stability and security take precedence over involvement in any direct conflict.
However, the landscape shifted today, as the United States and Israel carried out a military operation targeting sites inside Iran. This was followed by an Iranian response that struck military bases associated with the U.S. presence in Gulf countries.
Some of the damage extended to civilian areas in Gulf states — including residential buildings and public facilities — amid ongoing operations targeting military sites considered part of the American military infrastructure in the region.
These developments occurred despite previously declared Gulf positions rejecting the use of their territories or airspace for strikes against Iran, and despite the diplomatic efforts that preceded the escalation.
U.S. Bases in the Gulf
Iranian strikes today reached the core of U.S. military infrastructure in the Gulf, targeting sites regarded as the backbone of American military deployment in the region.
The attacks hit Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates, as well as facilities linked to the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain.
Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar is the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East. It hosts thousands of troops and spans approximately 24 hectares.
According to Reuters, citing an informed source, some personnel were evacuated from the base following the attack carried out by the United States and Israel on Iran.
In the United Arab Emirates, Al Dhafra Air Base — located south of Abu Dhabi — serves as a major hub for U.S. Air Force operations and functions as a joint facility shared with the UAE Air Force.
In Dubai, although Jebel Ali Port is not officially classified as a military base, U.S. military vessels dock there periodically for short stays.
In Saudi Arabia, 2,321 U.S. troops are stationed in the country, according to a letter issued by the White House in 2024. These forces operate in coordination with the Saudi government to provide air and missile defense capabilities and to support U.S. military aircraft operations. A significant portion of them is based at Prince Sultan Air Base, located about 60 kilometers south of Riyadh, where U.S. Army air defense systems are deployed, including Patriot missile batteries and the THAAD system.
In Bahrain, the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet is in the kingdom. The fleet oversees an operational theater that stretches from the Gulf to the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean, making it one of the most strategically important U.S. naval formations in the region.
In Kuwait, extensive U.S. military facilities are distributed across the country, including Camp Arifjan, the forward headquarters of U.S. Army Central Command, Ali Al Salem Air Base, known as “The Rock,” and Camp Buehring, which was established during the 2003 Iraq War and is used as a staging ground for forces deployed in Iraq and Syria.
The Gulf Between Washington and Tehran
Many observers have expressed surprise that Gulf states were subjected to Iranian missile attacks despite their repeated attempts to distance themselves from any U.S. military strike on Iran. At the same time, questions are being raised about the extent to which these countries are capable of absorbing such attacks.
In this context, Bahraini researcher and writer Jaafar Salman argues that Tehran understands that Gulf states may tolerate these missile strikes as long as they are directed solely at U.S. bases. According to him, these countries are likely to limit their responses to defensive measures without engaging in direct escalation.
However, Salman warns that if the strikes continue for an extended period or expand to include targets within the Gulf states themselves, the rules of the game could shift entirely. This concern is amplified by increasingly hardline voices within Iran calling for broader strikes on countries hosting U.S. bases — a development that could trigger a different Gulf response and push the region into a far more dangerous phase.
For his part, Qatari academic and writer Dr. Ali Al Hail suggests that Gulf states may be viewed as “scapegoats” in the ongoing conflict, given that they represent the weaker party in the regional equation. Al Hail argues that Iran’s message may be aimed primarily at the United States — signaling its ability to threaten American interests either through its allies or by targeting oil facilities — while simultaneously applying pressure on Gulf states to reconsider the nature of their relationships with Israel and Washington
In light of this sequence of events, a broader strategic question emerges: Will Iran’s targeting of military bases in the Gulf — despite prior commitments that they would not be used in strikes, prompt a reassessment of Gulf strategy? Will these countries reconsider their stance on hosting and facilitating U.S. military operations if such strikes occur regardless? And will Gulf states recalibrate their security calculations toward deterrence and strategic balancing, or continue adhering to a policy of distancing their territories from direct confrontation while relying on diplomatic channels to contain escalation?
Jaafar Salman maintains that the presence of U.S. bases in the Gulf remains a deeply strategic matter that is not altered by a single incident or temporary development. In fact, he argues that if the conflict becomes prolonged and more intense, it may further reinforce Gulf states’ conviction in the importance of these bases as a deterrent against Iran.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
