Once again, the Gulf states find themselves in direct proximity to a regional war, despite not being a party to it. As the confrontation between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other has evolved into a military clash, its repercussions have quickly extended into the Gulf arena, which for decades has served as a central hub of economic and commercial stability in the region.
On the morning of Saturday, February 28, 2026, the Middle East entered a new phase of escalation when military operations began between the two sides. Within hours, Iran launched missile and drone attacks targeting U.S. military bases in several Gulf countries, including Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, in response to American and Israeli strikes inside Iranian territory.
Former Kuwaiti diplomat Suleiman Ibrahim Al-Marjan said that “the peoples of the region are weary of wars and crises; since the Iran–Iraq War in the early 1980s, our region has not enjoyed genuine stability.”
The repercussions of the Iranian attacks were not limited to military installations in Gulf countries. Civilian facilities near some of the targeted sites were also affected, bringing urban and economic areas into the circle of danger and raising growing concerns about the safety of civilian infrastructure across the Gulf.
Ambassador Al-Marjan stressed that from the very first moment of the war, Gulf states found themselves in a purely defensive position. They were not parties to offensive military operations; rather, their role was confined to protecting their airspace and vital facilities, given the presence of U.S. bases on their territory. He noted that although the Iranian attacks were presented as targeting American military objectives, they in practice impacted Gulf security and interests, particularly as some strikes extended to the vicinity of civilian facilities.
Now in its eighth day, the war continues to see ongoing Iranian attacks against Gulf states. This trajectory reflects an escalating pattern of mutual military attrition that places Gulf security under sustained pressure, while underscoring the sensitivity of the Gulf’s position within regional and international conflict equations.
The Impact of War on the Gulf Economy
Qatari diplomat and politician Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa told Alhurra that targeting energy production and refining facilities, alongside rising maritime insurance costs, increases the economic cost of the war and affects both Gulf and global economies. He warned that growing risks to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz could have direct consequences if escalation persists over an extended period.
Former Kuwaiti Minister of Information Sami Al-Nisf agreed with this assessment, noting that Gulf economies are fundamentally built on the energy and services sectors. Security tensions around the Strait of Hormuz may prompt some countries to reduce or reassess oil production, while also posing challenges to gas exports, including those of Qatar.
Although rising oil prices may provide temporary gains for some producers, the greatest beneficiaries could be energy companies and countries outside the region, such as U.S. energy firms or Russia. By contrast, the Gulf’s service-based economy—spanning tourism, investment, and financial markets—depends on a stable regional environment. This stability has in recent years attracted capital fleeing conflict zones in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. Any expansion of the war therefore poses a direct threat to these sectors, according to the Kuwaiti commentator.
Economic repercussions have already begun to emerge with disruptions to air and maritime traffic in the Middle East. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz—through which roughly one-fifth of global oil trade passes—has declined to near-halt levels following Iranian drone attacks carried out in response to U.S. and Israeli military operations. Amid this escalation, Qatari Energy Minister Saad Al-Kaabi warned in an interview with the Financial Times that continued conflict could push Gulf energy producers to suspend exports within weeks, potentially driving oil prices to around $150 per barrel.
As part of precautionary measures, Qatar announced a temporary suspension of its liquefied natural gas production in tandem with ongoing Iranian attacks on Gulf sites. Kuwait Petroleum Corporation also announced preventive adjustments to crude oil production levels and refining operations in response to rapidly evolving security developments. The corporation stated that the move comes amid rising risks associated with navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategic energy transit corridors.
Ambassador Al-Marjan emphasized that the war’s repercussions extend beyond the region, given the Gulf’s pivotal role in the global energy system. Continued tensions and a near-complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz could expose approximately 20 percent of global oil supplies to direct risk, multiplying the crisis’s cost for the international economy—not just for Gulf Cooperation Council countries.
He warned that prolonging the war could place sustained pressure on energy markets and global supply chains, broadening its economic impact far beyond its geographic scope. At the same time, he expressed hope that the conflict would not endure, given its serious implications for regional stability and the global economy.
Political Balances and Regional Stability
Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa believes that the war’s impact on political balances will depend on its outcome and duration, warning that its repercussions could extend beyond the Middle East into the wider Asian sphere.
One of the most dangerous scenarios, he said, would be a decisive victory by one party, potentially enabling the victor to leverage its military and political superiority to reshape regional power balances and impose new equations. He considers it unlikely that either side would formally declare surrender, especially given the direct American involvement. However, any fundamental shift in the war’s trajectory could affect regional—and possibly global—power balances due to the interwoven international interests in the confrontation.
Sami Al-Nisf pointed out that Gulf stability affects not only its own populations but also underpins a broader economic and developmental system extending across the Arab and Islamic worlds. Gulf states serve as major hubs for labor and investment and play a key role in financing development projects and reconstruction efforts in conflict-affected countries such as Lebanon, Gaza, Yemen, Syria, and Sudan. Any instability in the Gulf would therefore reverberate across a wide network of interconnected economies and societies.
He added that the war may redefine strategic files previously managed within the framework of the Iran–U.S.–Israel confrontation, particularly Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and its network of regional proxies. These issues have now become matters of direct security concern for Gulf states, as the region itself falls within the threat radius associated with them. Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear capabilities or development of long-range missile systems raises strategic anxiety for Gulf countries due to geographic proximity and the likelihood that they would be most directly affected by future escalation.
Iranian statements hinting at targeting Gulf states in response to any American or Israeli attack further heighten these concerns, placing Gulf countries in the position of indirect participants in a broader conflict. In light of these dynamics, Al-Nisf believes the coming phase may push Gulf states to assume a more visible role in managing these strategic files, alongside pursuing economic and security alternatives—including diversifying energy export routes and reducing reliance on the Strait of Hormuz in anticipation of potential disruptions.
The War’s Trajectory and Possible Duration
The most pressing question in Gulf discussions today concerns the war’s duration and possible trajectories: Will the confrontation remain contained, or will it escalate further?
Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa believes the future of the conflict hinges on the warring parties’ ability to contain escalation and open a political track leading to a ceasefire. The absence of serious negotiations could prolong the confrontation and push it into more dangerous phases, especially as strikes have hit civilian and oil facilities in Gulf states.
In his view, the most realistic scenario is de-escalation followed by negotiations culminating in a binding agreement that accounts for the interests of the warring parties and regional states. Talk of major shifts in regional balances, he argues, is premature before the war’s outcomes and political and economic costs become clear.
Sami Al-Nisf offers a more cautious assessment, warning that assuming a short-lived confrontation may be premature and that the current phase could mark the beginning of a longer escalation. Claims that Iran’s stockpile of missiles and drones is nearing depletion may not rest on decisive data, and the war’s trajectory is shaped not only by military balance but also by evolving regional and international alliances. He therefore stresses the importance of activating the region’s defense partnerships with powers such as the United States, France, Pakistan, and Turkey.
Al-Nisf also calls for a more active role for the Arab League in addressing the conflict’s repercussions, arguing that it is untenable for several Arab states to face direct or indirect attacks while Arab institutions remain passive observers. One potential path, he suggests, would be documenting damages sustained by Gulf states as a result of Iranian attacks in preparation for submitting claims to the United Nations and seeking compensation—similar to the mechanism established to compensate Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion.
For his part, former Kuwaiti ambassador Suleiman Al-Marjan warns of the possibility of continued and escalating conflict, emphasizing that containing and ending the war as soon as possible remains the most important option to prevent the region from sliding into a prolonged phase of instability, and to return to dialogue and negotiation as a means of reducing tensions.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Sakina Abdallah
A Saudi writer, researcher, and TV presenter
