In the Middle East, major shifts rarely unfold where analysts expect them. Over the past two years, attention has centered on parsing the signs of divergence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Yet Iran’s latest moves have pushed a different question to the surface: Could a rising external threat revive cohesion within the Gulf bloc?
A sober reading suggests the possibility is not far-fetched. The region’s history shows that periods of external escalation have often forced a pragmatic, and sometimes cold, reordering of priorities among Gulf states. What appeared to be widening rifts can quickly narrow when the security environment shifts.
The much-discussed Saudi Emirati friction was never an existential rupture; it was, as most analysts concluded, a tactical competition over influence, direction, and pace, not a break in the fundamental strategic alignment.
For months, the narrative focused on economic transformation, divergent regional roles, and competition in emerging sectors. But the escalating confrontation with Iran, whether through proxy warfare or direct and quasi-direct strikes, is beginning to restructure the hierarchy of concerns. Security, once again, is asserting itself at the top.
In the literature of international relations, the “rally around the flag” effect is a familiar concept, the tendency of states to narrow internal divides when confronted with a shared external threat. Research in the field shows that geographically proximate states with similar security structures, and exposed to pressure from the same adversary, often, even if only temporarily, suspend their internal contradictions in favor of broader defensive coordination. Today, the Gulf finds itself approaching precisely these conditions.
Iranian attacks, whether launched directly or through its regional proxies, on Gulf oil installations or civilian infrastructure send a clear, unmistakable message to regional capitals: when Tehran seeks to redraw the balance of deterrence, the threat does not meaningfully discriminate between Gulf capitals. The memory of the 2019 Aramco attack remains vivid in strategic circles across the region, having exposed just how deeply interconnected Gulf energy networks, supply chains, and economic stability are. It was a stark reminder that the vulnerabilities of one state can quickly cascade across the entire GCC.
In this context, what security experts describe as a “shared security fate” begins to take hold, a reality in which an attack on one part of the system becomes a message to all, rather than an isolated incident that can be contained within national borders.
The economic dimension reinforces this logic with even greater force. Political competition can be managed or postponed, but threats to energy exports or disruptions to maritime corridors cut across every Gulf state without exception. According to the International Energy Agency, more than one fifth of global oil trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, meaning that any disturbance there instantly becomes a regional event with global repercussions. At that point, intra Gulf rivalry turns into a costly luxury, and the priority shifts decisively toward managing shared risks.
Washington’s role in this equation cannot be overlooked. The United States, regardless of who occupies the White House, has a consistent strategic interest in maintaining a cohesive Gulf security architecture in the face of Iran. Historically, when Iranian escalation rises, Washington has tended, often through quiet diplomatic channels, to encourage Gulf rapprochement. In this sense, heightened tensions with Tehran do not only draw Gulf states closer together; they also push their American ally toward reinforcing that unity.
Yet assuming that the Iranian threat will instantly dissolve all intra Gulf disagreements would be an oversimplification. The structural competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, particularly in the realms of investment, logistics, and technology, is rooted in deep economic transformation drives that will not simply fade under the weight of security pressures. In addition, strategic thinking within the Gulf is not fully aligned on how to manage relations with Iran: states differ on the acceptable level of escalation, the tools of response, and the limits of military engagement. This divergence suggests that while security coordination may advance, it will not necessarily translate into full political alignment.
Gulf history itself offers ample evidence that robust defense coordination does not automatically translate into full political integration. Past experience shows that GCC states can deepen security cooperation while still preserving wide margins of economic and political independence. For that reason, any potential Gulf rapprochement in the face of escalating Iranian pressure is likely to be pragmatic and calculated rather than an emotional leap toward unity.
If the confrontation continues to intensify, the most plausible scenario would see Gulf capitals raising the level of defense coordination, accelerating joint air and maritime security projects, and lowering political and media rhetoric between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, while economic competition continues, albeit more discreetly. In effect, the region may move toward an alliance of necessity, not an alliance of integration.
This reveals a striking paradox: by attempting to increase pressure on the Gulf, Tehran may inadvertently help close ranks within a regional order that has seen visible internal divergences in recent years. Major shocks in the Middle East rarely just redraw maps of influence; they reorder national priorities. Should Iranian escalation cross a certain threshold, security imperatives may realign what competitive interests had previously pushed apart.
Even so, any potential Gulf convergence would not resemble a romantic reunion, but rather a cold, calculated alignment driven by strict pragmatism. In a region long accustomed to strategic surprises, one rule has proven remarkably durable: a shared threat does not erase competition, it merely pushes it into the background, at least until the storm passes.
This article is translated from the original Arabic. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks.
Abdulaziz Alkhamis
Abdulaziz Alkhamis is a Gulf-focused geopolitical analyst and columnist specializing in Middle East strategy and regional power dynamics.
