Absolute control by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a shrinking role for the clergy, and deepening struggles within the pillars of the regime—this has been the scene in Iran since the killing of former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a joint U.S.–Israeli missile strike on February 28.
Experts and specialists on Iranian affairs—including opposition figures who spoke to Alhurra—say that the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader of Iran’s system of Vilayat-el-Faqih after his father Ali Khamenei is evidence of the hardline current within the IRGC consolidating its control over the country and issuing decisions without consulting religious authorities or senior clerics.
The same sources confirm that Mojtaba Khamenei’s authority, tied closely to the IRGC and its control over the direction of state affairs in Iran, began to take shape at the beginning of this century, “when the man began using his connections and his father’s authority to interfere in Iranian presidential elections and dismantle the reformist current, preparing to build his family’s financial, political, and economic empire through the IRGC’s control over the economy, politics, and security inside Iran and beyond.”
“These steps marked the beginning of preparations for transferring the position of Supreme Leader from father to son, in exchange for granting the Guard absolute authority in managing the country,” the sources added.
A Real Problem
However, these efforts face a serious problem.
Most of the first-tier leadership of the IRGC—closely tied to the Supreme Leader—were killed during the twelve-day war between Iran and Israel last June. Those who remained, along with many second-tier commanders, were killed during the first days of the current war.
According to the opposition group “Executive Authority of the State of Ahvaz,” the third tier of IRGC commanders now dominates the Iranian scene after “the families of the main clerics in the Vilayat-el-Faqih system were pushed out of the political equation over the past years, including the family of former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani.”
Two families have dominated power in Iran: the family of Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, and the Khamenei family, along with IRGC commanders and senior officials connected to them. However, the greater control lies with the Khamenei family.
“The third tier of IRGC commanders are the ones leading the war today. Their relationships are not as strong as those of the previous two tiers with the Khamenei and Larijani families. Therefore, the current war has created a gap between the religious-political leadership represented by these two families on one side and the IRGC on the other,” said Arif al-Kaabi, head of the Executive Authority of the State of Ahvaz, speaking to Alhurra.
Al-Kaabi also noted that the executive authority led by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and his ministers is completely outside the game.
Over the past 47 years, the IRGC has grown from a small force into a complex intelligence network combining ideology, arms, politics, and economics. Its activities are not limited to Iran; its operations and affiliated networks extend beyond Iran to various countries around the world.
Although hardliners have controlled the IRGC’s leadership in Iran over the past years, it also contains another current known as the Mahdists or Hojjatieh—a radical movement led by former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iranian websites reported in early March that Ahmadinejad had been killed in a joint U.S.–Israeli missile strike, but later denied the reports based on a statement issued by his office.
Ghaith al-Tamimi, head of the Iraqi Citizenship Project, believes that the religious authorities and ayatollahs have effectively become an echo of the IRGC.
“Since the Guard is engaged in an emergency war and cannot communicate or reveal everything that is happening to it, it has the justifications that allow it to take decisions from the religious authorities without informing them of the details,” al-Tamimi told Alhurra.
Al-Tamimi believes that the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s absence from public view so far suggests either that he has been killed or that he was wounded in the bombardment in a way that prevents him from appearing publicly. He stressed that the rivalries and factions within the ranks of the IRGC will surface once Mojtaba Khamenei’s fate is officially announced.
On Friday, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said that Mojtaba Khamenei had been wounded and was likely disfigured, casting doubt on his ability to lead.
Hegseth added that Mojtaba “issued a statement yesterday. It was actually a weak statement, but it wasn’t accompanied by audio or video. It was a written statement.” He continued: “Iran has a lot of cameras and audio recording devices. Why a written statement? I think you know the reason. His father is dead. He’s afraid, injured, on the run, and lacks legitimacy.”
Earlier, Reuters quoted an unnamed Iranian official on Wednesday as saying that “Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei suffered minor injuries but continues to carry out his duties.”
On Thursday, Iranian state television broadcast a written statement by Mojtaba Khamenei read by a news anchor—the first statement attributed to him since assuming the position of Iran’s new Supreme Leader.
Iraqi political analyst Jaafar Ziyara notes that networks of personal loyalty and relationships formed among IRGC commanders since the Iran-Iraq War play an important role in shaping the balance of power within the institution.
“The centers of power and the main actors in the making of political and military decisions in Iran are largely concentrated in the hands of IRGC leaders. These leaders play a pivotal role in charting the course of decisions related to war and national security, ensuring the continuation of the regime’s religious and political approach in Iran,” Ziyara told Alhurra.
However, Ziyara also believes that the IRGC is working to open the door for a pragmatic diplomatic path led by figures connected to the Guard or with backgrounds linked to it—among them Ali Larijani, who enjoys considerable acceptance among a number of influential clerics in the city of Qom.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
