After decades of denying Kurdish language and identity, Syria’s new leadership formally acknowledged the country’s Kurdish population earlier this year. But for many Kurds, the recognition remains incomplete unless it is enshrined in the constitution.
In January, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa issued Decree No. 13, recognizing Kurds as an integral part of the Syrian people and declaring Kurdish culture and language part of the country’s national identity. The decree also pledged to protect Syria’s cultural and linguistic diversity and guarantee the right of Kurds to preserve their heritage, develop their mother tongue and teach it in public and private schools in areas where Kurds constitute a significant share of the population.
But Kurdish concerns have moved beyond constitutional debate. Since early May, Kurdish-majority areas in northeastern Syria have witnessed protests, sit-ins and strikes after bilingual Arabic-Kurdish signs were removed from several government offices and replaced with signs written only in Arabic and English.
For residents and activists, the controversy over the signs has become an early test of Damascus’ commitment to implementing the presidential decree — and a sign that recognition of the Kurdish language could remain reversible unless it is formally protected in a permanent constitution expected after the transitional period ends in 2030.
Protesters are demanding official recognition of Kurdish as a national language, its inclusion in the constitution and guarantees for education in the mother tongue. They argue that Syria’s new government has yet to take concrete steps to translate the decree’s promises into institutional policy in schools, government bodies and local administration.
The dispute extends beyond language. Kurdish political activists and observers in northeastern Syria say Kurdish demands also include constitutional recognition of Kurds as a national community within Syria, adoption of a decentralized system of governance, broader local administration powers in Kurdish-majority areas and meaningful political and cultural participation at the national level.
Zana Omar, a political researcher close to the Syrian Democratic Forces, said the decree marked an important step toward acknowledging Kurdish cultural rights but was insufficient to guarantee them. The deeper issue, he said, lies in the absence of clear signs that the authorities are prepared to launch a broad national dialogue or draft a constitution that reflects the aspirations of Syria’s diverse communities.
The issue has become even more sensitive because discussions over Kurdish rights overlap with broader negotiations between Damascus and the SDF following an agreement signed in January. Both sides are currently working through administrative and military arrangements involving the return of state institutions to autonomous administration areas, the integration of civil institutions, the restoration of government control over oil, gas and border crossings and the incorporation of SDF forces into Syria’s new military and security structures.
While Damascus argues that the current phase requires gradual confidence-building, many Kurds fear that the focus on military and administrative arrangements could postpone the more fundamental question: their status in Syria’s future constitution and the extent of recognition for their language, culture and local self-governance.
Omar said the shape of the future Syrian state would determine the meaning and limits of Kurdish rights. A highly centralized state, he argued, could reduce cultural recognition to a symbolic gesture unless accompanied by constitutional guarantees for decentralization and local administration.
Speaking to Alhurra, Omar said the current authorities — backed by Turkey — appear to favor a centralized model that could effectively restrict Kurdish political rights and undermine the forms of local administration established in northeastern Syria during the war.
He added that he does not expect Syria’s new leadership to grant broad political rights to Kurds in the near future, predicting that official recognition would likely remain limited to cultural and linguistic rights. The resolution of the Kurdish issue in Syria, he said, depends not only on Damascus but also on regional and international actors, particularly Turkey and countries involved in the Syrian file.
By contrast, lawyer Mustafa Sheikh Muslim said the Syrian government had initially been relatively generous in its promises regarding Kurdish rights, but those commitments now appear to be receding — or at least becoming less clear — as implementation of the Damascus-SDF agreement moves forward.
Sheikh Muslim said the recent tensions in Kurdish areas send a clear message to the new government: a return to the policies once pursued by the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party against Kurds is no longer possible. The Kurdish issue in Syria, he said, is rooted in decades of history and cannot be treated as a temporary administrative or security matter.
Those fears are grounded in a long history of marginalization. After Syria gained independence in 1946, Kurds enjoyed a relatively limited degree of cultural and political space. Some participated in political life, and Kurdish-language newspapers and magazines circulated openly, though without formal constitutional recognition.
That space narrowed during the union between Syria and Egypt from 1958 to 1961, when authorities shut down Kurdish associations and media institutions. A more severe blow came in 1962, after Syria’s separation from Egypt, when authorities conducted a controversial census in Hasaka Province that stripped more than 150,000 Kurds of citizenship and classified them as “foreigners.”
After the Baath Party seized power in 1963, restrictions intensified. Kurdish was banned from public use, Kurdish publications and books were prohibited, and even songs and cultural activities came under pressure.
The landscape changed after the outbreak of the Syrian uprising in 2011, when Kurdish forces established control over large areas in northern and eastern Syria, formed the autonomous administration and adopted Kurdish in education and local governance. But the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad at the end of 2024 and the emergence of a new authority revived the issue from a different angle: how would the new Damascus deal with a self-administration structure that developed outside state control, and with Kurdish demands that now extend beyond language and culture?
Despite several understandings between Damascus and the SDF, military and political tensions persisted in parts of northeastern Syria until the two sides reached a new internationally backed agreement in January. The deal stipulates the return of Syrian state institutions to autonomous administration areas, the integration of civil institutions in Hasaka Province and other regions into state structures, while preserving the special character of local administration and retaining civil employees.
The agreement also includes the restoration of Damascus’ control over oil and gas fields and border crossings, along with the integration of SDF forces into Syria’s new army and security services.
But many Kurds say those provisions address governance and security more than political guarantees. Administrative integration and military arrangements can be implemented through executive decisions, they argue, but protecting language rights, identity and local governance requires constitutional guarantees rather than decrees that can later be amended.
Concerns deepened again after al-Sharaa signed the constitutional declaration for the transitional period in March. The document did not recognize Kurds as Syria’s second national group, nor did it grant Kurdish-majority areas any special administrative status. Instead, it emphasized equal citizenship and general rights for all Syrians without ethnic distinctions.
Researchers close to Damascus, however, argue that Syria’s new political order offers an opportunity to address the legacy of exclusion without turning the constitution into a catalogue of demands for every community.
Wael Alwan, a researcher at the Syrian Center for Studies, said a new understanding of citizenship and equal rights for all Syrians could create opportunities for coexistence, development and recovery after years of war and decades of policies under the previous regime that fractured Syrian society and deepened internal divisions.
Alwan told Alhurra that recognizing Syria’s geographic and social diversity — including the cultural and linguistic rights of Kurds — is part of building a new Syria. Respect for Kurdish in areas where Kurds live, he said, as well as respect for the country’s broader cultural diversity, could transform pluralism into a source of strength rather than conflict.
The autonomous administration rejected the constitutional declaration after it was issued, saying it contained centralized provisions reminiscent of the previous era and calling for the drafting of a genuine constitution shaped by all Syrian communities.
Ahmed Jassem al-Hussein, head of the Writers Union in Syria and a figure close to the government, said authorities are moving forward with implementing the presidential decree concerning Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights and that negotiations are underway between SDF representatives and the government over implementation mechanisms.
But he said there was no need to enshrine Kurdish rights in a separate constitutional provision.
“I do not imagine there will be a specific constitutional article guaranteeing Kurdish rights,” he told Alhurra. “There are other minorities — or, let us say, other groups — in Syria that would demand the same thing, and that could create certain problems.”
Al-Hussein said the current phase remains transitional and focused on building trust, adding that such issues cannot be resolved all at once. He said the government does not oppose teaching Kurdish in Kurdish-majority areas but prefers to address the matter within a framework of general cultural rights rather than through constitutional provisions dedicated to a single group.
That, ultimately, is where the gap lies between the two sides. Damascus speaks of equal citizenship and general cultural rights for all Syrians, while many Kurds fear that such universal language could become a way to avoid recognizing them as a distinct community with a unique historical experience with the Syrian state.
For that reason, the battle over the Kurdish language is not simply about school curricula or public signs. It has become an early test of whether Syria’s new political order will produce a constitution that genuinely reflects the country’s diversity — or settle instead for promises that could shift with political circumstances and future governments.
For many Kurds, the presidential decree arrived late, but it still mattered. The constitution, however, will determine whether that recognition marks the beginning of real change or merely a promise that can later be withdrawn.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
