Over the past decades, the Baloch have never ceased demanding their rights and seeking to free themselves from the ethnic and sectarian oppression they face in Iran.
The Baloch, one of the most prominent ethnic groups in Iran, live in the province of Sistan and Baluchistan in southeastern Iran. Iranian Balochistan forms part of the broader Balochistan region, which is divided among three countries: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. The region represents a strategic corridor linking the Middle East to South Asia and Central Asia.
Iran’s Baluchistan coastline, overlooking the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, stretches approximately 400 kilometers. It is part of the larger Baluchistan coastline, which extends around 1,100 kilometers in total, with Pakistan controlling the remaining 700 kilometers.
This coastal strip extends within Iran from the southeastern region, starting from Jask in the west and reaching the Pakistani border in the east. It includes major coastal cities such as Chabahar and Konarak and overlooks one of the world’s most critical maritime passages, the Strait of Hormuz, a key transit route for global oil tankers.
Map of Unrest in Baluchistan
Western Baluchistan has witnessed unrest, protests, and local armed operations, most of which aim for secession from Iran, while others call for federalism. These disturbances date back to Iran’s control of the region in 1928 and intensified following the establishment of the system of “Velayat-e Faqih” in 1979.
Baloch experts and researchers told Alhurra that the map of unrest is concentrated in Sistan and Balochistan province along an arc stretching from north to south of the provincial capital, Zahedan, down to the coastal city of Chabahar. It coincides with tense conflict zones in cities such as Rask, Saravan, and Khash, as well as the Makran region.
These areas witness armed attacks by Sunni Baloch groups, anti-regime protests, and deadly cross-border fuel smuggling. In recent years, many Baloch have been killed and others arrested by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Zahedan witnessed a massacre on September 30, 2022, when more than one hundred civilian protesters were killed by IRGC gunfire.
Baloch human rights activist Abdullah Arif Balochi, based in London, points out that successive Iranian governments have viewed western Balochistan strictly through a security lens.
He adds that they have also implemented demographic changes, including relocating Baloch tribes to other parts of Iran and settling large numbers of Persian Iranians in Baluchistan’s cities, empowering them to administer Sistan and Balochistan province. He notes that the IRGC controls administrative, military, and economic decision-making in Balochistan through numerous security and economic projects.
Balochi further notes that, for the Iranian regime, Balochistan is considered an unstable hotspot that could erupt at any moment due to long-standing underlying conditions.
However, despite more than a month of aerial warfare carried out by the United States and Israel against the Iranian regime—and despite the internal and external weakening the regime is experiencing as a result of sustained strikes—Balochistan, unlike other Iranian cities and regions, has not witnessed popular or armed movements against the IRGC and other Iranian security agencies.
“It is unlikely that there will be civilian protests under the current circumstances. Despite internal instability, the regime is still capable of suppressing the Baloch to prevent any civil movement within Balochistan. Up to this moment, there are hundreds of detainees, and a large number of Baloch have been killed on charges of collaborating with Mossad,” Balochi told Alhurra.
At the same time, Balochi does not rule out the possibility that armed Baloch groups based in the mountains could move into Baluchistan’s cities when an appropriate opportunity arises in the coming weeks, especially if they are provided with air cover by the United States and its allies.
Baloch sources speaking to Alhurra indicated that IRGC bases, security centers, economic facilities under IRGC control, and ballistic missile bases in Balochistan—particularly in the coastal cities of Chabahar and Konarak overlooking the Gulf of Oman—have been subjected to U.S.-Israeli strikes. The airstrikes also targeted IRGC sites along the border strip between Iran and Pakistan, potentially paving the way for armed Baloch groups to advance and confront Iranian forces on the ground.
Zaffar Jawaid, Secretary-General of the Baloch Canadian Congress, says that the Baloch are concerned about the possibility that the regime in Tehran may remain in power after the war ends.
“The deepest fears of the Baloch and other oppressed ethnic groups in Iran lie in the possibility that the war could expand and escalate into a bloody civil war, or that it could end without the fall of the current regime in Tehran. In that case, we as ethnic minorities would face a dangerous situation of marginalization and abandonment to the regime, as happened in the past. The Baloch, as a marginalized community, could lose more of their land, culture, identity, and resources to the regime in Tehran,” Jawaid added.
Spillover of Unrest into Pakistan
In contrast to the Iranian side of Balochistan, which is currently experiencing a cautious calm, the Pakistani side continues to witness an ongoing insurgency led by Baloch groups opposing Pakistan, coinciding with the war in Iran. According to observers and specialists in Pakistani affairs who spoke to Alhurra, this raises concerns in Pakistan about the expansion of insurgency and the possibility that any future Baloch uprising in Iran could spread into its territory, potentially leading to the establishment of a unified Greater Balochistan state.
“Rebel groups in Pakistan have escalated their attacks, temporarily seized areas of land, and targeted infrastructure linked to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. In response, the Pakistani state has militarized eastern Balochistan through large-scale security operations, resulting in serious human rights violations and civilian casualties,” Jawaid continued.
Amid regional changes, Jawaid does not rule out the possibility that an opportunity may arise in the future for cross-border political understanding between eastern and western Balochistan based on shared interests.
Eastern Balochistan, under Pakistani control, has long witnessed an armed insurgency led by Baloch groups against the Pakistani army and against Chinese control of Gwadar port, as well as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor project, which links western China through Pakistan to Gwadar port and the Arabian Sea. The project is a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Baloch human rights activist Abdullah Arif Balochi stresses that Pakistani Balochistan has already been experiencing unrest for decades and that Iranian Balochistan will not pose a threat to Pakistan.
“The most active and internationally engaged Iranian Baloch groups are those advocating for federalism. Their policies are very clear and more rational, and they have no ambition to interfere in the Pakistani side. Their goal is regional stability. Yes, there is humanitarian sympathy for the Baloch and the oppression they face in Pakistan, but the policies of Baloch parties are very clear regarding the situation in Pakistan,” Balochi added.
According to Alhurra’s monitoring of the Baloch issue in Iran and Pakistan, both countries have not recognized Baloch rights in recent years and have continued to exclude them from meaningful participation in cultural, economic, and political spheres, as well as from managing their own regions. However, the Iranian side has been harsher in its treatment of the Baloch, carrying out military campaigns amounting to collective eradication, especially under the current ruling system in Iran.
Qambar Malik, Secretary-General of the Balochistan Center for Rights Defense and Studies, notes that Iran and Pakistan view the Baloch struggle through the lens of territorial integrity, with each state considering the movement a threat to its sovereignty rather than recognizing its original nature.
Malik rules out any future coordination between Baloch armed groups in Iran and their counterparts in Pakistan.
“There has been no significant coordination between armed Baloch groups on both sides of Balochistan in terms of logistics or cross-border operations in the past, and it appears unlikely that this would suddenly change,” Malik explained.
The Strategic Corridor
Malik believes that the Balochistan corridor could become a gateway linking the Arabian Sea to resource-rich Central Asia, bypassing traditional chokepoints, if regional stability is achieved. At the same time, he stresses that such a development cannot occur without recognizing Baloch demands and their rights to land and resources.
“In the current strategic environment, the importance of the Balochistan corridor is increasing. With growing uncertainty surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, international powers—including the United States and its allies—may increasingly view the corridor as a potential alternative for stabilizing energy and trade routes,” Malik added.
In this context, Malik argues that the strategic importance of the Baloch corridor and the international attention it attracts could contribute to achieving Baloch demands for autonomy and self-determination, particularly if these demands are seen as aligned with broader objectives of ensuring secure and continuous access to vital supply lines.
