Through a complex network of land routes operated by Iraqi militias loyal to Iran—and under the supervision of officers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—extensive smuggling operations are carried out. These include fuel, weapons, metals, spare parts for missiles and drones.
Over the past years, Iran has never stopped circumventing U.S. sanctions imposed on it by using Iraq through its militias. However, Alhurra’s tracking of land-based sanction evasion indicates an increase in Iranian smuggling activities via secret routes that cross the border between Iran and Iraq.
An Alhurra correspondent in the Kurdistan Region obtained exclusive information from leaders in the Iranian opposition, revealing a network of routes passing through Ahvaz, in southwestern Iran, toward Iraqi territory. According to this information, the network includes unknown paths used for smuggling, which Iraqi militias are familiar with.
These routes include a path starting from Khidr Island- which is part of the city of Abadan, passing through a smuggling crossing that sources say is directly supervised by the Revolutionary Guard, reaching the Al-Faw Peninsula in southern Basra province. Another route extends from the Hawizeh area in Ahvaz toward Qurna district in southern Iraq’s Basra province.
A third smuggling route begins from the Rafie area in Ahvaz and reaches the Iraqi subdistrict of Al-Mashrah through the Umm al-Na’aj marshes in Maysan province.
These regions contain numerous waterways and channels that run through marshlands and water surfaces—areas typically only used by local fishermen. According to Iranian opposition leaders, they are also used by members of the Quds Force and militias familiar with these routes and waterways. Many of these areas were, in the 1990s, bases for Iranian-backed Iraqi opposition groups, particularly the Badr Corps, which operated there and used them to launch attacks against the former Iraqi regime.
The United States began imposing a naval blockade on Iranian ports located on the Gulf and the Sea of Oman starting April 13 of this year. The blockade includes all ships entering and leaving Iranian ports—about eight in total—which represent major arteries for Iran’s trade and economy.
Therefore, Iran’s land crossings—especially with Iraq—have long been a key pillar in its efforts to circumvent U.S. sanctions, according to the head of the Executive Authority of Ahvaz State, Aref al-Kaabi.
“There are many illegal crossings along the Iranian-Iraqi border, especially in the south, as well as in the border region between Iranian Kurdistan and Sulaymaniyah province in Iraqi Kurdistan. In general, the Iraqi-Iranian border is fully open for importing and exporting whatever Iran wants,” al-Kaabi told Alhurra.
Although al-Kaabi does not exclude Iran’s land border with Pakistan—which also sees intense activity by smugglers and networks working for the Revolutionary Guard—he stressed the need for the United States to monitor land borders and crossings between Iraq and Iran, particularly Al-Faw port and Basra’s crossings adjacent to the Ahvazi city of Khorramshahr.
“Monitoring the Iraqi-Iranian border would significantly reduce Iran’s ability to circumvent sanctions, making the economic effects of the sanctions on the regime and its missile and nuclear programs very clear, and placing greater pressure on Tehran,” al-Kaabi explained.
According to exclusive information obtained by Alhurra from the Iranian Kurdish opposition Freedom Party, Iran spends a large portion of its illicit financial revenues—obtained through electronic banking networks—on purchasing military supplies and transferring them via companies, intermediaries, and smuggling networks into Iran to develop its missile and nuclear programs. These supplies include drone spare parts, nuclear technology, ballistic missile technology, and prohibited chemicals necessary for military programs.
A leader in the party, Goran Yazdan Pana, pointed to the existence of many Revolutionary Guard-affiliated companies specialized in land-based evasion. These companies deliver supplies to IRGC proxies in Iraq, who then transport them into Iran through special smuggling corridors.
“Since the beginning of this year, Iran—through its Iraqi proxies and these corridors—has managed to import sensitive military electronics, dual-use materials used in the production and development of ballistic missiles and drones, and essential chemicals for rocket and drone engines, with a value estimated in the tens of millions of dollars,” Yazdan Pana added.
Yazdan Pana bases his information on his party’s cells and underground networks inside Iran. He noted that incoming intelligence confirms active transport movement along land corridors controlled by Iranian-backed Iraqi groups since the United States imposed its blockade on Iranian coasts in mid-April.
The Iraqi-Iranian border stretches approximately 1,600 kilometers, most of it natural terrain consisting of rugged mountains and water bodies. Along it are nine main official crossings: Shalamcheh in Basra, Al-Sheeb in Maysan, Zurbatiyah in Wasit, Al-Mundhiriyah and Soumar in Diyala, Haj Omran in Erbil, and three crossings in Sulaymaniyah—Bashmakh, Parvizkhan, and Seranban.
According to information obtained by Alhurra from Iranian Kurdish parties, Ahvazi leaders, and Iranian and Iraqi activists, the border hosts more than 40 unofficial crossings in addition to dozens of smuggling routes. However, the head of Iraq’s Border Crossings Authority, Lieutenant General Omar al-Waeli, denied in January—during a session in the Iraqi parliament—the existence of any unofficial crossings in central and southern provinces.
In February, the Iraqi News Agency reported that the Border Crossings Authority had reached an agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government to close all unofficial crossings through a joint committee tasked with sealing them along the border strip.
Perhaps the Iranian sector most affected by the U.S. naval blockade is the oil sector. The blockade has prevented Iranian oil from entering global markets, leaving the sector nearly paralyzed.
Iraqi political analyst Jaafar Ziyara believes that Iran’s land-based evasion operates through a complex, multi-layered network in which Iraq represents the central hub. Iraqi oil, unlike Iranian oil, is not subject to international sanctions and enjoys legal cover in global markets.
“Iran relies on Iraq as a main route for blending and re-exporting oil under an Iraqi identity, via land routes within Iraq, through both official and unofficial crossings, taking advantage of weak oversight or the influence of allied actors in some border areas,” Ziyara explained.
He added that the same network involved in smuggling Iranian oil also facilitates the transfer of raw materials entering Iraq under the cover of civilian goods from China, which are later transported to Iran. These include materials believed to be used in sensitive military industries, such as components for solid rocket fuel.
However, Iranian affairs expert Masoud al-Fak argues that relying on land routes through Iraq as a substitute for maritime ports is not realistic. He noted that Iran’s export infrastructure—especially oil—is designed for large-scale maritime transport that trucks or limited railways cannot match.
Even if Iran-backed groups have influence inside Iraq, land transport capacity remains limited, more costly, and slower, all under international financial and commercial scrutiny that makes large flows noticeable and easy to track. Iraq itself cannot risk exposing its financial system and oil exports to broad secondary sanctions.
“What Iran can do through Iraq remains within a limited framework: land-based evasion, passing some goods through intermediaries, using front companies, fragmenting shipments to reduce exposure, and possibly expanding regional barter arrangements,” al-Fak said.
He added that the bottleneck is not only at border crossings, but also in the global financial, insurance, and shipping systems—where the United States retains significant influence and oversight.
According to al-Fak, Iran will not be able to fully evade the blockade. Instead, it will pay higher costs per unit of trade, and its ability to export oil will remain fundamentally constrained.
Despite the naval blockade, Iran has managed to export some quantities of oil by sea between April 13 and April 21, according to Reuters.
The agency cited data from analytics firm Vortexa, indicating that about 10.7 million barrels of Iranian crude passed through the Strait of Hormuz and exited the area under U.S. naval blockade. The oil was reportedly smuggled on six tankers that had switched off their automatic identification systems.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
