Today in Lebanon, the war is not being fought on a single front, but on two: the battlefield and politics. At a time when the Lebanese state is seeking to halt the fighting and open channels for negotiation, Hezbollah is betting on the option of direct confrontation, raising the slogan “the battlefield has the final say.”
As a result, millions of Lebanese find themselves marginalized in a life-or-death equation.
In his speeches, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem describes the confrontation as an “existential battle,” stating that the party is prepared to wage a long war. Regarding negotiations, he repeats that they amount to “imposing surrender when conducted under fire.”
On the other side, Israel rejects any attempt at a ceasefire before Hezbollah is disarmed.
For its part, the Lebanese government is trying to push toward ending the war and opening a negotiating track. However, President Joseph Aoun indicated, during his meeting with the French Minister Delegate for the Armed Forces, Alice Rufo, on March 31, that Israel still refuses to respond to Lebanese, Arab, and international calls to stop the war and begin negotiations.
This indicates that there is also a deadlock on the political horizon.
Meanwhile, Member of Parliament Najat Aoun stresses her rejection of Hezbollah speaking on behalf of the Lebanese, considering that representation of the state lies with the president and the government. In remarks to Alhurra, she affirmed that “a militia linked to Iran should not determine the timing of war and peace.”
Militarily, the phrase “the word belongs to the battlefield” does not necessarily imply the ability to achieve a decisive outcome. Strategic expert retired Brigadier General Naji Malaeb believes that Hezbollah “still retains combat capabilities that enable it to continue the confrontation, including short-, medium-, and long-range weapons, drones, as well as the ability to carry out intensive barrages.”
However, according to Malaeb in remarks to Alhurra, these capabilities are employed within the framework of a “long war of attrition rather than a decisive battle, where the party does not focus on preventing Israeli incursions deep into the south as much as it seeks to test its opponent’s ability to bear the cost and sustainability of a ground confrontation.”
He adds that this comes amid challenges facing Israel, including a shortage in military manpower, as indicated by Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir. According to this reading, the party aims to prolong the confrontation in preparation for imposing a ceasefire later, similar to what occurred in previous rounds.
Malaeb also notes that the launching of dozens of rockets daily, including “Scud” missiles with a range of about 700 kilometers, “reflects the party’s continued ability to operate launch platforms outside full surveillance, despite Israeli intelligence advances and the use of artificial intelligence technologies that have enabled precise operations, including the assassination of a large number of the party’s leaders.”
Conversely, the Israeli army published images of weapons it said it found in the south, arguing that the Lebanese army has failed to disarm the party or prevent its presence there. Malaeb explains that “the Lebanese army, despite entering some sites and tunnels and confiscating weapons south of the Litani River, has not completed its deployment in border villages, and the confiscations have been limited to what has been uncovered.”
He also points out that “the absence of a cohesive central Syrian army facilitates the continued smuggling of light and medium weapons and ammunition, particularly with the presence of the party’s stockpiles inside Syria, although these activities have declined compared to the past, according to Israeli estimates.”
Political analyst George Aakouri told Alhurra that “the party is capable of continuing an open war of attrition but lacks the military and logistical capabilities that would allow it to achieve decisive results,” citing the scale of human and material losses suffered by Lebanon compared to those borne by Israel.
In contrast, writer and political researcher Dr. Makram Rabah told Alhurra that the party does not possess the ability to wage a long-term war, “but instead relies on an approach based on continuing to launch—even just one rocket per day—in order to maintain a certain level of threat to Israel, allowing it to market this as a ‘victory.’ However, this approach is increasingly clashing with growing internal Lebanese rejection, given the scale of destruction that exceeds the state’s capacity for reconstruction, especially with the continuation of the party’s military role.”
Rabah, Aakouri, and Aoun see that the insistence on the slogan “the word belongs to the battlefield” goes beyond the immediate military dimension and is linked to broader regional calculations, given Hezbollah’s decision-making is tied to trajectories led by Iran.
According to this reading, Hezbollah’s behavior operates along two parallel tracks: the first relates to the dynamics of regional confrontation, and the second is tied to the course of negotiations between Iran and the United States. In this context, the battlefield is not limited to being a space for military operations, but becomes a pressure tool employed in both tracks, whether through escalation or within a negotiating framework.
This approach is based on the assumption that the outcome of this confrontation will lead to a redrawing of regional balances, with Lebanon constituting one of its primary arenas. This explains, according to the assessments of Aoun, Rabah, and Aakouri, the limited impact of international initiatives concerning Lebanon, in the absence of a decisive settlement among the concerned parties.
Aakouri concludes that international movements, particularly French efforts, “remain within the framework of proposing ideas and preparing the atmosphere,” stressing that “any serious mediation must be led or endorsed by the United States, and must fundamentally be linked to resolving the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons as a primary entry point for any negotiation track.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
