Fog of Ceasefire

Thirty-six hours ago, six weeks of war were put on pause for two weeks. What does the ceasefire even cover? Does it include Lebanon? What about Iranian strikes on Gulf states? Are Israeli strikes on Hezbollah part of the deal — or not?

We look at the promise and the pitfalls.

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QUOTE OF THE WEEK

“Our hands remain upon the trigger, and should the slightest error be committed by the enemy, it shall be met with full force.”

— Iranian Supreme National Security Council statement after ceasefire announcement 

TOP OF THE NEWS

Hormuz Is Open, but Iran Still Controls Passage

The ceasefire’s central condition was Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and Tehran agreed. According to the statement released Tuesday night by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on behalf of the Supreme National Security Council, safe passage during the two-week pause will be possible only “via coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces and with due consideration of technical limitations.” That wording doesn’t describe an open waterway.

A Greek-owned bulk carrier and at least one other vessel passed through yesterday morning, but hundreds of vessels are still stranded in the region, including 426 tankers alone. Shipowners are working through the fine print of who qualifies and how coordination works in practice. How long clearance takes, whether fees are imposed, and which flags are accepted will be tested at volume in the coming days. Iran has accepted no permanent constraint on its ability to close the strait again.

Two Proposals, One Room, No Agreed Text

Both parties accepted the ceasefire holding incompatible frameworks for what comes next, and neither has abandoned its position. The United States has a 15-point plan. Iran submitted a ten-point counterproposal that demands, among other things, full sanctions relief from the U.S., the United Nations Security Council, and the IAEA; the release of frozen Iranian assets abroad; withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from regional bases; compensation for war damages; and the right to continue uranium enrichment. Iran’s plan also calls for continued dominance over the Strait of Hormuz as a permanent economic and geopolitical arrangement, including, according to some reports, a fee for ships transiting the waterway.

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Photo: Reuters

Pakistan’s Mediation: Real Achievement, Limited Power

Pakistan’s role in brokering Tuesday’s pause was significant. Field Marshal Asim Munir maintained overnight contact with U.S. Vice President JD Vance, special envoy Steve Witkoff, and Araghchi in the hours before the agreement. Witkoff and Araghchi exchanged direct text messages during the negotiations. Pakistan’s prime minister then announced the ceasefire, invited both delegations to Islamabad for Friday talks, and pledged to remain at the center of the process. The reasons Pakistan is well-positioned to host are clear enough: Besides sharing a long border and having cultural ties to Iran, it has a Shia Muslim population second in size only to Iran’s. It also hosts no U.S. military bases, and was not struck by Iranian missiles during the war.

That role is already being tested. Within hours of the ceasefire taking effect, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif referred to violations that were “undermining the spirit of the peace process” and urged all parties to exercise restraint.

Islamabad is not in a position to enforce anything. Pakistan has no leverage over IRGC battlefield behavior and no authority over the nuclear issue. It also has no mechanism to compel either party to honor a final agreement. Its value is as a channel and a venue. Whether the talks produce anything depends on Washington and Tehran, not Islamabad.

Tehran’s Domestic Split

The Supreme National Security Council’s statement announcing the pause declared that “nearly all the war’s objectives have been achieved” and that Iranian forces had driven the enemy into a state of historic helplessness. That phrasing was directed at an Iranian public that has endured nearly six weeks of strikes on military, infrastructure, and civilian sites.

Iran’s hardline press rejected it immediately. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor-in-chief of Kayhan, whose editorial line is directly supervised by the office of the supreme leader, used his column to argue that Washington, not Tehran, would be the beneficiary of any pause or negotiation. He wrote that Iran was winning and should press the advantage, that the enemy was “out of breath” and should not be allowed to recover, and that the honor of those killed in the war — above all the slain supreme leader — demanded continuation, not compromise. He called the pause “a gift to the enemy.”

The IRGC’s own position sits somewhere between the political leadership and the hardline press. The Revolutionary Guards issued a statement saying they would heed the ceasefire, but warned they are ready to return to war if the “enemy makes another miscalculation.” 

Israeli soldiers in a military jeep near the Israeli side of the border with Lebanon. Photo: Reuters

Israelis Are Already Breaking the Pause

Pakistan’s prime minister announced Tuesday that the ceasefire covers “Lebanon and elsewhere, effective immediately.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office said the same night that Lebanon is not included.

Israel launched what it called its largest coordinated strike of the current war, hitting more than 100 Hezbollah targets within 10 minutes in Beirut, southern Lebanon and the Bekaa valley. Lebanon’s health ministry issued emergency appeals as hospitals were overwhelmed with casualties. Iran’s foreign ministry said it was considering resuming attacks against Israel over what it called ceasefire violations, and Araghchi raised the strikes directly with Pakistan’s prime minister.

If Tehran concludes that the United States cannot or will not restrain Israel in Lebanon, the political case for Tehran to continue the Islamabad process might be difficult to sustain.

WHAT COMES NEXT: FIVE THINGS TO WATCH

Islamabad, site of the talks. Photo: Reuters

1. Who Is at the Table in Islamabad

The delegations matter as much as the agenda. On the U.S. side, Vance, Witkoff, and President Trump’s son-in-law and adviser Jared Kushner are all expected to participate. On the Iranian side, the picture is less settled. Iran’s ISNA news agency reported yesterday that Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf will lead the Iranian delegation, but state-affiliated news agency Tasnim said the head has not yet been picked. That ambiguity just before talks open suggests internal disagreement about who has responsibility. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian confirmed to Pakistan’s prime minister in a phone call that Iran would participate in the Islamabad talks.

The choice of Ghalibaf, if confirmed, sends a clear message: Tehran is sending a security-establishment figure with IRGC roots rather than a career diplomat, which may be another sign of who is actually running Iran’s wartime decision-making.

2. The Nuclear Question Will Not Wait

The two-week window was created as a pause to allow a broader agreement to be finalized. The nuclear issue will be at the center of that attempt.

The two sides are far apart on the question of enrichment. U.S. President Donald Trump stated publicly yesterday that “there will be no enrichment of Uranium” in Iran. Iran’s ten-point plan explicitly preserves the right to enrich. Senator Lindsey Graham declared that every ounce of the material must be “controlled by the U.S.” Iran has already told mediators it will not accept full stockpile removal under a temporary arrangement.

The gap may be wider than the public record shows. The Persian-language version of Iran’s ten-point plan, as released by Iranian state TV channels, included a phrase stipulating continued uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. That phrase does not appear in the English-language versions Iranian diplomats shared with journalists. The omission has not been explained. Whether it was a deliberate hedging of the document for foreign audiences, a translation decision, or something else, the effect is the same: The two sides may not be negotiating from an identical text, and the document Washington called a “workable basis” may read differently in Tehran than it does when they meet.

With the talks in Islamabad set to open tomorrow, that contradiction is unresolved and neither side has publicly moved from its stated position.

3. IRGC Is Not a Signatory

The ceasefire is a statement from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The IRGC issued its own statement saying it would heed the ceasefire, but warned it remains ready to return to war if the enemy makes another miscalculation. A directive attributed to the supreme leader ordered all armed forces including the IRGC to halt attacks immediately.

Whether that order was actually issued by Mojtaba Khamenei is of course an open question. American and Israeli intelligence claim they have information that Mojtaba is unconscious and suffering from a severe medical condition, unable to be involved in any regime decision-making. Two statements attributed to him since assuming power were read by television presenters, not delivered by him directly. If the supreme leader is incapacitated, the ceasefire order was issued by someone else, and the chain of authority behind it is unclear. Whether it holds across all levels of IRGC command, including units that have operated with considerable autonomy throughout the conflict, is one of the most consequential operational questions of the next two weeks.

4. Iran Enters Islamabad with Declared Distrust

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council stated publicly in its ceasefire announcement that its delegation enters Islamabad with “complete distrust” of the United States. It cited what it described as the pattern of Gaza and Lebanon, where ceasefire arrangements did not prevent resumed attacks. U.S. intelligence assessments have concluded that the Iranian regime, though weakened, is more hardline after weeks of strikes, with the IRGC exerting greater control rather than less. A negotiating partner that combines declared distrust with increased internal hardline consolidation is not one that is likely to make early concessions. The Islamabad talks may well produce a framework discussion, not a final deal, and the two-week window may need to be extended by mutual agreement, which the ceasefire text allows.

A tanker sits anchored awaiting passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Photo: Reuters

5. Clock Is the Real Pressure

Mediators working on the pre-ceasefire framework had already concluded that the core issues, including full Hormuz arrangements and the disposition of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, could only be resolved as part of a final agreement. If Islamabad does not produce significant progress by April 22, the clock simply resets to its position on Tuesday evening, with Washington holding a deadline and Iran refusing to capitulate on sovereignty issues, and Israeli and Gulf partners pressing the administration not to let a temporary pause harden into something permanent by default. Iran has already told the world it does not trust the other side. The two weeks may end not with a deal or a breakdown, but with both sides arguing about whether to buy more time. That argument could well become the next crisis.

ESSENTIAL READING: LEBANON AND THE WAR

Dogs evacuated from the southern suburbs of Beirut. Photo: Reuters

Israel’s shifting goals in Lebanon — Long War Journal, April 4. An assessment of how Israel’s immediate objectives have moved from rapid Hezbollah disarmament to establishing a permanent security zone two to three kilometers from the Blue Line. The piece maps the operational constraints, including overextended forces and airpower alone failing to halt Hezbollah’s regeneration, and examines why the IDF is anticipated to continue its campaign even after any Iran ceasefire. The domestic Lebanese fractures section, covering the failed attempt by the government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to expel Iran’s ambassador-designate, is useful background. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/04/analysis-israeli-goals-in-lebanon-war-shift-from-imminently-disarming-hezbollah-to-reestablishing-south-lebanon-security-zone.php

Hezbollah’s leverage calculation — The Alma Research Center’s April 6 daily report provides detail on Hezbollah’s attack patterns since March 2: 1,121 attack waves, roughly 70% rockets and missiles, 29% UAVs, concentrated on northern Israel within 5 kilometers of the border. Includes Lebanese government and Hezbollah MP statements on the diplomatic track. Useful for understanding where each side’s red lines sit ahead of Islamabad. https://israel-alma.org/daily-report-the-second-iran-war-april-6-2026-1800/

The Lebanon-Iran linkage — The UK Parliament Research Briefing (updated this week) is the cleanest single-document overview of the Iran–Lebanon nexus, including why Iran conditioned any ceasefire on halting strikes against Hezbollah, Lebanon’s ban on Hezbollah military activities and why it cannot enforce it, and the nuclear breakout timeline context. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-10521/CBP-10521.pdf