In her interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, MBN’s editor-in-chief, Leila Bazzi, explored a region slipping further from diplomacy and deeper into uncertainty. Crocker argues that the collapse of the U.S.-Iran talks was hardly surprising given the complete lack of common ground, while warning that military pressure alone is unlikely to produce a lasting outcome. From the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz to Lebanon and Pakistan, he sketches a broader picture of a Middle East where temporary arrangements may contain escalation, but solve little, and where any durable stability still depends on stronger states rather than force alone.
Leila Bazzi: Joining me today is Ambassador Ryan Crocker, one of America’s most experienced diplomats, with decades of service in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; and a clear understanding of how quickly short-term gains can turn into long – term traps.
Thank you, Ambassador, for joining me. On April 9, you told NPR that nothing ever really ends in the Middle East, and that the U.S.-Iran ceasefire would solve little. Now that the Islamabad talks have ended in deadlock, was this outcome foreseeable from the start?
Ambassador Ryan Crocker: Okay, thanks. Yeah, I don’t think it’s a surprise at all that the negotiations achieved no real progress. The agendas of the two sides were diametrically opposed. There was no common ground and I think really all of us who follow the area could see that these talks were not likely to produce anything and they didn’t. There will be continuing indirect contact. I’m sure the Pakistanis said they will stay active or other intermediaries, but right now I don’t see much prospect at all of diplomacy.
Leila Bazzi: With diplomacy stalled, the United States is tightening pressure in the Strait of Hormuz and expanding its military posture across the region. Is this a calculated show of force, or the early shape of a wider conflict with Iran?
Ambassador Ryan Crocker: I don’t really see the prospect for a wider conflict, although that certainly could happen. This is an enormously complex situation, a lot of moving parts, a lot of shifting positions on the part of the major players, primarily the United States and Iran, but also Israel. So anything could happen, but I don’t see the further escalation as the most likely prospect.
The introduction of Marines to the area, one brigade of the 82nd Airborne, these would be adequate forces for a very quick strike on an island or something, but it’s not a big enough force to occupy anything. I also think that President Trump is saying he does not want the conflict to expand. So we’ll see what happens next.
A number of scenarios are possible, but I do not foresee the likelihood. I certainly hope there will not be the likelihood of a major U.S. ground offensive. I think it’s all the above and then some, actually.
Leila Bazzi: For decades, the United States was the Gulf’s main security guarantor. But as regional alignments shift and pressure grows on the Strait of Hormuz, is Washington losing that role, or is Iran using the waterway as strategic leverage?
Ambassador Ryan Crocker: For the Arab Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman, they really don’t have a lot of choices here. They are not going to move away from the U.S. In a sense, they may become more dependent on us for security, although less enchanted with that relationship. But I don’t see a particular degradation of United States relations with the Gulf countries.
One very interesting thing to watch as this U.S. blockade of the Straits of Hormuz proceeds is whether the Navy, primarily of the United Arab Emirates and the Saudis, will send their ships to help enforce the blockade. They have pretty well sapped this out so far. But one of the things I’m watching is whether they will involve their forces in supporting the U.S. as we seek to increase the pressure on Iran.
that’s one of the things I’m watching for. They have maintained a purely defensive posture thus far. And participation in a blockade could be consistent with that defensive line chosen thus far. But I think this is another example or another indication of which way the Gulf states are going to trend in this.
Leila Bazzi: Ambassador, you served in Islamabad during periods of intense strategic double-dealing. Today, as Pakistan presents itself as a neutral intermediary between Washington and Tehran, it is also expanding major arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Sudan. Does that signal a shift from strategic depth to strategic opportunism? And what does it say that Saudi Arabia is turning to Pakistan for weapons, rather than the United States?
Ambassador Ryan Crocker: Well, I think Pakistan has one overwhelming interest in this current situation, and that is strengthening its ties with the Trump administration and the U.S. We’ve all watched what happened last year in the confrontation between India and Pakistan. The U.S. intervention there prevented a broader conflict, and it also led to a significant warming of relations between the U.S. and Pakistan.
The chief of staff of the Pakistani army, of course, had a very cordial visit to Washington, and a good meeting with President Trump. And I think that has motivated their actions thus far to try to use this current conflict as an opportunity to build better, bigger, stronger bridges to Washington. And I think that has been reciprocated.
I think that the Trump administration has been grateful for Pakistan’s role in this. And of course, at the same time, Pakistan has long had a close relationship with Saudi Arabia. There is, in fact, as I understand it, a defense agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which Saudi Arabia has not yet invoked, and Pakistan is probably hoping they won’t.
Leila Bazzi: Doesn’t that also make Pakistan a potential liability for Washington, given its reported arms sales to actors such as the LNA in Libya? Wouldn’t that cut against U.S. interests? Or is Pakistan simply overstating its diplomatic value to Washington while pursuing transactions wherever it can?
Ambassador Ryan Crocker: But I would imagine that that close relationship will continue to strengthen as well. Now, I don’t think this administration is at all focused on who is selling what to whom in Libya. I don’t think they care.
Again, Pakistan is looking for U.S. support vis-à-vis India. They are looking for U.S. support vis-à-vis the Taliban in Afghanistan. And they see an opportunity, I think, to strengthen the ties with Washington, and that’s what they’re working to do in this current conflict.
Leila Bazzi: With talks set for tomorrow in Washington involving U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Lebanese and Israeli representatives, the goal is a ceasefire, not a peace agreement. Do you see this as a meaningful step toward stabilizing Lebanon, or merely a temporary arrangement that leaves Iran’s influence largely intact?
Ambassador Ryan Crocker: Well, as you know, the conflict in Lebanon goes back a long, long time. Operation Latani was, what, 1978, when Israel launched a ground incursion up to the Latani River, and they maintained a military presence in southern Lebanon from 1978 all the way up to 2000. And between Operation Latani and the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, we saw a 1982 full-scale invasion of Lebanon by Israel.
The target then, of course, was the Palestinian movement, the PLO, and now it’s Hezbollah. And indeed, Hezbollah came into being as a result of the Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation. So this is a long, sad, tangled, and tragic narrative that I don’t think a few days’ worth of talks in Washington are going to resolve.
It’s also worth remembering, of course, that Israel and Lebanon’s direct negotiations back in 1982 and 1983, culminated in an actual signed agreement of May 17th, 1983. That never went into effect. The Lebanese parliament never ratified it. But again, there is nothing new here in direct Israeli-Lebanese contacts. This has all been tried before. None of it has produced lasting peace.
And I am of the view, and have been for some time, that the only long-term solution for peace in Lebanon and peace in northern Israel that is sustainable and durable is through a stronger Lebanese state. And, of course, the current actions, particularly the huge flow of displaced persons from the south up to Beirut and other parts of Lebanon, has the exact opposite impact of weakening the Lebanese state, not strengthening it. So I hope that through U.S. mediation, some form of ceasefire will take hold.
Leila Bazzi: Ambassador, you spoke about the 1983 talks. You were in Lebanon at the time, and you survived the U.S. embassy bombing. You later returned to help reopen the embassy. Back then, Lebanon was a weak state, and today it is still a weak state. So what has changed? Isn’t history repeating itself? What can the Lebanese government realistically bring to the table with the Israelis if it does not truly control the decisions of war and peace?
Ambassador Ryan Crocker: The U.S. will continue its policy under this administration of working to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces, to strengthen the Lebanese state, and that all parties will realize that the stability and the security of both countries and the region largely can only come through a stronger Lebanese central government, stronger than it is now. And in that respect, I hope very much that the United States will take immediate steps to alleviate the burden of the million or so displaced Lebanese in an already weak state. UNHCR and the United Nations Commission for Refugees is very deeply engaged in Lebanon, trying to support the government on this. They’ve launched an emergency appeal of $300 million. I hope the United States will step up with that funding, both as a humanitarian measure but also as a means of strengthening, or at least not for weakening, the Lebanese state. Well, that is the essential dilemma here.
The 1982 Israeli invasion was sparked by actions by Palestinian armed groups out of southern Lebanon, terrorist attacks across the border into Israel, cross-border shelling. Those were the sparks that led to the 1982 invasion. And, of course, then the Lebanese state had no control over the PLO, the Palestinian presence in south Lebanon.
We fast forward now, what, 44 years, and it’s the same scenario with just a different player in southern Lebanon. It’s not the Palestinians any longer. It’s Hezbollah backed by Iran. The dynamic is the same. The Lebanese state did not control its territory in the 1970s and early 1980s. It does not control its territory now. And only through effective state control over all Lebanese territory, I think, is the situation ever going to be resolved. That won’t happen quickly. But there is a change dynamic here.
The revolution in Syria, of course, took Syria off the table as a supporter of Hezbollah and a transit point for Iranian assistance. Iran itself is dramatically weakened. And as I understand it, Lebanese popular opinion is certainly not behind Hezbollah. So there is a range of regional and internal factors that I think would favor an extension of state control. But it won’t happen overnight. And it won’t happen under Israeli guns.
So I hope that Israel will achieve its immediate objectives in its further degradation of Hezbollah’s military capabilities in the south, further leadership in Beirut and elsewhere, and will agree to a ceasefire and take a long-term view of the situation. They’ve tried everything else. They’ve been doing it since 1978.
And their formidable armed forces and all the power they generate have brought security to the Israeli-Lebanese border. The only man who can do that is a strong and independent Lebanese government. And that is going to take time, it’s going to take consistency, and it’s going to take support, certainly from the United States, also from other countries.
And it’s going to require a realization, I think, on the Israeli side, that this will take time, that even if the guns fall out, the Lebanese state is not in a position to forcibly disarm Hezbollah. That will only come through a gradual building of a stronger Lebanese state, and it will take time. But Israel, the U.S., and who knows the Lebanese, have spent almost half a century of conflict that has resolved nothing, and it’s time to try something different.
Leila Bazzi: Ambassador, as you warned on April 9, do you still expect tomorrow’s talks may lead nowhere?
Ambassador Ryan Crocker: Well, I would anticipate that the Israelis will call for prompt Lebanese action to disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese will call for an immediate ceasefire. Neither is likely to happen by close of business and what have you.
We just have to hope that Israel, with a lot of support and encouragement and indeed pressure from the United States, will once again understand that the use of force is not going to solve the problem of security on their northern border. So I would not expect any major diplomatic breakthrough. I do think U.S. engagement here is very important, and I am pleased to see that we are engaged in this diplomatic effort.
And I understand from news reporting that President Trump has also been active with Prime Minister Netanyahu to try and limit the violence. I hope those efforts continue because the United States, in this situation and so many others, is the indispensable partner to some form of peaceful resolution, short-term and long-term.
Leila Bazzi: Before I let you go, Ambassador, I was struck by something you said in your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Be careful what you get into, and even more careful about how you get out of it. Is the United States now at risk of repeating that mistake with Iran, entering a conflict it may not be able to control?
Ambassador Ryan Crocker: Well, it’s axiomatic, Leila, that it’s a lot easier to start a war in the Middle East than it is to end one. And none of us can predict now where this is going, particularly with the U.S. blockade now coming into being. I think the best we can hope for is an informal return to the status quo and the February 28th. The United States continues to suspend all kinds of operations against Iran, and where Iran, maybe not by announcement but by action, allows the states to reopen to all traffic. That’s about the best case I can see. And all that does is return us to where we were on February 27th. It solves nothing.
But again, wars are a lot easier to start in the Middle East than they are to conclude. I don’t see any immediate aspect of concluding this one, either through diplomacy or further force. So I just hope that both sides will exercise restraint and let things quiet down and return to the February 27th situation and then see, in a period of long quiet, what might be possible dramatically.
Leila Bazzi
Leila Bazzi is Editor-in-Chief of MBN
