Israel, Iran, and the End of Ambiguity: Sokolski on the New Nuclear Order

For more than half a century, the world has relied on one central framework to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Today, that system is under exceptional strain.

There are no longer binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals. Global powers are modernizing instead of disarming. And tensions around Iran’s nuclear program continue to escalate.

All of this comes as diplomats gather in New York for the NPT Review Conference from April 27 to May 22, 2026. The question now is no longer whether the system is being tested – but whether it can still hold.

Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and former U.S. Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy at the Pentagon, joined MBN Editor-in-Chief Leila Bazzi to answer the question.

MBN: Is the NPT still functioning, or is the international community simply going through the motions? We’ve already seen how this played out with North Korea. It left the treaty, freed itself from inspections, and built nuclear weapons. Now Iran is openly considering a similar path.

Sokolski: I think that’s a bit too absolute. Most countries are still in the treaty – almost all of them. The real issue is that the few exceptions are the ones that matter. The treaty also depends on something critical: that nuclear states reduce their reliance on these weapons. And right now, that’s not happening.

China is expanding its arsenal. Others are modernizing. So yes, there’s a credibility problem. But the real question is not whether the treaty is broken. The question is: do we want to strengthen it? Because if we do, we need to rethink how it’s applied – especially when countries can get right up to the edge of building a bomb without consequences.

“Once you get to highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium, it is effectively too late. At that point, the material itself is already weapons-relevant. Some parts of the fuel cycle are very hard—if not impossible—to fully safeguard in real time.”

MBN: Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons gives countries the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. So where does that right actually begin – and where does proliferation start?

Sokolski: That’s the key question – and for decades, we’ve avoided answering it clearly. The standard approach has been simple: If a program is declared peaceful, has a civilian purpose, and is under some form of inspection – then it’s acceptable.

But we now know that’s not enough. It wasn’t enough in Iraq. It wasn’t enough in Iran. It wasn’t enough in North Korea. All of these countries were members of the NPT. All had facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. And all got very close – or crossed the line –into weapons capability.

So the real issue is how we define “peaceful.” Under the current interpretation, countries can argue that enriching uranium – or even reprocessing plutonium – is part of their rights. But if you go back to the negotiating history, that’s not what was intended. There were proposals to allow full access to the entire nuclear fuel cycle – and those were rejected.

Why? Because once a country can produce nuclear fuel, it is already very close to producing a weapon.

MBN: Let me bring this back to Iran. We now know that Iran has enriched uranium to 60% or more. So are we already at the point where Iran could have reached a weapons capability?

Sokolski: We don’t know. And that’s not just an intelligence gap. It’s part of the problem itself. Once a country has produced nuclear fuel and experimented with key processes, it becomes very difficult to track where the remaining steps might be happening. Some of these activities don’t require large facilities. They can take place in small, dispersed setups.

So where is everything? What stage are they at? There’s no clear answer. Some argue they are years away. Others say they could be weeks away. And the reality is – this uncertainty is built into the system.

MBN: So let me ask you directly: Did the attacks on Iranian facilities last year and this year actually stop Iran’s program? Or did we simply stall it, while allowing it to continue in a less visible, and potentially more advanced, way?

Sokolski: I think we need to be honest about what we’re doing. There’s this idea – people call it “mowing the lawn” – that you need repeated strikes to set the program back. But you’re not destroying a lawn. You’re trying to destroy knowledge. And that’s the problem.

Once the knowledge is there – once the designs are understood — you don’t necessarily need the same level of expertise to move forward.

So yes, there is a lot of uncertainty. And that uncertainty doesn’t go away just because you strike facilities.

MBN: So we’re not eliminating the program— we’re managing it?

Sokolski: At best, we’re delaying it. But delay without clarity creates risk. What’s missing is a clear set of demands that would actually reduce that uncertainty. And that requires something we haven’t really seen – which is tougher, more consistent enforcement.

MBN: Let me take this step further. Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, while remaining outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons under a policy of ambiguity. So if we step back – does this suggest that the global nonproliferation system is really about rules… or about how those rules are applied?

Sokolski: I think that’s a very fair question. Let’s be clear: Israel has nuclear weapons. And so do India, Pakistan, and North Korea. The issue is not just who has them – it’s whether there’s a pathway for countries to move away from relying on them. Because in the end, the treaty only works if states – including the major powers – reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons.

“What should actually qualify as “peaceful” nuclear activity? Should countries be allowed to withdraw from the treaty while in violation, without facing automatic consequences?”

MBN: So ultimately, this isn’t just about Iran. It’s about whether the system itself can still shape behavior.

Sokolski: Exactly. The treaty is not just about stopping proliferation. It’s also about creating conditions where countries don’t feel they need these weapons. And if that part doesn’t hold, then the rest of the system becomes much harder to sustain.

MBN: Since the 2025 strikes, access to some of Iran’s nuclear facilities has been restricted, and in some cases, inspectors have lost visibility over key materials. So, are we effectively blind today when it comes to Iran’s nuclear activities? And practically speaking, what does that mean for how close Iran could actually be to a nuclear weapon?

Sokolski: The core issue is how nuclear materials behave. When you’re dealing with what we call bulk handling facilities – you’re not tracking solid objects. You’re dealing with gases, liquids, and powders. And that matters. Because it is far easier to track and account for solid fuel assemblies than it is to track materials that can be moved, diluted, or diverted in small amounts.

So the question becomes: Is this really safeguardable? Many experts have argued for decades that it is not fully safeguardable. The problem is not just technical – it’s also political. To keep consensus, the system has often assumed a level of control that may not actually exist. And we’ve seen what happens when inspectors are removed or access is restricted: You lose continuity of knowledge. And in nuclear terms, that matters a lot.

Because once you get to highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium, it is effectively too late. At that point, the material itself is already weapons-relevant. So the real issue is this: some parts of the fuel cycle are very hard – if not impossible – to fully safeguard in real time.

MBN: What do you realistically expect from this conference? And how are emerging or undecided countries likely to read this moment? Do they still see value in joining the system – or are they beginning to question it?

Sokolski: There are a few things you can expect almost automatically. Every review conference revisits the idea of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East – which inevitably brings up Israel’s position.

The United States will likely focus on China’s refusal to engage in serious arms control negotiations. Russia and China will push back – raising concerns about U.S. deployments and alliances. So in many ways, the familiar divisions will remain.

But the more important issues are often the ones that don’t get enough attention. For example: What should actually qualify as “peaceful” nuclear activity? Should countries be allowed to withdraw from the treaty while in violation, without facing automatic consequences? That was the case with North Korea.

And perhaps it’s time to consider mechanisms like automatic sanctions for countries that withdraw while not in compliance. There are also gaps in enforcement. For instance, the treaty prohibits helping countries develop nuclear weapons, including key components. But there’s no clear international mechanism to enforce that. That’s a serious gap.

Will there be agreement on these issues? Probably not. But that doesn’t mean the discussion isn’t valuable. Because these conferences are where you define the debate – where you set the direction. And once those issues are clearly on the table, they can be carried forward into other forums. That’s how progress happens.