Armed members of the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun militias, along with Iraqi factions, are being deployed inside Iran as part of a security plan prepared by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in anticipation of any attempt at a popular uprising or a ground war that could be launched by the United States and Israel.
According to exclusive information obtained by an Alhurra correspondent in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq from Iranian sources, including opposition leaders and activists inside Iran, the IRGC has divided Iran into three security zones. It has assigned internal security responsibilities to three groups: the Fatemiyoun militia, composed of Afghan Shiite fighters; the Zainebiyoun militia, composed of Pakistani Shiite fighters; and Iraqi factions, including Kataib Hezbollah Iraq, Harakat al-Nujaba, the Badr Organization, Kataib Imam Ali, Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Ansar Allah al-Awfiya.
The same sources indicate that, under the plan, the Fatemiyoun militia is tasked with operations in central Iran and parts of the east, as well as the north, including the capital Tehran. The Zainebiyoun militia is assigned security duties in eastern and southeastern Iran, in the province of Baluchistan and along its coast on the Gulf of Oman. Meanwhile, Iraqi militias are positioned, according to the plan, in Ahvaz and parts of Iranian Kurdistan, particularly in the provinces of Ilam, Kermanshah, and Sanandaj.
Sources confirmed that after the IRGC suffered heavy strikes from American and Israeli aircraft during the forty-day war, losing many of its personnel and seeing its bases destroyed, and in preparation for a ground war or the outbreak of a popular uprising, it decided to deploy some of its external arms inside Iran. These forces are to carry out military and operational tasks alongside the IRGC, Iranian intelligence, and the Basij, especially given their extensive experience in urban warfare and hit-and-run operations gained during approximately 13 years of participation in the Syrian civil war, as well as field operations in Iraq.
According to the same sources, the duties assigned to these militias include setting up checkpoints on roads and within neighborhoods in Iranian cities, participating in the protection of vital and military facilities, and carrying out raids, searches, and arrests of Iranians accused of cooperating with the United States, Israel, or the Iranian opposition.
Although Iranian authorities are concealing the details of their internal security plan, they are attempting to highlight the civilian role of these militias inside Iran, such as participating in solidarity gatherings or operating under the cover of relief campaigns for Iranians during the war.
At the beginning of April, Tasnim News Agency, affiliated with the IRGC, published on its page on the platform (X) a video of a civilian motorcade parade in which the Fatemiyoun militia participated alongside Hezbollah and other militias in central Tehran. Participants raised militia flags alongside the Iranian flag, as well as images of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and current Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei.
Samir Yassin, Secretary-General of the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz, considers the IRGC’s use of its external arms inside Iran a notable shift that cannot be separated from rising internal security tensions within the country.
Yassin points out that the deployment of these militias does not appear in the form of clear military units, but rather within semi-organized formations or individuals operating in civilian clothing within parallel security networks, particularly in Ahvaz, Baluchistan, and Kurdistan.
“The IRGC employs these militias as a supporting force that can be mobilized during moments of tension, whether to contain protests or to reinforce control in areas described as sensitive. Moreover, the combat experience these formations have gained in external conflict zones qualifies them to carry out rapid intervention roles in complex security contexts,” Yassin told Alhurra.
Yassin believes the regime is trying to avoid exhausting its regular forces and the IRGC internally by delegating some tasks to parallel forces, especially amid ongoing tensions with the United States and Israel and the possibility of escalation.
Qassem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force—the IRGC’s external wing—established the Fatemiyoun Brigade in May 2013, drawing from Afghan Shiite refugees who had fled to Iran due to deteriorating conditions in their home country. Dozens of Pakistani Shiite refugees in Iran later joined them, forming their own militia known as the Zainebiyoun Brigade.
The purpose of establishing these two forces was to participate in the Syrian civil war. Indeed, they fought intense battles in Syria under the leadership of the Quds Force. The Fatemiyoun were deployed in Daraa, Damascus, Palmyra, and Aleppo, while the Zainebiyoun participated in battles in Latakia, Aleppo, and Damascus.
According to previous reports published by Alhurra, the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun militias withdrew, along with Iraqi militias and many former Syrian officers and soldiers, into Iraqi territory before the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024. After the withdrawal, the Quds Force stationed these forces at Camp Ashraf, affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces in Diyala province, northeast of Baghdad, before beginning to transfer them in batches into Iran during last March.
Farzin Karbasi, an Iranian Kurdish opposition political analyst residing in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, confirms that the decision to deploy the Fatemiyoun, Zainebiyoun, and Iraqi factions inside Iran was issued by IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi. It included transferring members of these militias, along with Iraqi factions, overland into Iran.
“These militias were transferred from Iraq into Iran under the cover of humanitarian relief campaigns and support initiatives for Iran announced by the Popular Mobilization Forces at the onset of the war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other. The decision included deploying the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun militias and assigning them security and military tasks in Iranian cities,” Karbasi told Alhurra.
Karbasi stresses that the primary objective of deploying these militias internally is to suppress any popular uprising seeking to overthrow the regime, especially amid Iran’s internal collapse and severe economic crisis. He notes that Iran’s defeat during the forty-day war has diminished its military capabilities, while Iranian soldiers and officers are suffering from psychological breakdowns and have lost confidence in the regime and their leadership.
“The Iranian regime is very weak, fearful about the condition of its forces, and is close to losing control over them. Therefore, it resorts to these militias as a substitute for Iranian forces.”
Alhurra’s correspondent quoted Iranian opposition figures as saying that Afghan and Pakistani refugees in Iran were given attractive promises by the IRGC in exchange for joining the Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun. These promises included high salaries, land, and Iranian citizenship after the Syrian war. However, the IRGC has so far fulfilled these promises only for a small number of individuals—mainly commanders—while ordinary fighters are still waiting.
“The danger of these militias lies in the fact that when they commit crimes, they often escape accountability, as their members come from outside the local social fabric. This makes them more prone to committing violations and more brutal in dealing with civilians, unlike local forces whose identities are known and who are subject to accountability,” said Salah Abu Sharif al-Ahvazi, Secretary-General of the Ahvazi Popular Democratic Front, to Alhurra.
Al-Ahvazi added that the Iranian regime’s reliance on these foreign militias reflects its field weakness, loss of trust in its local forces, and its attempt to compensate for this decline through more extreme tools that are less bound by legal or moral constraints.
For his part, international strategic expert Amer al-Sabaileh believes that the Iranian authorities’ use of these external arms is aimed at preparing for potential internal security breakdown.
“The strikes that targeted regime centers in recent times could pave the way for renewed public unrest against it. Therefore, it needs to deal with this issue through repression. Bringing in these militias is closer to controlling the expected instability resulting from any confrontation with ground forces,” al-Sabaileh told Alhurra.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
