As the ceasefire in Lebanon took effect on March 16, the war between Israel and Hezbollah did not so much end as it entered a more ambiguous phase. What appeared on the surface as a halt in fighting revealed another dimension: a more complex management of the war, layers of undeclared roles, and losses that have not been fully disclosed.
Data gathered by Alhurra, based on open-source analysis, tracking circulating digital material, and interviews with field, security, and political sources, indicate that what unfolded on the ground was not merely a confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, but a broader arena in which Iran likely played roles beyond traditional support.
The threads of this investigation began with scattered material: images circulating on social media and lists containing dozens of names said to belong to Iranians killed during the war. When these materials were compared with media reports and Israeli intelligence sources, a recurring pattern emerged pointing to the targeting of individuals suspected of affiliation with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including financial and intelligence officials believed to have been working in direct coordination with Hezbollah.
However, the striking element at this stage was not only the nature of the names or the locations targeted, but the near-total absence of any official statements from the IRGC or Hezbollah confirming or denying this information. Compared with previous wars, where names of the dead were clearly announced, this silence does not appear incidental but may be part of a systematic approach to managing information.
Based on Lebanese Ministry of Health data and UN sources estimating the scale of human losses, figures up to April 2026 indicate that the total number of fatalities in Lebanon ranges between approximately 2,100 and 2,300. Israel, for its part, stated that around 1,800 of those were Hezbollah fighters killed in military operations in the south, the Bekaa Valley, and the outskirts of Beirut.
As for Iranian fatalities, cross-analysis of open sources, intelligence, and media reports suggests their number falls in the dozens, most of them IRGC officers or military advisors linked to the Quds Force.
But we did not rely solely on these general estimates. Through careful tracking of local obituary data inside Iran and analysis of content across various media platforms, we were able to document around twenty names likely linked to the Quds Force. According to the investigation’s methodology, this figure represents the minimum observable threshold, while the actual number is likely higher, especially given the presence of advisors who do not hold publicly declared ranks or operate within informal structures.
These findings were reinforced through interviews conducted by Alhurra with field sources. Medical sources reported that an airstrike on the city of Tyre targeted a non-Lebanese individual believed to be linked to the IRGC, whose body was removed from the site by Hezbollah elements under complete secrecy, without any official registration of identity.
This incident, when cross-referenced with open data, reflects a recurring pattern: the presence of likely non-Lebanese fatalities accompanied by a complete absence of official announcements, reinforcing the hypothesis of undisclosed casualty figures.
Who Was Running the Operations?
Building on these findings, the investigation shifted to analyzing the decision-making structure during the recent war. Interviews with sources familiar with Hezbollah’s environment indicate that the IRGC’s role extended beyond support or training to include direct participation in operational planning, presence within coordination rooms, and supervision of certain field operations.
These sources suggest that this shift is tied to a broader context, most notably the killing of key leadership figures during the 2024 confrontation and the absence of Hassan Nasrallah, who had served as the executive link between Tehran and the party, regulating the relationship between the two. With his absence, the need for direct Iranian intervention to manage the situation became more apparent.
In an interview with Alhurra, political analyst Ali al-Amin confirmed this assessment, arguing that the battle shifted from a defensive framework for Hezbollah to one affecting Iran’s strategic presence in Lebanon, necessitating direct intervention from Tehran to address the political and security vacuum and emerging threats.
An Iranian source speaking to Alhurra revealed that Tehran had assigned senior IRGC leadership to manage the war file and that Iranian officers participated in leadership meetings within Hezbollah over the past year, using Lebanon as a regional operations hub.
According to this source, the relationship between the two sides goes beyond military coordination to include a multi-layered supervisory system: financial, security, and even religious. A permanent IRGC representative is said to be present within Hezbollah’s Shura Council, participating in decision-making, while IRGC-linked personnel are embedded in social institutions such as “Jihad al-Binaa” and “al-Imdad,” submitting periodic reports to Tehran on the performance of party cadres.
These accounts intersect with what French researcher Gérard Vespierre told Alhurra, noting that hundreds of Iranian cadres, despite their limited numbers, play a decisive role in directing tens of thousands of Hezbollah fighters.
Historical Roots: A Structure Extending Since the 1980s
Looking back at the historical background, we reviewed Iranian research reports based on published confessions and testimonies from former IRGC officials. These documents show that the relationship between the two sides dates back to the early 1980s, when Iranian officers—including Brigadier General Khosrow Orouj—oversaw the training of Imad Mughniyeh in 1982 during special military courses inside Iran.
Other names also appear within this structure, such as Mohammad Hadi Haj Rahimi, linked to the Quds Force training unit, and Mohammad Baqer Zolfaghari, presented as one of those responsible for Hezbollah’s early military structure. Prominent leaders such as Mohsen Rezaei, Mohsen Rafiqdoost, and Mohammad Saleh Hosseini also appear within the coordination network linking Tehran to the Lebanese arena at that time.
These findings point to the existence of an institutional training structure within Iran, including sites such as Badand, Varamin, and Imamzadeh Abdullah, as well as units affiliated with the Quds Force such as the “Imam Ali Unit,” which played a central role in preparing fighters for operations outside Iran.
According to an Iranian source speaking to Alhurra, Lebanon is viewed in operational terms as a forward base for the IRGC, with its units deployed across multiple areas, including the Bekaa Valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs, in addition to logistical and training sites.
However, this presence has not remained static. According to journalist Ali al-Amin, IRGC personnel in earlier periods entered Lebanon in larger numbers and with relative ease, particularly in a political environment that favored Hezbollah. But this reality changed after the 2024 war and the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, with increasing pressure on the party both internally and from Israel and the Syrian regime alike.
Despite accusations directed at the Iranian embassy in Beirut, portraying it as a center for managing IRGC operations, data gathered by Alhurra from informed Iranian sources suggests a more complex picture. These sources deny that Tehran relies on its embassies to manage operations in Lebanon, emphasizing a separation between diplomatic work and field activity.
However, the data does point to an indirect role for the embassy limited to general coordination and facilitating the movement of IRGC personnel, including arranging entry and exit procedures and providing certain logistical cover—placing it in the position of administrative support rather than an operational command center.
In parallel, Lebanese authorities have taken measures aimed at limiting the presence of individuals linked to the IRGC, including banning their activities, deporting some of them, and tightening entry requirements for Iranian nationals by imposing prior visa conditions.
Yet interviews with informed sources revealed difficulties in implementing these measures, particularly due to the use of indirect travel routes and potential gaps in documentation systems.
Alhurra’s attempt to track the number of Iranian arrivals during this period highlights the level of opacity surrounding the issue, as official administrations refrain from providing any relevant figures or data. Rabih al-Haber, director of “Statistics Lebanon,” confirmed that accessing accurate information is nearly impossible at this stage, noting that key parts of the relevant institutions and agencies remain under Hezbollah’s influence, restricting data flow and limiting independent verification.
Within this context, we conducted an analysis of flight movement data during the escalation period using Flightradar24 and Flight Connections. The analysis showed a decline in direct flights between Iran and Lebanon since November 2024, alongside increased reliance on alternative routes such as Tehran–Baghdad–Beirut and Tehran–Istanbul–Beirut.
It also indicated the continued operation of flights via regional carriers such as Turkish Airlines and Middle East Airlines, enabling access to Lebanon through transit routes.
Based on flight density and aircraft capacity, the number of arrivals from Iran during the war period is estimated at around 200 individuals. However, this discrepancy between declining direct flights and continued inflow suggests that the network did not stop but reorganized itself into a more complex pattern.
Nevertheless, informed sources told Alhurra that the use of forged Lebanese passports by IRGC elements makes it difficult to determine the actual number of Iranians entering, while confirming that the IRGC focused on sending leadership figures and specific individuals rather than large numbers.
In this context, a legal case has emerged in Lebanon after MP Ghada Ayoub filed a lawsuit concerning the use of Lebanese passports under false names.
According to security sources speaking to Alhurra, this case revives the issue of the disappearance of Joseph Sader in 2009, which remains unresolved to this day. These sources, in information revealed for the first time, indicate that Sader, who worked at Beirut airport, had accessed key data related to the real identities of Iranian individuals used in passport forgery operations. They add that after accessing this information, he was abducted and has not been heard from since.
These facts do not appear to be mere side details in a war that has temporarily ended, but rather indicators of a more complex and opaque operational pattern that goes beyond conventional military confrontation. Between conflicting figures, undisclosed names, and indirect transit networks, a picture emerges that is difficult to fully decode, yet clearly points to the depth of Iran’s presence within the operational decision-making structure in Lebanon.
The investigation into these findings does not lead to definitive answers so much as it opens a series of questions: Was the war truly managed from within Lebanon, or from outside it? And where do Hezbollah’s limits as a local actor end, and where do the IRGC’s boundaries as a strategic decision-maker begin?
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Randa Jebai
Randa Jebai is an award-winning journalist with more than 20 years of experience. She joined Alhurra TV’s investigative team in 2020, earning honors from the AIBs, New York Festivals, and the Telly Awards. She previously worked with major Lebanese outlets and holds master’s degrees in law and journalism.
