For more than four decades, Iranian espionage cells and networks have remained present in Turkey.
Iranian opposition figures and activists told Alhurra in exclusive comments that Iran’s Quds Force has begun activating sleeper cells and expanding its influence in Turkey following the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025.
The same sources indicated that the Iranian plan includes recruiting large numbers of Turks, Afghans, Pakistanis and Arab residents in Turkey in exchange for money to carry out intelligence tasks and launch attacks on U.S. and Israeli economic and political interests in Turkey.
These tasks also include transferring some of the recruits into Iran and integrating them into militias loyal to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to perform intelligence and military roles inside Iran during wartime.
On Jan. 29, Turkey’s state broadcaster announced the arrest of six individuals, including one Iranian national, on charges of espionage for gathering military information on behalf of Iran, following coordinated raids across five provinces.
It said Turkish authorities detained the suspects after a joint investigation conducted by Istanbul prosecutors, counterterrorism police and the Turkish intelligence service. The detainees were accused of collecting information on military bases and other sensitive sites inside and outside Turkey in coordination with the IRGC’s intelligence apparatus.
Turkish journalists and political observers who spoke to Alhurra did not deny the presence of Iranian influence in their country but ruled out Iran’s ability to carry out operations inside Turkey.
Journalist and Middle East researcher Ismail Goktan said there are still groups directly or indirectly supported by Iran, as well as others influenced by Iran’s Islamic Revolution, composed of Turkish and Kurdish Islamists.
Goktan pointed to two main movements — one Turkish and one Kurdish — as prominent examples of Iranian influence in Turkey. These include Turkey’s Felicity Party, an offshoot of the Islamist Welfare Party that maintains ties with Iran and holds a favorable view of the country’s system of velayat-e faqih, and Huda-Par Party, the political wing of the formerly armed Hezbollah movement, a Kurdish group that also maintains ties with Iran. He added that smaller groups are also influenced by the Iranian system.
However, Goktan said Iran is unable to mobilize these groups in an organized manner because most of them still identify as Sunni Islamist movements despite their political proximity to Iran.
“There is no doubt that Iran has been trying for years to build an axis it can rely on inside Turkey, but it cannot build one similar to what it has established in Iraq, Lebanon or even Syria, because most Islamic movements influenced by Iran limit their activities to political or religious spheres and have not converted to Shiism,” Goktan told Alhurra.
On April 15, Iran’s official news agency IRNA reported on a joint meeting in the Iranian city of Tabriz that brought together pro-Iran Turkish journalists and activists with Iranian counterparts to prepare for the formation of “resistance media” spanning the two countries, as a key part of Iran’s war against the United States and Israel.
According to the agency, the meeting included several Turkish journalists and activists known for their loyalty to Iran, including journalist Nureddin Sirin. It added that the Turkish delegation expressed support for “velayat-e faqih and the resistance front” led by Iran and composed of its regional proxies.
“There are individuals loyal to Iran, to Lebanese Hezbollah and to other Iranian militias in Turkey, but they have no influence. Their numbers are very small, and they will not be able to organize any formation or establish so-called resistance media. Therefore, Iran will not succeed in any step, whether in mobilizing its influence or promoting its militias in Turkey,” Turkish international relations expert Mohammed Ragipoglu told Alhurra.
Iranian influence in Turkey has a violent history. In the 1990s, Iranian cells represented by the organization “Salam and Tawhid,” a secret Turkish group loyal to the IRGC, carried out a series of bombings in Turkish cities and assassinations targeting prominent figures, activists and journalists.
At the same time, the IRGC mobilized another affiliated organization in southeastern Turkey, a Kurdish group known as Hezbollah, whose fighters received intensive military and intelligence training from Quds Force officers, the IRGC’s external arm.
“Iran does not focus its recruitment efforts only on Turks but works intensively to recruit refugees and residents in Turkish cities, especially Arabs whose numbers have increased since the start of the Arab Spring, particularly Syrians, followed by Lebanese and Palestinians, as well as Pakistanis and Afghans. Iran has managed to recruit many of these individuals to carry out its agendas in recent years,” Iran affairs specialist Soran Balani told Alhurra.
Balani noted that Iran has extensive experience in forming such covert cells worldwide, especially in regional countries, by using its diplomatic tools to recruit activists, journalists and well-known social figures to work on its behalf and implement its agendas.
Embassies and diplomatic channels are not the only means through which the IRGC conducts its external operations. According to information obtained by Alhurra from Iranian opposition figures active in Europe, Iran’s system has evolved into an integrated network that includes media outlets, journalists, political lobbying groups, research centers, academics, social media networks and charitable, cultural and religious organizations. These operate quietly to carry out actions and attacks against Western interests through recruits of various nationalities, while simultaneously polishing Iran’s image abroad and portraying it as a victim.
Abdulrahman al-Haidari, spokesman for the Arab Democratic National Movement in Ahvaz, said Turkey, from Iran’s perspective, is not merely a neighboring country but an advanced operational arena. Ankara combines a sensitive geographic location, relative political and media openness, and the presence of social environments receptive to the discourse promoted by the Iranian system.
“Iranian influence in Turkey and around the world does not always move through clear official institutions but rather through what can be described as dormant media cells — individuals and institutions that do not operate officially in Tehran’s name but act politically and in the media to protect its narrative, justify its policies and present its armed proxies as legitimate resistance movements,” al-Haidari told Alhurra.
He said this type of influence is more dangerous than traditional influence because it does not impose itself through direct force but infiltrates through language, psychological impact and the reshaping of public awareness.
According to al-Haidari, this Iranian strategy takes on added sensitivity in Turkey, which hosts a broad segment of society with Islamic orientations. This provides Iran with an ideal opportunity to exploit the environment through an ideological discourse centered on “resistance” slogans, allowing Tehran to build popular sympathy that transcends historical differences between the two countries.
However, al-Haidari said Iran does not limit itself to media and cultural influence but seeks to gradually expand its reach by building loyalty networks, cultivating political and media figures, and potentially creating environments conducive to semi-organized formations or networks linked to its regional project. He added that, under Iranian influence and various IRGC activities, Turkey could shift from being merely a media platform to a complex arena of influence combining media, intelligence and political leverage.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
