Shiite parties are seeking to place the weapons of armed factions under state control, in an effort to deal with increasing U.S. pressure on Baghdad related to dismantling the weapons of Iran-backed factions, according to Iraqi political and government sources who spoke to Alhurra.
These efforts aim to establish a mechanism to end the weapons of armed factions through a tripartite committee that includes Iraq’s designated prime minister Ali al-Zaidi, outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, and the leader of the Badr Organization, Hadi al-Amiri, who has close ties with leaders of armed factions affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces.
The Coordination Framework announced on April 27 its nomination of al-Zaidi for the position of prime minister, a nomination that was welcomed by U.S. President Donald, who wished him success “as he works to form a new government free of terrorism and capable of achieving a brighter future for Iraq.”
Alhurra obtained information from two sources within the Coordination Framework (the ruling Shiite alliance) indicating that the committee was formed at the initiative of the Framework, and that its task is to develop a comprehensive plan to place weapons under state control as part of a government program that includes clear timelines and an implementable execution plan.
According to the information, the committee’s tasks are not limited to the factions file alone but also include regulating the status of the Popular Mobilization Forces and institutionalizing them within the framework of the state, along with preparing a comprehensive vision for all types of weapons outside official control.
A leader in the Coordination Framework told Alhurra that “this vision is supposed to be presentable to the American side, in an attempt to reassure it and buy time at the same time.”
The same source confirmed that “there is welcome from the Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction led by Qais al-Khazali, and the Imam Ali Brigades led by Shibl al-Zaidi, as well as other factions, each of which has its own conditions in return,” without specifying those conditions.
In contrast, other factions reject any discussion about handing over their weapons and consider it an existential issue. Groups such as Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba affirm that the weapons of the “resistance” will remain in their hands as long as the American presence continues in the region.
All of these factions are designated on U.S. terrorism lists.
Former advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, Maen al-Jubouri, told Alhurra that “it is not easy for a political authority—whether a prime minister, a president, or otherwise—with its personal and party capabilities, even if supported, to end the phenomenon of parallel weapons, which at times may surpass the weapons of governments.”
A source in the Iraqi National Security Council told Alhurra that “there are indications of a willingness among a number of factions to hand over their weapons, but at the same time, there is a challenge that the next government will face regarding the weapons of Kataib Hezbollah and al-Nujaba.”
He added that “the two factions are refusing to negotiate so far and are seeking to retain every piece of weaponry they possess.”
However, the matter is not over yet. What the tripartite committee will produce now will be a mechanism and an initial framework open to discussion within the Shiite political environment, but ultimately aims at one thing, according to the sources who spoke to Alhurra: disarming the factions.
Security expert specializing in armed groups, Fadel Abu Rgheef, told Alhurra that “it is not easy for factions to give up their weapons; there is an ideology tied to these weapons, and I do not believe Iran will agree to that.”
The head of the Baghdad Center for Public Policy, Abbas al-Anbari, told Alhurra that “it is difficult for the Iraqi government or any other party to make a decision regarding the factions in agreement with Iran or its representatives, because the military and security decision-making inside Iran is not clearly defined.”
Most of these factions are linked to Iran. During periods of influence of the former commander of the Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani, Tehran was responsible for establishing these groups, training them, and funding them in their early stages. This connection to Tehran means that the decision comes from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, not from the faction leaders. This connection will pose a major challenge to the Iraqi government.
At the same time, Washington is demanding that the designated prime minister resolve the issue of uncontrolled weapons as a key condition for continuing the partnership with the United States.
For several months, Washington has been exerting significant pressure on the government of current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and leaders of the Coordination Framework to deal decisively with the weapons of Iran-backed armed factions.
These pressures intensified following the outbreak of war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other on February 28, and the alignment of Iraqi factions with Tehran in the conflict by targeting U.S. diplomatic facilities in Iraq.
Many of these factions have political wings within the Coordination Framework and hold influential parliamentary representation following the November 2025 elections.
Washington has taken more stringent measures by halting the flow of dollar shipments from Iraqi oil revenues to Baghdad and suspending high-level security cooperation between the two sides, in order to pressure the Iraqi government to deal more seriously with armed factions.
Washington has three tracks in Iraq. The first lies in excluding factions from power, as it refuses to deal with any government that includes figures linked to armed factions, whether those figures are political or even presented as technocratic fronts, as shown in a message recently sent by the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Baghdad, Joshua Harris, to leaders of Shiite political forces, according to a Coordination Framework leader who spoke to Alhurra last week.
The second track relates to the financial aspect, where the U.S. administration links the flow of dollars to the Iraqi Central Bank and the stability of the banking system to the seriousness of the government in reducing the influence of factions and dismantling their military wings.
The third track consists of direct security pressure, through allocating financial rewards for the capture of prominent faction leaders, placing the government before a complex test in how to deal with these figures.
Al-Zaidi is seeking to strengthen the independence of his decision in forming the government by selecting his ministers away from factional interference, relying on his economic background to convince political forces that Iraq’s financial stability is tied to reducing the influence of weapons outside the state.
Al-Jubouri says that “if the Iranian system changes and the rule of the clerical establishment falls, this will be reflected inside Iraq, and there could be major measures to neutralize weapons and their impact domestically.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Mustafa Saadoon
Mustafa Saadoon is an Iraqi journalist who has worked for several international and Arab media organizations. He covers politics and human rights.
