As the confrontation in southern Lebanon escalates, a term associated with Hezbollah has resurfaced in the discourse—one that evokes one of the bloodiest and most controversial chapters of the conflict: suicide operations.
Arab media outlets and Lebanese press reports have cited military leaders within Hezbollah as saying that the party is preparing to return to “the tactics of the 1980s,” including the option of suicide operations.
Media figures affiliated with the party have also promoted this idea through media platforms and social networks.
However, revisiting this option raises questions about its seriousness and realism in light of changing battlefield dynamics, as well as the possibility that it is merely another chapter in psychological and media warfare.
Answering these questions begins with examining the ideological structure that accompanied Hezbollah’s emergence in the early 1980s, when religious narratives derived from Karbala and Ashura intersected with the military and organizational dimension. During that period, “self-sacrifice” was not presented merely as a symbolic idea, but gradually evolved into a mobilization tool, and then into a combat option tied to field realities amid an asymmetrical confrontation with Israel.
In this context, the operation carried out by Ahmad Qasir in 1982 marked the first of its kind and the starting point for suicide operations associated with Hezbollah. At the time, Qasir drove a Peugeot 504 loaded with large quantities of explosives into the Israeli military governor’s building in the city of Tyre, before detonating himself inside. The attack resulted in the killing of 76 people and the injury of 118 others, in addition to the complete destruction of the eight-story building.
Shortly thereafter, Lebanon witnessed a series of suicide attacks that marked a turning point in the nature of the confrontation. On April 18, 1983, a suicide bomber detonated a truck carrying approximately 900 kilograms of explosives inside the U.S. Embassy compound in Beirut, killing 63 people and injuring around 120 others. On October 23 of the same year, two simultaneous attacks targeted the headquarters of U.S. and French forces in Beirut, in what later became known as the “Beirut barracks bombings,” resulting in hundreds of deaths and injuries. On September 20, 1984, the U.S. Embassy in Aoukar was targeted in another attack.
These operations primarily relied on car bombs driven by attackers toward fortified targets. Over time, suicide operatives were incorporated into a more cohesive organizational structure. By 1985, following Israel’s withdrawal to the border strip, a special unit was formed for this type of operation, though precise numbers of those involved remain unknown.
According to data published in The National Interest, Hezbollah carried out 36 suicide operations between 1982 and 1986, after which the pace of such operations declined significantly, eventually coming to a halt by the end of the 1990s.
The cessation of suicide operations reflected a transformation in military capabilities. Over time, Hezbollah transitioned from a guerrilla warfare model to a force possessing a missile arsenal, intelligence capabilities, and drones.
Nevertheless, the idea did not disappear from the discourse. Rather, the glorification of such operations remained present in statements by party leaders, including former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who on more than one occasion referred to the effectiveness of this type of operation in certain contexts.
Experts believe that reintroducing this option today does not reflect a practical shift as much as it is tied to the pressures facing Hezbollah.
Dr. Mustafa Amin, an expert on extremist groups, says that “the idea still exists within the organization’s ideological framework, but it is not being considered as an operational option given the development of its military capabilities,” adding that invoking it “falls within the tools of psychological deterrence and media escalation.”
In remarks to Alhurra’s website, Amin added that any actual resort to this tactic “would expand the party’s classification on terrorism lists, which contradicts its effort to present itself as a political and military actor within the Lebanese context.”
Similarly, strategic expert retired Brigadier General George Nader points out that suicide operations in the 1980s relied on the ability to reach targets within populated areas, where the presence of Israeli forces allowed proximity and direct attacks. Today, however, the reality has changed fundamentally, as Israeli forces now adopt a deployment pattern based on evacuating the areas in which they are stationed of civilians, stripping such operations of their basic conditions.
In light of these factors, Nader told Alhurra that “carrying out a suicide operation, whether through an explosive belt or a car bomb, has become impossible due to the difficulty of reaching military targets.”
As this tactic has declined, new alternatives have emerged—most notably today, according to Nader, “loitering drones remotely guided, which perform a similar function in terms of impact but without the need for a direct human element,” stressing that “these means themselves face countermeasures by Israel to limit their effectiveness.”
Observers believe that the revival of discussion around suicide operations partially reflects Hezbollah’s current capabilities.
In this context, political analyst and journalist Youssef Diab told Alhurra that waving the threat of suicide operations “reflects a state of weakness and a narrowing of available options and constitutes an attempt to confuse the adversary and instill fear within its ranks.”
According to Diab, this rhetoric also reflects “a shift in the messages directed to the party’s audience, as it seeks to re-present itself as a force capable of protection, while suggesting the possibility of gradually regaining areas seized by the Israeli army,” while at the same time reflecting “a decline in its ability to maintain the image it promoted for years as a force capable of altering the balance of power in the region.”
Diab notes that this “tactic faces major field challenges, given Israeli technological superiority and advanced surveillance systems on land, sea, and air, making its implementation more difficult and less impactful compared to the past.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
