In Beirut, traces of the war with Israel still linger across parts of the city: cracked buildings, shuttered storefronts, and slow-moving reconstruction crews working through neighborhoods struggling to resume daily life.
But the fear that has resurfaced in Lebanon in recent days is no longer tied solely to the border. A speech by Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Kassem has revived a prospect many Lebanese have spent years trying to avoid that the dispute over Hezbollah’s weapons could once again spill from politics into the streets.
Kassem said that “the people have the right to take to the streets, topple the government, and resist this American-Israeli project with all the power they possess.” In a country still marked by the events of May 7, 2008 — when Hezbollah turned its weapons inward and seized parts of Beirut after a government move against its private telecommunications network — many Lebanese did not view the remarks as mere rhetoric.
The U.S. response came swiftly. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio condemned Hezbollah’s call to bring down the Lebanese government, saying the group was “seeking to drag Lebanon back into chaos and destruction,” while stressing that Washington “will not allow the Lebanese government to be overthrown.”
The question now is not whether Hezbollah retains the capacity to destabilize Lebanon internally. The group still possesses an arsenal and security infrastructure unmatched by any other Lebanese faction. The more pressing issue is whether it is prepared to use that leverage domestically at a moment when it is emerging battered from a costly confrontation with Israel, facing mounting losses in its strongholds and growing Lebanese and international pressure to address the future of its weapons.
The Shadow of May 7
For many Lebanese, any mention of mobilizing supporters in the streets immediately evokes the events of May 7, 2008, when Hezbollah deployed its fighters internally following a cabinet decision targeting the group’s communications network. Since then, those events have become a lasting reference point in debates over Hezbollah’s arms — the moment when weapons long framed as part of the “resistance” were used to settle a domestic political dispute by force.
Today’s crisis is unfolding under very different circumstances. Since October 2023, Hezbollah has engaged in a prolonged conflict with Israel that has cost the group fighters and senior commanders, while large parts of southern Lebanon — its traditional support base — have suffered displacement, destruction, and economic paralysis.
At the same time, Hezbollah faces intensifying pressure tied to its arsenal amid Lebanese-Israeli negotiations and U.S. sanctions targeting figures linked to its political and security structures.
A Lebanese government source told Alhurra that Hezbollah had chosen to escalate its rhetoric but was still waiting to see the outcome of two tracks: U.S.-Iran negotiations and Lebanese-Israeli talks. The source said Hezbollah continued to view its weapons as “an Iranian power card in the region,” adding that the group’s leadership understood that mounting pressure could eventually push it toward becoming a conventional political party.
A Force Diminished, but Still Powerful
Despite its losses, Hezbollah remains the largest armed force outside the Lebanese state. According to estimates by the Israeli Alma Research and Education Center, the group possessed roughly 25,000 rockets on the eve of its March 2 attack on Israel, most of them short- and medium-range, in addition to hundreds of advanced missiles, including precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles, and air defense systems.
The group is also believed to possess around 1,000 suicide drones, though the full extent of its drone capabilities remains unclear. Its manpower is estimated at between 40,000 and 50,000 regular fighters, along with tens of thousands of reservists. Alhurra said it could not independently verify those figures.
Retired Brig. Gen. Naji Malaeb said the danger in any internal confrontation would not necessarily stem from missiles or heavy weaponry, but from the “light and medium arms” that could be deployed in cities and towns.
Threat or Pressure Tactic?
Analysts and observers of Hezbollah differ in their reading of the group’s rhetoric. Some see it as a serious threat should the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons move toward a decisive stage. Others view it as part of a political and psychological pressure campaign aimed at raising the cost of any Lebanese or international attempt to force the group to retreat.
Political writer and analyst Hadi Mourad told Alhurra that “a party that carried out the events of May 7 and fought wars beyond Lebanon’s borders cannot have its threats dismissed as mere rhetoric.” He added that Hezbollah had come close to domestic escalation on April 8, 2026, before direct Arab intervention conveyed a message to Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri urging restraint.
By contrast, political analyst Sousan Mehanna argued that the current situation resembled “a broad psychological war” more than a genuine decision to launch an internal conflict. She said Hezbollah understood that any domestic confrontation today would differ dramatically from May 7, given the changed political, popular, and regional landscape.
Still, Mehanna cautioned against underestimating the threat. Hezbollah, she said, continues to maintain a substantial military and security apparatus capable of imposing localized control or generating widespread chaos. “Possessing the capability is one thing,” she said, “and being able to bear the consequences of using it is something entirely different.”
Former lawmaker Fares Souaid said Hezbollah was attempting to rally its support base and reclaim the negotiating file from the Lebanese state, returning it instead to Tehran. But he argued that repeating the May 7 scenario had become far more difficult because both domestic and regional conditions had fundamentally changed.
Malaeb distinguished between a “civil war” and an “internal conflict.” The former, he said, would require multiple heavily armed Lebanese factions prepared for broad confrontation — a condition that does not currently exist. The latter, however, could emerge if the state attempted to enforce a monopoly on arms by force, turning the confrontation into one between Hezbollah and the state, particularly the Lebanese Army.
Lebanon’s Dilemma
The Lebanese state does not appear eager for a direct confrontation with Hezbollah. Malaeb said authorities were still avoiding the option of forcibly disarming the group, while the president was seeking to keep channels of dialogue open in hopes of “nationalizing” Hezbollah’s decision-making and tying it to the state rather than Tehran.
But that approach does not resolve the underlying dilemma. As Mehanna argued, the continued existence of weapons outside state control leaves Lebanon vulnerable to every regional conflict while steadily eroding state institutions. At the same time, any attempt to remove those weapons by force risks triggering broader unrest, chaos, and potentially even territorial fragmentation.
Mourad said Hezbollah was seeking to cement an equation in which any effort to disarm the group would effectively “blow up the country.” The danger, he argued, is that the Lebanese state could come to accept that equation as a permanent reality.
For now, Lebanon does not appear to be on the brink of civil war. No domestic armed factions seem prepared for a broad confrontation with Hezbollah, and the state does not appear ready to push the Lebanese Army into direct conflict with the group. But Hezbollah’s rhetoric has once again thrust the issue of its weapons into Lebanon’s most sensitive political space: a test of whether the state can impose its authority without igniting internal conflict.
Both sides, at least publicly, appear intent on avoiding a moment of direct confrontation. Yet Lebanon enters this debate weaker than at previous turning points: a state with limited capacity, a weakened but still heavily armed Hezbollah, and a society with little appetite left for another war.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
