As the United States intensifies pressure on Iraqi political forces to demilitarize Iran-backed armed factions and reduce their influence within state institutions, an important question emerges regarding the political weight of these factions and whether it is possible to eliminate it as well, or at least reduce it to the greatest possible extent.
A source within the Coordination Framework told Alhurra that the United States has placed a veto on the participation of six-armed factions, which possess political wings, in the next government scheduled to be announced Thursday under Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaidi.
The source, who requested anonymity, confirmed that the American veto arrived through a message delivered to a group of Coordination Framework leaders, without revealing the names of these factions.
A spokesperson for the State Department told Alhurra, in response to a question regarding Washington’s vision for the shape of the next government, that the United States is closely monitoring the process of forming the Iraqi government, stressing that these factions “must have no role in state institutions.”
The U.S. State Department had not responded, by the time this report was published, to a request sent by Alhurra regarding the existence of a “veto” message against the participation of six factions in the next government.
The results of the recent elections held last November, and the political alliances that followed at the beginning of 2026, revealed an unprecedented growth in the political power of these factions, in a move clearly aimed at strengthening their political role rather than relying solely on military power.
These factions benefited from the boycott of the elections by their traditional rivals, foremost among them Sadrist Movement leader Muqtada al-Sadr, as well as from amendments introduced to the election law, in order to expand their parliamentary and governmental presence and transform their security and military influence into an entrenched political force within the Iraqi system.
According to a tally conducted by Alhurra, the armed factions active in Iraq secured nearly a quarter of the seats in the Iraqi parliament, with 80 lawmakers out of the parliament’s total 329 seats.
All of these factions are part of the Coordination Framework alliance, which includes Shiite forces loyal or close to Iran. It is the largest bloc in parliament with approximately 180 lawmakers and is constitutionally entitled to nominate the prime minister.
This large political representation within the Coordination Framework (around 40 percent) means that these factions now possess direct political representation within the political system, enabling them to influence legislation, select the government, and control key state security and economic institutions.
So, who are the most prominent of these factions, and how is their electoral weight distributed within the Iraqi parliament?
Asaib Ahl al-Haq
The “Sadiqoun” Movement, the political wing of “Asaib Ahl al-Haq” led by Qais al-Khazali, was the most prominent phenomenon in the 2025 elections, achieving a historic leap from 9 seats in 2021 to 27 seats.
This growth reflects the strategy of al-Khazali and his faction — both designated as terrorist entities by the United States — to transition from military efforts to political activity while benefiting from the penetration of their cadres into state institutions.
The “Sadiqoun” Movement ranked second or third in most central and southern provinces and came first in Babil with more than 79,000 votes.
According to sources within the Coordination Framework who spoke to Alhurra, the movement expressed readiness to hand over its weapons to the Iraqi government, halt its military activities, and devote itself to political work, but Iran is attempting to prevent this step.
Badr Organization
The Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, is considered the oldest Iraqi faction linked to Iran, having been established during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s with direct support from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.
The organization possesses a highly influential political wing within parliament and state institutions, particularly the Interior Ministry and security agencies.
Estimates from the 2025 election results indicate that Badr directly secured, or obtained through alliances, approximately 15 to 18 lawmakers, maintaining its broad influence within the Coordination Framework.
The importance of Badr lies in its traditional control over security positions and sensitive parliamentary committees. One of its leaders, Karim Alawi al-Mohammadawi, chaired the parliamentary Security and Defense Committee during the previous term.
Ataa Movement
The movement led by Popular Mobilization Forces chief Faleh al-Fayyadh won 10 seats in the Iraqi parliament. It is part of the Reconstruction and Development Alliance led by outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who won first place in the elections with 46 seats.
In 2021, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions on al-Fayyadh, accusing him of involvement in “serious human rights abuses” targeting protesters in October 2019.
Sanad National Assembly
Also known as the “Land of Sumer” Gathering, led by Ahmed al-Asadi, it won six seats within the Reconstruction and Development Alliance led by al-Sudani.
Al-Asadi currently serves as Iraq’s Minister of Labor and Social Affairs since October 27, 2022. He previously served as the official spokesperson for the Popular Mobilization Forces, which include Iran-backed armed factions.
Al-Asadi founded the “Jund al-Imam Brigades” in 2014, which are described as the military wing of the Islamic Movement in Iraq. They are linked through political partnerships with other factions such as “Ansar Allah al-Awfiya,” which the United States classifies as a terrorist organization, according to the Washington Institute.
Ansar Allah al-Awfiya Movement
The movement won 4 seats in the Iraqi parliament within the Reconstruction and Development Alliance led by al-Sudani. It is considered the political wing of Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, led by Haider al-Gharawi.
The group first appeared in 2013 as a political party in Maysan Province, and a year later transformed into an armed faction while retaining its political wing.
Al-Gharawi and his armed faction were first placed on U.S. terrorism lists in June 2024 on charges of killing U.S. service members and carrying out attacks on American military bases and diplomatic facilities in Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. Last month, the United States offered a $10 million reward for information leading to him.
According to Coordination Framework sources who spoke to Alhurra, al-Gharawi expressed readiness during private meetings within the Shiite alliance to abandon the armed approach and engage in political work.
Muntasiroun Bloc
The movement won 4 seats in parliament after the 2025 elections and is linked to “Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada” led by Abu Alaa al-Walai. It is part of the State of Law Coalition led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
Al-Walai and his armed faction have been designated as terrorists by the United States since 2023 on charges of planning and participating in attacks against Americans. Like al-Gharawi, Washington allocated a $10 million reward last April for information leading to him.
Hoquq Movement
The “Hoquq” Movement succeeded in winning 6 seats in the November 2025 elections. It represents the political wing of Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq, one of the most prominent pro-Tehran factions in Iraq and designated as a terrorist organization by the United States since 2009.
This is the second time the movement has participated in elections after winning one seat in the 2021 elections.
The armed faction is led by Abu Hussein al-Mohammadawi, who is wanted by the United States and whom many describe as Iran’s man in Iraq. He has been designated as a terrorist by the United States since 2020.
Khadamat Alliance
It is the political wing of “Kataib al-Imam Ali” led by Shibl al-Zaidi and won 5 seats in the Iraqi parliament after the 2025 elections.
In 2018, the U.S. Treasury Department placed al-Zaidi on its sanctions list on charges of “smuggling oil on behalf of Iran, raising funds for Lebanese Hezbollah, and sending fighters to Syria on behalf of the Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.”
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Ghassan Taqi
A journalist specializing in Iraqi affairs, he has worked with the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) since 2015. He previously spent several years with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as well as various Iraqi and Arab media outlets.
