Most Iraqis had not heard the name Ali Al-Zaidi before last Monday, when his nomination was announced—surprising everyone—for the position of prime minister-designate in Iraq.
His name had not been circulating among lists of candidates, nor within the conflicts among the Coordination Framework forces (the ruling Shiite alliance in the country). Yet he suddenly emerged as a “compromise candidate” who ended three months of disagreements within the Framework under internal pressure and external pressure—particularly from Washington.
With no political experience or prior executive position, Al-Zaidi, 40 years old, has 30 days to form a cabinet that includes Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, and to balance relations between the United States and Iran—a task that is far from easy.
For many observers, Al-Zaidi represents an exceptional case within a system based on partisan and sectarian quota-sharing since 2003, which has consistently produced candidates from within the establishment.
He is a successful businessman but lacks any notable political experience. He has never held a government position or leadership role in the state. Nevertheless, he has relationships with all political forces without exception. This was clearly evident during the condolence gathering for his father held last March, which was attended by senior state officials, including the President of the Republic and the President of the Supreme Judicial Council, in addition to prominent leaders from Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish political forces.
The idea that he has limited political experience may be seen as a weakness, but others view it as a potential advantage.
Adnan Al-Sarraj, head of the Iraqi Center for Media Development, believes that Al-Zaidi is “not politically affiliated,” which makes him “acceptable to various parties without commitments” in a political environment accustomed to quotas and party loyalties.
However, this neutrality may also be a double-edged sword, placing him in a position of weakness where he relies heavily on the forces that brought him to this position.
“It is difficult to see how this government will be a successful one, because the man has no political experience and does not have any parliamentary base. Therefore, everything will depend on the Coordination Framework,” says Aqil Abbas, a nonresident senior fellow at the Iraq Initiative within the Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council.
One of the pivotal points will be the formation of the government itself. Will Al-Zaidi be able to choose an independent team that reflects his vision, or will he yield to the pressures of the political forces that supported him?
Munqith Dagher, head of the Independent Research Group, says that forming the government will be the “first test” that Al-Zaidi will face, and whether he will “follow the traditional approach and allow parties to control the selections, or assert his independence.”
If he succeeds in passing his government through parliament, which is not guaranteed but possible with the support of the Framework, which holds more than half the seats—Al-Zaidi will face another difficult task: managing relations with Washington.
For several months, the United States has been exerting significant pressure on the government of current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani and the leaders of the Coordination Framework to deal firmly with the weapons of Iran-aligned armed factions.
These pressures intensified with the outbreak of war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other on February 28, and with Iraqi factions siding with Tehran in the conflict by targeting American diplomatic facilities in Iraq.
Many of these factions have political wings within the Coordination Framework and hold influential parliamentary representation following the November 2025 elections.
Washington has taken stricter measures by halting the flow of dollar shipments from Iraqi oil revenues to Baghdad and suspending high-level security cooperation between the two sides, in an attempt to pressure the Iraqi government to deal more seriously with the armed factions.
From this perspective, it can be said that Al-Zaidi’s selection was not random.
According to Aqil Abbas, appointing the man reflects an attempt by the Coordination Framework to buy time and reduce American pressure by “presenting a figure not linked to armed factions, who may be acceptable to Washington.”
From the U.S. perspective, President Donald Trump congratulated Al-Zaidi on his nomination as Iraq’s prime minister, expressing hope that he would succeed in forming “a new government free from terrorism that could deliver a brighter future for Iraq.”
Trump confirmed on the Truth Social platform his aspiration for a strong and productive relationship between the two countries, saying that this step represents “the beginning of a tremendous new chapter between our Nations — Prosperity, Stability, and Success.” Earlier, Washington had welcomed Al-Zaidi’s designation through its embassy in Baghdad.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the man has received a blank check from Washington.
“This does not mean that the United States supports Al-Zaidi or is lobbying on his behalf, nor does it mean that, if he succeeds in forming the government, he will not face significant pressure from Washington—particularly regarding the issues of corruption and armed groups,” says Hamza Haddad, a fellow and researcher at the Center for a New American Security, based in Washington.
On the domestic front, Al-Zaidi will face a test no less difficult. The country has been suffering from widespread corruption for decades, amid a severe economic crisis resulting from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the decline in oil exports, Iraq’s main source of revenue.
In addition, Iraqi public opinion is circulating reports suggesting Al-Zaidi’s links to institutions suspected of corruption and currency smuggling.
He previously held the position of director of the South Islamic Bank, which is subject to sanctions imposed by the Central Bank of Iraq. He also manages a company that has lucrative government contracts to supply materials for the ration card system, in addition to owning a well-known local television station.
Al-Sarraj points out that the accusations against Al-Zaidi “remain within the realm of rumors,” but they nonetheless create an atmosphere of doubt that may affect his public image.
In addition, the lack of political experience may make Al-Zaidi vulnerable to mistakes, especially in dealing with crises.
Al-Sarraj says that the real challenge is not possessing experience, but rather “managing crises,” something many previous prime ministers have failed at despite their experience.
Nevertheless, it is not possible to judge Al-Zaidi’s experience before it actually begins.
“Everything will depend on his ability to pass a series of tests that will determine his political future, between American pressure, internal balances, and economic challenges,” says Dagher.
What will Al-Zaidi’s ascent to the premiership mean? This is the question raised by Victoria Taylor, former U.S. diplomat and director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council, in a series of tweets following his nomination.
Taylor suggests that Al-Zaidi will likely continue the same approach followed by previous prime ministers by being forced to “balance the interests of his political and economic leaders and may be viewed as a general manager rather than a prime minister.”
Taylor believes that Al-Zaidi will face challenges similar to those faced by current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani, “such as militias outside state control, a fragile oil-dependent economy, and the inflation of public sector salaries.”
But the difference with Al-Zaidi is that he “does not possess Al-Sudani’s long experience in governance and will be under close scrutiny and heavy pressure from the United States,” Taylor adds.
The article is a translation of the original Arabic.
Ghassan Taqi
A journalist specializing in Iraqi affairs, he has worked with the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) since 2015. He previously spent several years with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as well as various Iraqi and Arab media outlets.
