The struggle within Iran’s ruling establishment is no longer defined solely by the traditional divide between conservatives and reformists. Since the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in late February, Iranian opposition figures say power centers in Tehran have entered a more intense phase of competition, marked by the rise of a hardline ideological faction within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its efforts to consolidate control over the state’s key decision-making institutions.
According to information obtained by Alhurra from opposition leaders, a group known as Mansouroun (the Victorious) has emerged at the center of this shift. The organization was among several ideological armed groups that conducted clandestine operations against the Shah before the 1979 Islamic Revolution and later became one of the formations relied upon by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in building the Revolutionary Guards after the monarchy’s collapse.
Opposition figures say Mansouroun’s influence has expanded in recent months across state institutions, the IRGC and security agencies amid a largely concealed struggle with other factions within the system, particularly following Khamenei’s departure from the political scene and the rise of his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, to the position of Supreme Leader.
Among the most prominent figures associated with the group, according to those sources, were Gholam Rashid, commander of the IRGC’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, who was killed in an Israeli strike during the 12-day war in June, and Ali Shamkhani, a former IRGC and naval commander, former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and adviser to Khamenei, who was killed in a joint U.S.-Israeli strike in February.
The most influential figure today, opposition leaders say, is Mohsen Rezaei, the former IRGC commander who currently occupies two highly consequential positions: head of the three-member council governing Iran since Khamenei’s death and military adviser to the current Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei. Sources say a number of senior IRGC commanders, including current IRGC chief Ahmad Vahidi and Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani, belong to the same circle or operate within its sphere of influence.
Opposition figures allege that Rezaei and Vahidi, working through the Mansouroun network, oversaw what they describe as an “undeclared internal coup,” one that effectively curtailed the authority of President Masoud Pezeshkian and his government while transferring substantial executive powers to the Revolutionary Guards and their security apparatus.
According to this account, the president is no longer able to manage major state files from his constitutional position. Instead, the IRGC, through its commanders and affiliated offices, now exercises effective oversight over much of the government’s work, ranging from foreign policy and domestic security to economic affairs.
The same sources claim that Rezaei and Vahidi blocked an Iranian delegation led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf from concluding an agreement that would have ended the war with the United States and Israel. Ghalibaf was subsequently removed from leading the delegation, and the role was assigned to Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, whom the sources describe as being closer to Rezaei and Vahidi than to President Pezeshkian and more responsive to their guidance.
Tawfiq Abu Elias al-Ahwazi, a member of the political bureau of the Ahwazi Popular Democratic Front, said developments inside Iran cannot be understood as a struggle among clearly defined state institutions but rather as a contest among influence networks embedded within the Revolutionary Guards and the so-called deep state.
“The Iranian system no longer revolves around a single decision-making center in the traditional sense,” Ahwazi told Alhurra. “Instead, it consists of overlapping power networks led by the Revolutionary Guards, whose security, ideological and economic wings compete for influence, while the Supreme Leader or the circle around him remains the ultimate source of legitimacy.”
“What we are witnessing today,” he added, “has been years in the making. The Revolutionary Guards and the regime’s hardline leaders have prepared for this transition over a long period. It represents a gradual shift from rule by the religious establishment to rule by the security and military establishment. The current divisions are not primarily ideological; they are struggles over who will manage the post-crisis era, who controls the parallel economy, who holds the security and military decision-making authority, and who inherits influence within the deep state.”
Ahwazi divides Iran’s principal power centers into four currents. The first is the ideological IRGC faction, composed of senior Revolutionary Guards and Quds Force leaders. It is the most hardline tendency and believes the survival of the regime requires a return to what it calls the “spirit of the Islamic Revolution” of 1979.
He said this faction, of which Mansouroun is one of the most prominent hubs, opposes any opening to the West, advocates a broader security crackdown, relies heavily on the Basij militia and ideological institutions, and views political flexibility as a potential first step toward the regime’s collapse.
Alongside it operates another current within the Guards that Ahwazi describes as an economic-pragmatic faction. It wields extensive influence across financial networks, smuggling operations, major corporations, ports and the energy sector. While it does not challenge the regime’s official ideology, it prioritizes preserving the system over open-ended escalation and favors reducing tensions when confrontation threatens the economy or domestic cohesion.
Iranian opposition figures told Alhurra that this faction, represented most prominently by Ghalibaf, has increasingly clashed with the ideological hardliners over the impact of U.S. sanctions, Iran’s declining regional influence, shrinking resources and disagreements over how to respond to public protests. Although conservative at its core, they say, the group seeks to contain crises in order to preserve the structure of the Islamic Republic itself.
Ahwazi said the rivalry between the two factions is increasingly spilling over into Iran’s regional proxy networks—not through open confrontation, but through information leaks, efforts to dismantle economic influence, the sidelining of leaders within those groups, and intelligence competition centered on loyalty to the Supreme Leader and his inner circle. Even so, he believes the ideological-security faction remains dominant for now.
At the same time, a third current within the Revolutionary Guards has quietly expanded its influence. Ahwazi describes it as the “security-technological” faction, responsible for digital and social surveillance, internet shutdown operations, AI-enabled security systems and cyber warfare.
In his view, Iran is undergoing “an internal reconfiguration of the balance of power between the Revolutionary Guards and the security state.” He said there is no clear evidence that the regime faces imminent collapse, but there are signs of “fractures within the elite, competition for influence and growing anxiety about the post-leadership era.”
Iranian authorities have consistently denied the existence of serious internal divisions, whether between the presidency and the Revolutionary Guards or within the leadership’s inner circle.
In remarks reported by the website Asr-e Iran in early May, Haj Mirza, chief of staff of the Iranian presidency, said: “There are absolutely no disagreements. The leaders and the president attend all meetings, and all decisions are made unanimously,” stressing that maintaining unity is a government priority during the current period.
Political analyst Jafar Ziyara argues, however, that competition within the system does not necessarily mean Iran is headed toward an armed confrontation between rival IRGC factions.
“Over the years, a distinct current emerged within the core of the Revolutionary Guards that is closely aligned with the Supreme Leader and has effectively sidelined other forces from leadership positions,” Ziyara told Alhurra. “As a result, the likelihood of an internal armed conflict between IRGC formations—which share a commitment to preserving Mojtaba Khamenei’s leadership, maintaining the Islamic Republic and preventing a breakdown in the chain of command—is extremely low.”
Ziyara said the Iranian system consists of four main circles: a hardline faction closest to the Supreme Leader; a financial and political network led by Ghalibaf with influence in both the Guards and the security establishment; the reformist camp; and a traditional conservative bloc.
Over the past decades, the Revolutionary Guards have evolved from a force created to protect the revolution into a vast network combining ideology, military power, politics, economics and intelligence. Its influence now extends far beyond Iran, reaching across the Middle East, Africa, South America and Europe. Yet under Ali Khamenei, that influence was not absolute, as the former Supreme Leader sought to balance competing factions within the ruling system.
Jamil Ahmadi, a Kurdish opposition activist based in Europe, said the Revolutionary Guards have in recent months marginalized both the clerical establishment and the government from the decision-making process and pushed for Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment as Supreme Leader because of his complete loyalty to the Guards.
“The Revolutionary Guards now control most levers of authority inside and outside the country,” Ahmadi told Alhurra. “Within this broader struggle, a fierce confrontation is under way between IRGC Intelligence and the Ministry of Intelligence. The ministry no longer possesses any meaningful authority because IRGC Intelligence has effectively absorbed its powers and become the sole security authority both domestically and abroad.”
Ahmadi said the growing reach of IRGC Intelligence has recently led to armed confrontations with personnel from the Intelligence Ministry, incidents that were subsequently contained and concealed by IRGC leadership to prevent divisions from widening within the system.
Iran’s government maintains that decisions are made by consensus and that the president and senior leaders participate in all key meetings. But the opposition figures interviewed by Alhurra argue that the central question in Tehran is no longer who formally holds office, but who has the power to issue orders—and ensure they are carried out.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
