Prominent Iraqi Shiite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr announced on Wednesday that he was severing ties with the “Saraya al-Salam” militia and integrating the faction into Iraqi state institutions, transforming his long-standing calls for state control over weapons from rhetoric into a concrete organizational step.
The decision does not resolve Iraq’s deeply entrenched militia problem, but it shifts Sadr’s position within the country’s political debate. For years, the cleric urged armed groups to relinquish influence outside the state. This time, he began with his own faction, placing rival militias — particularly those aligned with Iran — before an uncomfortable question: who will follow suit?
“The move is political, though it is being framed in security terms,” Muhannad Salloum, assistant professor at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, told Alhurra. He argued that Sadr stood to gain far more politically than militarily from the decision, noting that Saraya al-Salam had been largely dormant since 2022, limiting the practical military concessions involved. Politically, however, the move allows Sadr to present himself as “the leading Shiite figure voluntarily placing his weapons under state authority,” at a moment when Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has been promoting the principle of state monopoly over arms in discussions with Washington.
For months, the United States has pressed Iraqi authorities and leaders of the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework alliance to take firmer action against Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq. Prime Minister Zaidi welcomed Sadr’s announcement, describing it as an “important” step toward reinforcing stability and consolidating the principle that weapons should remain exclusively in state hands. He also called on other armed factions to operate under official state institutions. Former Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kazimi likewise praised the move, saying Iraqis — along with the country’s regional and international partners — were waiting for decisions that would restore the authority and prestige of the Iraqi state and pave the way for an Iraq free of illegal weapons.
Yet the warm political reception does not mean Baghdad’s path to restoring full sovereignty is clear. Over the years, Iraqi militias have evolved into powerful networks with political parties, parliamentary representation, economic influence and entrenched positions within state institutions. Any effort to reorganize them risks upsetting the balance of power within Iraq’s Shiite political arena and touching directly on Iran’s influence in the country.
Riyadh Al-Masoodi, a former Sadrist lawmaker, said Sadr’s position was “not new” and dated back to the period following Iraq’s victory over ISIS in 2017. The real problem, he argued, lies in the “political investment” in weapons, which he said threatens Iraq’s political system. He called for a legal process that would retire older fighters, integrate qualified members into the Popular Mobilization Forces and transfer militia casualties to the Martyrs Foundation, in order to prevent armed groups from exploiting them politically or partisanly.
Security analyst Sarmad al-Bayati said the dispute is not over the principle of restricting weapons to the state, but over “who starts first.” By acting against his own faction, he said, Sadr has placed rival militias in an awkward position. Some groups may even see the move as an opportunity to transition into a more formal status. Earlier this year, Asaib Ahl al-Haq — a long-time Sadrist rival — declared its willingness to place weapons under state control.
The larger obstacle, however, remains the militias most closely tied to Iran, especially Hezbollah Brigades and Al-Nujabaa Movement, both designated by the United States as terrorist organizations. Those factions have consistently rejected calls to surrender their weapons or place them fully under state authority. Between groups openly rejecting the idea and those signaling tentative openness stand other factions that remain undecided and unwilling to take a definitive position.
The debate cannot be separated from Iran’s role in Iraq. Tehran views armed factions as one of its most important instruments of regional influence, not only in Iraq but across a network extending into Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. Any restructuring of these militias — or reduction of their autonomy — would likely be viewed in Tehran as an erosion of its regional leverage.
Salloum predicted that Iran would seek to manage the issue quietly “by influencing how these factions are integrated into state institutions rather than openly opposing the process.” “The battle here is not over the principle itself, but over the mechanism,” he said. He added that Sadr’s decision to move first creates “a new political benchmark” against which the conduct of other militias, particularly within the Coordination Framework, will now be measured.
Former lawmaker Sajjad Salem, a critic of armed factions, argued that the issue extends beyond weapons themselves to the way militias use arms in politics and elections. Some factions, he said, appear more focused on their rivalry with Sadr than on resolving the weapons issue altogether.
The Iraqi government finds itself in a difficult position. While it publicly supports restricting weapons to state control, it also recognizes that any direct confrontation with militias could trigger a broader political and security crisis. Baghdad has therefore leaned toward more cautious language, speaking of “reorganization” and “restructuring” rather than outright dismantlement or direct confrontation.
Still, the core question is not one of terminology, but of power: can the Iraqi state truly absorb the militias into its system, or will the factions continue operating both inside and outside the state simultaneously?
Sadr’s decision gives him a new political position within this debate. He can now present himself not merely as a preacher of state control over weapons, but as the leader who started with his own movement. In Iraq’s Shiite political landscape, where armed influence and political competition are deeply intertwined, the move may become a tool for pressuring his rivals as much as an attempt to redefine the relationship between the state and armed groups.
Other factions, however, may interpret the move as an attempt to reshape the balance of power within Iraq’s Shiite camp rather than a genuine institutional reform effort. That perception could determine whether they respond positively or resist.
Security expert Fadel Abu Regheef said Sadr’s call appears serious, but its success will depend on the willingness of other factions to respond — particularly those with overlapping political and regional loyalties.
For now, Sadr’s announcement appears to mark the beginning of a new test for Iraq’s fragile state. The central question remains unresolved: will Iraqi militias truly become part of the state, or will the slogan of “weapons only in state hands” continue to collapse at the limits of power on the ground?
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
Mustafa Saadoon
Mustafa Saadoon is an Iraqi journalist who has worked for several international and Arab media organizations. He covers politics and human rights.
