Talks to end the war may be the closest they have ever been to a deal, but the gap on nuclear enrichment remains, and the U.S. president says he is in no hurry. Iran has now threatened to halt negotiations entirely and fully close the Strait of Hormuz over ceasefire violations.
Share your thoughts, analysis and predictions with me at ailves@mbn-news.com. If you were forwarded the MBN Iran Briefing, please subscribe. Read me in Arabic here, or on the flagship MBN Arabic-language and English-language news sites.
And don’t forget to check out the latest Iran Briefing podcast. In this edition of the MBN Iran Briefing podcast I’m joined by MBN Washington Bureau Chief Joe Kawly and Mohammed Soliman, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, as we look at the shifting geography of the Iran war, U.S. President Trump’s call to expand the Abraham Accords, and the roles of Pakistan and China in shaping what comes next.
Quote of the Week
“I don’t think the Mediterranean is completely beyond the scope of their capabilities. The issue here would be accuracy.”
—Nicole Grajewski, assistant professor at the Center for International Studies at Sciences Po in Paris, referring to Iran’s long-range missiles
MBN Iran Briefing Podcast
Expert conversations unpacking the latest developments in Iran and how they are reshaping security, energy markets, and geopolitics across the Middle East.
TOP OF THE NEWS
Oman Under Pressure. “Oman will behave just like everybody else, or we’ll have to blow them up.” Those words from U.S. president Donald Trump last week brought one of Washington’s oldest allies in the Arab world into the headlines.
Muscat has been the one Gulf capital that both Washington and Tehran have consistently trusted to carry messages neither side would deliver directly. Oman spent the months before the current war trying to prevent it, hosted the last serious U.S.-Iran talks before the bombs fell, and has since watched Iranian drones hit its ports while Tehran denied any involvement.
It hosted the secret back-channel talks in 2013 that laid the groundwork for the 2015 nuclear deal, mediated prisoner releases, and kept lines open when every other channel had closed. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Oman has no tradition of enmity with Iran. Omanis recall that Tehran under the Shah sent troops to help suppress the Dhofar Rebellion in the 1970s. Even after the 1979 revolution, Muscat maintained working ties with the Islamic Republic while its Gulf neighbors did not. The result is what analysts call “positive neutrality,” with a state doctrine of non-intervention and dialogue that both sides have found useful.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi meets Sultan of Oman Haitham bin Tariq Al Said at Al Baraka Palace in Muscat, Oman. Photo: Reuters
In early January, Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi traveled to Tehran, meeting President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani. In a possible a signal that messages were moving through Muscat, within days President Trump publicly suggested that Iran wanted to negotiate. On Feb. 6, Oman hosted indirect U.S.-Iran talks, described by both sides as constructive. Although the talks had initially been mooted to be held in Turkey, Iran demanded that they be held in Oman instead, with the agenda narrowed to nuclear issues only.
It was not enough. Hours before U.S.-Israeli strikes began on Feb. 28, Al Busaidi appeared on CBS News to declare that “a peace deal is within our reach.” Iranian drones hit the Omani ports of Duqm and Salalah in early March, both used by U.S. forces. Araghchi said that Iran’s armed forces were “independent and somewhat isolated,” and that the attacks were “not our choice.”
In the ensuing weeks, Pakistan stepped in as lead ceasefire mediator, with Washington confirming Islamabad as the primary interlocutor.
But then, last week, Oman took a step that went too far for Washington. Tehran floated a proposal for joint management of the Strait of Hormuz along with the Omanis. Iranian state media reported on Thursday that Iran’s Deputy Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Bagheri Kani, confirmed in Moscow that Iran and Oman are negotiating a new mechanism for managing vessel passage through the Strait. Iranian outlet Fararu reported that Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, had traveled to Muscat carrying a written message from Araghchi, and that Iranian and Omani delegations discussed “principles governing freedom of navigation through the Strait in accordance with international law.” The idea that navigation through the Strait might be defined by Muscat and Tehran provoked the Americans, who have long maintained the position that the waterway should be open to all. Suddenly, in the Americans’ eyes, the Omanis went from being helpful mediators to Iran’s partners in crime.
It was in response to this development that the U.S. president said Oman would “behave just like everybody else, or we’ll have to blow them up.” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent followed with a formal warning on X that the U.S. Treasury “will aggressively target any actors involved — directly or indirectly — in facilitating tolls for the Strait and any willing partners will be penalized.” Bessent subsequently said he spoke with the Omani ambassador, who gave assurances there were no plans for tolling.
Then on Saturday, Oman’s Maritime Security Centre warned mariners that a floating object suspected to be a naval mine had been sighted in its territorial waters within the Strait of Hormuz. The location sits at the precise jurisdictional boundary that Iran and Oman have been negotiating to co-manage.
A bulk carrier and a tanker sit anchored as Iran vows to close the Strait of Hormuz, in Muscat, Oman. Photo: Reuters
Persian Gulf Strait Authority
Iran established the PGSA in early May as the official body administering transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Vessels seeking passage must contact the authority via email, submit detailed information, and pay a toll before a permit is issued. No official tariff has been published, but reports indicate payments of up to two million dollars per transit, accepted in Chinese yuan or Bitcoin transferred to IRGC-linked wallets.
Last week, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated the PGSA under Executive Order 13224, the counterterrorism authority, ruling that it materially supports the IRGC and operates what Washington called a scheme of maritime extortion. The designation blocks all U.S.-held assets of the authority, restricts transactions by U.S. persons, and extends secondary sanctions to any foreign financial institution knowingly facilitating major transactions with it. That last mechanism is the action’s real reach, as it places non-U.S. banks, insurers and shipowners on notice.
The PGSA responded thus: “You will not achieve control over the Strait of Hormuz, which you did not achieve in the field and diplomacy, with sanctions either.”
As a tentative memorandum of understanding was reportedly being drafted, with Hormuz reopening as its first condition, Washington simultaneously moved to sanction the very mechanism Iran had built to monetize the strait.
Ships and boats in the Strait of Hormuz, Musandam, Oman. Photo: Reuters
ESSENTIAL READING: OMAN AND THE IRAN CRISIS
“Oman and the Iran War: Neutrality Under Strain” – Arab Center, May 2026.
“Oman’s Flipflopping on Iran Will Leave It Isolated in the Gulf” – Foundation for Defense of Democracies, March 2026.
“Trump’s Oman warning” – CNBC, May 29, 2026.
“Trump Threatens to ‘Blow Up’ Oman Over Strait of Hormuz” – Time, May 28, 2026.
Andres Ilves
Andres Ilves is Iran Editor and Senior Adviser at MBN. His career as a journalist and writer includes two decades at the BBC and Radio Free Europe.
