As Pakistan Mediates, Shia Workers Face Gulf Deportations

A Pakistani Shia man who spent 15 years working in the United Arab Emirates says a single summons to an immigration office abruptly ended his life there.

His wallet and phone were confiscated, his residency permit was canceled, and during questioning, he said, he was asked: “Are you Shia?”

Soon afterward, he found himself facing deportation without a publicly stated charge, judicial process, or opportunity to access the bank accounts and property he left behind, according to his account.

The man, who spoke to MBN on condition of anonymity out of concern for acquaintances still living in the UAE, offers a glimpse into a broader crisis that has placed Pakistan at its center. Islamabad was not a participant in the conflict with Iran, but it became entangled through its role as a mediator after offering itself as a channel for negotiations between Washington and Tehran.

At the same time, Pakistani Shias in the Gulf appear to have become more vulnerable to suspicion amid a regional security climate increasingly sensitive to any perceived connection to Iran, whether religious, social or political.

No publicly available evidence has established a direct link between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent allegations about digital campaigns allegedly operating from Pakistan and deportation decisions in the UAE.

Yet the overlap in timing illustrates how the conflict with Iran has drawn Pakistan — and its new diplomatic role — into broader calculations across Israel and the Gulf. Israel fears mediation efforts could produce a settlement that falls short of its objectives toward Tehran, while Gulf states increasingly view any potential Iranian connection as a security issue requiring immediate attention.

The man’s account is not unique.

Reuters reported that a database compiled by a Pakistani Shia organization showed that roughly 7,500 Pakistani Shias had been deported from the UAE since late February. The news agency reviewed immigration documents, visa records and travel information related to dozens of deportees, interviewed several of them, and reported that both Emirati and Pakistani authorities denied that the deportations were linked to sectarian identity, saying instead that they were related to regulatory violations.

But testimonies obtained by MBN, together with accounts reported by Reuters, paint a different picture. Several men said they were never informed of clear charges and were returned to Pakistan after years of employment in the UAE, leaving behind jobs, savings, homes, vehicles and bank accounts they could no longer access.

One deportee told MBN that his residency permit remained valid through 2027 but that he was informed he had to leave the country immediately. When he asked why, he said, the only response was: “We cannot tell you, but you must leave.”

He said authorities searched mobile phones for Iranian phone numbers or messages related to the war. He insisted he had not posted political content and had no contacts in Iran. In his view, the basis for suspicion was clear: his Shia identity.

“The first question they asked was about my sect,” he said. “Then they asked about Khamenei, Iran, and whether I knew people there.”

He added that authorities confiscated his phone, Emirates identification cards and SIM card, leaving him unable to access his bank accounts or manage his affairs. Many deportees, he said, were forced to leave behind family members, property, vehicles and household belongings.

Syed Qaiser Abbas, a local official in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, offered a broader account. He told MBN that the first wave of deportees arrived in his area in late March and that thousands of people from Kohat, Hangu, Orakzai and Parachinar had been affected.

His figures exceed those reported by Reuters and could not be independently verified. However, he said deportees consistently reported the same thing: the absence of any stated offense.

“No crime, no illegal documents, no corruption,” he said. “Their only crime was being Shia.”

In a statement obtained by MBN, Mohammad Amin Shaheedi, head of the Pakistani organization One Nation, said the UAE launched an organized campaign targeting Pakistani Shias after the confrontation with Iran.

The statement estimated that more than 5,000 Pakistani Shia families had been expelled following the cancellation of their residency permits and suggested that as many as 30,000 Pakistani passport holders may have been affected overall.

Those figures reflect estimates from a Shia political organization rather than an independent count. Nevertheless, if accurate, they point to the scale of concern within Pakistan’s Shia community.

Human Rights Watch described the reports as deeply troubling.

Michael Page, deputy director of the organization’s Middle East and North Africa division, told MBN that Human Rights Watch had previously documented cases involving the enforced disappearance and deportation of Pakistani Shias from the UAE “apparently based solely on their religious background” and is currently investigating the new allegations.

MBN contacted the foreign ministries of both the UAE and Pakistan, as well as the office of the Israeli prime minister, seeking comment. No responses had been received by the time of publication.

For Islamabad, the deportation controversy has emerged at a moment of unusual diplomatic prominence.

As Washington searched for a credible channel to Tehran and Iran sought a political off-ramp from confrontation, Pakistan presented itself as a country capable of speaking to both sides.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s visit to Washington last week and his meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio elevated Islamabad’s profile in diplomatic efforts. Pakistan’s military establishment, led by Army Chief Asim Munir, also emerged as a key player in facilitating communications between Washington and Tehran.

Kamran Bokhari, a senior fellow at the Middle East Policy Council, told MBN that Pakistan’s significance stemmed from the fact that it was not merely transmitting messages.

“There was no other actor capable of performing this role,” Bokhari said.

“Turkey is a historical rival of Iran, Saudi Arabia is a regional competitor, and Oman’s channel effectively collapsed with the outbreak of war. Pakistan, meanwhile, is Iran’s neighbor, a nuclear-armed state, and maintains ties with Washington, Beijing, Riyadh and Ankara. That made it uniquely difficult to replace.”

Pakistan’s role was not endorsed by Washington alone.

China, Islamabad’s closest strategic partner, also praised its efforts to de-escalate the crisis, giving Pakistani mediation support from two competing global powers.

For Pakistan, the moment offered an opportunity to reclaim regional influence beyond what its current economic weight might suggest. But it also drew the country into a conflict zone where diplomacy, warfare and competing political narratives increasingly overlap.

In Israel, Pakistan’s growing profile has been viewed differently.

In recent weeks, Netanyahu has intensified accusations regarding online campaigns hostile to Israel, describing what he called “bot farms” and fake accounts designed to erode American support for Israel and drive a wedge between the United States and its ally.

While Netanyahu stopped short of accusing the Pakistani government of orchestrating such campaigns, he referred to networks allegedly operating from Pakistan as part of broader efforts by foreign actors to influence American public opinion.

Jafar Al-Hashemi, a Middle East analyst, told MBN that Netanyahu’s comments should be viewed in the context of timing.

In his assessment, Israel does not see mediation solely as a pathway to ending the conflict. It also sees it as a process that could prevent it from achieving broader objectives against Iran.

The Gulf states, however, are operating according to different calculations, in which mediation itself may be less central.

The key factor, analysts say, is that confrontation with Iran has moved from a hypothetical scenario to an active reality.

Countries concerned about Iranian missiles and drones are not only watching military fronts. They are also paying closer attention to expatriate communities, religious affiliations and political or digital activities that could be interpreted as potential channels of influence.

Bokhari said Gulf concerns about Iranian influence within some Shia expatriate communities were not new but had remained largely dormant.

“There was no reason to raise the threat level as long as war with Iran remained a distant possibility,” he said. “Once the conflict erupted, those concerns moved into a much higher state of alert.”

At the same time, Bokhari acknowledged that such a security-driven approach could affect innocent people.

He described the situation as one of “guilt by association,” in which suspicion is shaped by whom someone knows, where they go, or the religious identity they carry rather than by any proven misconduct.

Al-Hashemi, for his part, said there was no need to assume direct Israeli pressure to explain certain Gulf policies.

Gulf governments, he said, prioritize stability and tend to view any individual or trend that could generate security or political complications as a risk to be addressed before problems arise.

“When governments believe some residents may contribute to instability or tensions with other countries, they often rely on preventive measures,” he said.

For Pakistan, the situation presents an uncomfortable balancing act.

The country depends on the UAE and Saudi Arabia economically and politically and relies heavily on remittances from workers in the Gulf. At the same time, it seeks to present itself as a responsible intermediary between the United States and Iran.

As a result, Bokhari said, Islamabad is unlikely to publicly confront Abu Dhabi. Instead, it will probably seek to address the issue quietly through diplomatic channels.

The sudden return of thousands of workers would create domestic economic pressures, fuel public anger and open a political space that Iran or other actors could seek to exploit.

The cost of Pakistan’s mediation role extends beyond balancing relations between Washington and Tehran.

Its growing diplomatic profile has drawn it into an Israeli debate over the digital narrative surrounding the war while simultaneously exposing its Shia citizens in the Gulf to heightened security scrutiny.

To date, no chain of evidence directly links Netanyahu’s allegations to the deportation decisions. Yet one reality is increasingly difficult to ignore: Pakistan has become a more prominent player in the Iran file, and its Shia citizens in the Gulf have become more vulnerable to suspicion at a moment when religion, politics and security are becoming harder to separate.

For Islamabad, the next challenge may not be its ability to carry messages between Washington and Tehran. It may be its ability to protect its citizens from a regional environment in which religious identity — or merely the perception of it — can become sufficient grounds for losing an entire life built abroad.

Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.