Suleiman Frangieh, a former minister and member of parliament, has gone from being a presidential candidate to appearing on U.S. sanctions lists. The leader of the Marada Movement, whose candidacy for the presidency was championed by Hezbollah for years, found his name on a list released Thursday targeting figures who contributed to strengthening the group’s influence in Lebanon.
The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on Frangieh and Mahmoud Qomati, Deputy Head of Hezbollah’s Political Council, along with companies and individuals whom the Treasury said are part of a financial network linked to the group.
The Treasury emphasized that the Lebanese officials designated under the sanctions “exploited their positions to obstruct peace efforts in Lebanon and delay Hezbollah’s disarmament.”
According to the statement, Frangieh used his strategic alliance with Hezbollah to advance his political ambitions and received financial support from the group in exchange for backing efforts that targeted parliamentary seats held by reformist and independent lawmakers during Lebanon’s parliamentary elections.
Qomati, meanwhile, was accused by the Treasury of helping coordinate cash transfers from Iran to Lebanon in support of Hezbollah’s activities.
Although the sanctions package contains a broad financial component, Suleiman Frangieh’s name attracted the greatest attention given his political weight, his alliance with Hezbollah, and his close relationship with former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
From the Presidency to Sanctions
The significance of the U.S. decision does not lie solely in targeting the leader of a Christian party allied with Hezbollah. Washington had previously sanctioned Gebran Bassil, leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, in 2020. Rather, what makes this case notable is that the sanctions now target the very figure whom Hezbollah fought one of its longest political battles to install in Baabda Palace.
After President Michel Aoun’s term ended on October 30, 2022, Hezbollah maintained its support for Frangieh’s candidacy for more than two years despite internal divisions and external pressure. The battle ultimately ended in early 2025 when Frangieh withdrew and Joseph Aoun was elected president.
Political analyst Elias Zoghbi believes the sanctions on Frangieh fall “within the same framework as previous U.S. sanctions imposed on political, security, military, and economic figures that Washington considers closely tied to Hezbollah, which it designates as a terrorist organization.”
Speaking to Alhurra, Zoghbi added that these measures are “successive sanctions imposed in stages, and they appear likely to continue expanding to include a broad circle of the party’s supporters and backers.”
Last month, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on two active-duty officers in the Lebanese Armed Forces and General Security, a move that observers described as an unprecedented step in Washington’s relationship with Lebanon’s security institutions.
Journalist Tony Boulos noted that “Frangieh was among the first politicians to speak recently about efforts that were being prepared to bring down the government.” In a media interview, Frangieh linked the government’s future to the outcome of the ongoing confrontation, saying: “If our side wins on the battlefield, the government should fall after the war. If their side wins, it will continue. That is the equation.”
Boulos told Alhurra that the sanctions imposed by the United States on former minister Youssef Fenianos in 2020 for corruption and support of Hezbollah “served as an early indication of a U.S. move toward the political circle surrounding Frangieh,” arguing that the new sanctions are a continuation of that trajectory.
Washington’s Messages
After imposing the sanctions on Thursday, the U.S. State Department stated that “the activities of Hezbollah’s allies entrench a parallel power structure that keeps Lebanon weak and divided,” adding that “Hezbollah remains the greatest obstacle to Lebanon’s recovery and holds the state hostage to perpetual conflict.” The department stressed that “Hezbollah must disarm in order to achieve lasting peace in the region and ensure Lebanon’s stability and prosperity.”
According to Zoghbi, the sanctions carry clear messages calling for “the dismantling of Hezbollah’s security, political, and financial apparatus as part of Washington’s effort to rescue the Lebanese state from the dominance of its weapons and reduce Iran’s influence over its proxies in the region.”
Boulos believes the sanctions imposed on Frangieh also send political messages to Hezbollah’s allies within Lebanon, “particularly Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and other forces that played a role in obstructing constitutional processes over recent years, as well as hindering the Lebanese state’s efforts to advance ongoing negotiations with Israel aimed at securing arrangements that would consolidate the ceasefire and pave the way for a peace agreement between the two countries.”
What About Frangieh’s Political Future?
Weeks before the sanctions were announced, Suleiman Frangieh reaffirmed his political choices and alliances. In a media interview, he reiterated his support for Hezbollah, saying: “If Hezbollah wins, we will win alongside it. If it loses, God forbid, we will lose with it honorably. But what is certain is that we cannot abandon our convictions.”
Regarding peace with Israel, Frangieh stressed that “Lebanon should be the last country to sign a peace agreement after its rights have been secured.”
Opinions differ regarding the actual impact of the U.S. sanctions on Frangieh’s political future. Zoghbi argues that “these sanctions have a political effect on those they target, particularly since Frangieh is a presidential candidate, has a member of parliament, allied lawmakers, and regional popularity in northern Lebanon. He has already paid the political price of his association with Hezbollah, which is one reason he failed to reach the presidency.”
He added that “this political cost is likely to continue in the coming period, with his influence diminishing further as Hezbollah’s own influence and that of the Iran-led axis continue to decline.”
Boulos likewise believes the sanctions “constitute a direct blow to Frangieh’s presidential ambitions and place him under political and financial suspicion because of his relationship with Hezbollah, which is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and several other countries.”
In contrast, political and security affairs researcher Badih Qarhani downplays the impact of the sanctions on Frangieh’s standing within his political base. He told Alhurra: “I do not believe these sanctions will affect any political or electoral prospect for Frangieh.”
Qarhani even argues that the sanctions may strengthen Frangieh’s standing within his constituency. “Anyone familiar with the mentality of the people of his region understands this,” he said. “We should not forget the chants of many residents of Zgharta—‘You are the Patriarch, Suleiman’—during the dispute between Frangieh and the Maronite Patriarchate.”
He added: “Frangieh’s political future was primarily tied to the former Syrian regime, in addition to Hezbollah. With the fall of Assad’s regime, there is no longer a political future for Frangieh at the presidential level. This has nothing to do with U.S. sanctions but rather with the changes that have occurred in the region, particularly in Syria.”
The Biggest Winner
The new sanctions acquire added significance because of their timing. They come amid mounting U.S. pressure on Lebanon regarding both Hezbollah’s disarmament and the Washington-sponsored negotiations between Lebanon and Israel.
Zoghbi believes that “the growing number of people targeted by U.S. sanctions will increase political pressure on Hezbollah and weaken its allies,” adding that the group “has already lost many allies outside the Shiite community due to its involvement first in supporting Hamas and then Iran.”
Qarhani offers a different assessment, saying: “Experience shows that these sanctions have not driven Hezbollah’s allies away from it or politically isolated them. The example of Gebran Bassil is clear—he maintained his alliance with Hezbollah until the very last moment.”
The consequences of the latest sanctions are not limited to politics. They also include extensive financial and legal measures. The sanctions freeze all assets and financial interests belonging to those designated that are located in the United States or under the control of U.S. persons. They also apply to any entities in which sanctioned individuals own, directly or indirectly, a stake of 50 percent or more.
The sanctions prohibit U.S. individuals and companies from conducting transactions with those listed, while also opening the door to secondary sanctions against foreign financial institutions that deal with them or facilitate their transactions, significantly increasing the international cost of doing business with them.
In his first response after being designated, Frangieh wrote on X that the U.S. measures “do not concern us in the slightest.” He added: “We have always been, and remain, in favor of peace, but against surrender,” before concluding: “This action will not affect our views; it will only strengthen our conviction in them.”
While Frangieh remains steadfast in his positions, Boulos called on the Lebanese state to treat the information contained in the sanctions decisions as a basis for investigating him, “particularly regarding any financial suspicions that may be contained in the files on which Washington relied.”
The U.S. decision has also raised growing questions among Hezbollah’s allies about the future direction of U.S. sanctions policy in Lebanon and whether it may expand to include additional political figures and forces.
Regardless of the path these sanctions take, “the Lebanese state remains their greatest beneficiary,” according to Zoghbi, because they “will succeed in containing its adversaries, foremost among them Hezbollah, its weapons, and its various arms, allowing state legitimacy to gradually extend across all Lebanese territory and bring more political and sectarian components under its authority.”
This translation preserves the article’s full content, structure, quotations, and attribution while rendering it in natural English suitable for publication.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
