The political order that underpinned Iran’s Islamic Republic for more than four decades has come under unprecedented strain since the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The transition to his son, undertaken as a result and in the throes of a brutal war, has revealed the instability of a system built around the authority of a single arbiter, with competing power centers now struggling to set the country’s direction at a moment of profound uncertainty.
Khamenei’s death on Feb. 28 under U.S. and Israeli airstrikes has intensified competition among the institutions and networks that once operated under his oversight. While the new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has been presented as his father’s successor, his authority has yet to command the consensus that the elder Khamenei enjoyed, leaving rival factions to pursue their own agendas.
In recent weeks, representatives of the supreme leader and Friday prayer leaders have intensified calls for loyalty to Mojtaba Khamenei, warning against rhetoric that could undermine the “status of the leadership.” While the campaign appears intended to reinforce his position, its persistence and breadth suggest his authority has yet to be fully consolidated within the establishment.
An Iranian opposition politician, speaking to MBN on condition of anonymity, said the crisis extends beyond Mojtaba Khamenei himself. It also reflects the vulnerabilities of a political system built around the supreme leader as the ultimate decision-maker rather than around independent institutions capable of managing a leadership transition.
As the new supreme leader has struggled to exercise the same authority as his father, competing centers of power have increasingly acted according to their own calculations. According to the Iranian source, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), is seeking to expand its influence over security and military affairs, while parliament is attempting to preserve its role in the governing structure. The government sees negotiations with the West as a way to ease economic and political pressure, while the judiciary and security agencies have relied on arrests and executions to reinforce their role as guardians of the system.
Sources familiar with internal deliberations told MBN that the crisis has moved beyond the traditional divide between conservatives and other political currents. Instead, they said, the central question has become who ultimately controls decision-making within the state. Under Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader acted as the final arbiter among the IRGC, the government, parliament and the judiciary. Today, no single figure possesses the same authority to impose compromises, while no institution can dominate decision-making without risking an internal power struggle.
People familiar with the dispute cautioned against reducing it to a contest between reformists and conservatives, or between advocates of war and supporters of peace. They said the regime’s institutions remain aligned on core principles: maintaining a tight domestic security grip, preserving Iran’s regional influence, and safeguarding the IRGC’s central role as one of the pillars of the Islamic Republic.
The disagreement instead centers on how those policies should be managed, who should bear their political and economic costs, and who should have the final say.
Against that backdrop, efforts to portray Mojtaba Khamenei as the natural heir to his father have not transformed him into a unifying figure within the ruling establishment. Leaks and public statements from Iranian institutions suggest that he has become part of the struggle for power rather than its resolution.
Sources close to the ruling establishment offered a different account. They told MBN that Mojtaba Khamenei has played a role in containing disputes among key decision-making centers in recent months, particularly over negotiations with the United States, and has sought to prevent political disagreements from escalating into open confrontation between state institutions.
According to those sources, the dispute is not about the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic itself, but about how to manage the current phase, the limits of possible concessions in negotiations, and how to respond to external pressure.
Researchers specializing in Iranian affairs, however, cautioned against overstating Mojtaba Khamenei’s influence, noting that decision-making remains dispersed among the Office of the Supreme Leader, the Supreme National Security Council, the IRGC, the presidency and parliament.
People close to the government did not deny the existence of internal disagreements, particularly over relations with the United States and the limits of military escalation. But they argued that the debate concerns the most effective means of preserving the Islamic Republic rather than the nature of the political system itself.
Nizar Jaf, a researcher on Iranian affairs, told MBN that the current differences do not reflect a split between two opposing camps so much as competing views among state institutions over the best way to protect the system during an exceptional period. The government, the Foreign Ministry and some lawmakers see negotiations as a tool to ease economic and political pressure, while the IRGC fears that any concessions could open the door to U.S. demands affecting what it considers the regime’s strategic foundations, particularly Iran’s nuclear program and missile capabilities.
The divide has become especially visible in the debate surrounding calls to “avenge” Khamenei’s death. The Iranian newspaper Ham Mihan questioned what the slogan actually entails: Should it require halting negotiations, targeting American and Israeli officials, withdrawing from previous understandings, or entering a direct military confrontation?
Opposition sources told MBN that the significance of those questions lies in the fact that they were raised by an Iranian media outlet, reflecting the absence of a unified vision within the state over how to navigate the post-Khamenei period.
The contradictions have also surfaced in parliament, which recently resumed sessions after being suspended during the latest war. Parliamentary procedures for emergencies have been revised to allow sessions to be held in secure locations or conducted virtually.
Parliamentary committee elections also reflected an effort to redraw the balance of power within the conservative camp. The hardline Paydari Front lost influence over the National Security and Energy committees, while lawmakers aligned with Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf gained ground. The exclusion of figures such as Mahmoud Nabavian and Ebrahim Rezaei was widely viewed as a sign of an internal struggle over how to manage the next phase.
Ghalibaf occupies a distinctive position in that debate. Although he is one of the most prominent officials to emerge from the ranks of the IRGC, he has adopted a more pragmatic approach to the crisis. Political sources told MBN that Ghalibaf believes an open-ended confrontation following Ali Khamenei’s death could push the system into a crisis beyond the capacity of its institutions to contain.
For that reason, his support for keeping negotiating channels open is viewed not as a political realignment, but as an effort to shield the state from the consequences of an internal conflict that could threaten its cohesion.
Jaf told MBN that negotiations have become the most contentious issue within the ruling establishment. The IRGC does not oppose diplomacy in principle, he said, but rejects any process that could lead to strategic concessions affecting what it considers the pillars of the Islamic Republic’s survival.
That position, however, is far from universally shared within the conservative camp. Lawmaker Kamran Ghazanfari accused President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and other supporters of negotiations of attempting to carry out a “coup” from within the system.
The rebuttal came from within the conservative establishment itself. Javan, a newspaper affiliated with the IRGC, dismissed Ghazanfari’s remarks as illogical, saying the exchange of accusations had reached an unprecedented level within the Islamic Republic.
The dispute highlights a notable shift in Iran’s political discourse. The charge of “treason,” long directed at the regime’s opponents, is now increasingly being used against rival factions within the ruling establishment itself.
The debate intensified after remarks by Mohammad Jafar Qaem Panah, an adviser to President Pezeshkian, who questioned the relationship between state institutions and the office of the supreme leader. If the supreme leader’s decisions are implemented literally and without debate, he asked, what purpose is served by institutions such as the Supreme National Security Council, parliament or the government?
Sources familiar with the matter told MBN that such a question would have been nearly unthinkable during Ali Khamenei’s tenure, when the authority of the supreme leader was treated as beyond discussion. Today, they said, the fact that it can be raised publicly reflects a broader shift in attitudes toward the institution of the supreme leadership itself.
The comments prompted Ahmad Alamolhoda, the supreme leader’s representative in Mashhad, to denounce the remarks as an attack on the principle of Velayat-e Faqih, or Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.
The unease has also spread to the military establishment. Abdollah Haji Sadeghi, the supreme leader’s representative to the IRGC, sent a message to IRGC and Basij commanders urging them not to accuse government officials of treason because of negotiations or question agreements approved by the leadership.
Observers said the message was intended to prevent political divisions from spilling into the security apparatus on which the Islamic Republic relies to preserve its cohesion.
The disputes have not been confined to political and security institutions. They have also reached the state media, which has increasingly become a battleground over who has the authority to define the government’s narrative.
Tensions escalated between President Pezeshkian’s administration and Iran’s state broadcaster after a series of incidents suggested that the dispute was no longer limited to editorial decisions but had evolved into a struggle over control of official messaging.
The Government Information Council said the removal of portions of a presidential speech referring to the previous leadership’s approval of negotiations was not an isolated incident. It said segments of interviews with the parliament speaker and the head of the judiciary had also been omitted from broadcasts.
According to the Iranian news website Entekhab, a Cabinet meeting turned confrontational after Pezeshkian and the head of the state broadcaster, Peyman Jebelli, clashed over the presentation of a government report on the negotiations.
The dispute also reached the president’s inner circle. Yusef Pezeshkian, the president’s son and adviser, questioned who decides which parts of statements by the heads of Iran’s three branches of government are broadcast and which are removed.
The debate extended to foreign policy as well. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said negotiations had not been the decision of a single individual but rather a collective decision made by state institutions. He added that ending the war likewise could not be the decision of one person alone.
Araghchi’s remarks drew criticism from media outlets aligned with the hardline camp, which accused him of undermining national unity. He defended continued negotiations, arguing that diplomacy carries a lower cost than war.
Despite Mojtaba Khamenei’s calls for unity and confidence in state institutions, the persistence of political and media disputes suggests that the crisis runs deeper than appeals for discipline can resolve.
Sources familiar with internal deliberations told MBN that the Islamic Republic now faces two possible paths. The IRGC could attempt to impose temporary unity by tightening security controls and preventing internal disputes from widening. Alternatively, the power struggle could continue to intensify, with accusations and leaks increasingly moving from closed-door meetings into public view.
For now, Iran does not appear to be undergoing a smooth transition of power. Instead, it is witnessing a broader realignment of authority within the ruling establishment. Mojtaba Khamenei has yet to establish himself as a figure commanding consensus across the political elite, while the IRGC, despite its expanding influence, cannot govern alone without provoking resistance from other institutions.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
