As the Houthis’ escalate their campaign in Yemen, Tareq Saleh, commander of the National Resistance Forces, has re-emerged after rumors of his death and declared himself ready to wage a “decisive battle” to wrest Sana’a and Hodeidah from the grip of the Iran-backed group.He also said his forces had acquired new military capabilities.
Saleh, a nephew of the late Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, commands the National Resistance Forces deployed in Mokha and western Taiz, regions close to the Bab el Mandab Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea. That key deployment and his service on the Presidential Leadership Council since April 2022 give Saleh a crucial role in the fight against the Houthis.
Since July, the Houthis, designated as a terrorist group by Washington, have launched dozens of missile and drone attacks on government-held areas along Yemen’s western coast. The Port of Mokha has ceased operations as fighting has resumed on several fronts, reviving the possibility that the conflict could shift from a war of attrition to broader military operations.
Sadeq Dwaid, spokesman for the National Resistance Forces, told MBN that the latest Houthi escalation showed the group was moving away from the path to peace, adding that the Presidential Leadership Council and the Yemeni government were prepared for all options.
The Houthi escalation is linked to pressure from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — another U.S.-designated terrorist organization — to expand the confrontation into the Red Sea. Houthi control of areas in western Yemen keeps maritime routes and energy supply lines through the Bab al-Mandab Strait under threat, as is the Strait of Hormuz.
With the prospect of renewed confrontation growing, Yemeni political and military analyst Thabet Hussein said Saleh leads the faction most serious about waging war against the Houthis, drawing on the force he has built and deployed along the western coast.
His forces include officers and soldiers who previously served in Yemen’s Republican Guard, Special Forces and Central Security Forces. They fought alongside the Southern Giants Brigades and the Tihama Resistance in battles against the Houthis along Yemen’s western coast in 2018.
Saleh said that new weapons had entered service and that government forces’ drones had been upgraded. He did not disclose the weapons’ types or sources or when they might be used.
Dwaid said part of the National Resistance Forces’ arsenal consisted of weapons and equipment seized during operations that thwarted Iranian smuggling attempts to supply the Houthis through Hodeidah’s ports. He described the seized equipment as substantial and sophisticated. The NRF’s new capabilities, he added, were the result of years of training and development.
Hodeidah, north of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, is the Houthis’ principal maritime hub on Yemen’s western coast. It is used to receive imports, fuel and humanitarian aid. Control of Hodeidah does not give the group direct command of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, but it strengthens its presence in the Red Sea and its ability to threaten vessels traveling to and from the waterway.
Mokha, by contrast, lies about 75 kilometers from Bab al-Mandab and serves as a major base for the National Resistance Forces led by Saleh. Keeping it under government control also provides a barrier against any southward Houthi expansion along the coast toward the strait.
Walid al-Qudaimi, a Yemeni minister of state and cabinet member, told MBN that the Houthi attacks were intended to wear down Saleh’s forces, disrupt ports and logistical infrastructure, and prevent the National Resistance Forces from preparing a counteroffensive.
Al-Qudaimi said the attacks could also be an attempt to test conditions on the ground before launching a land advance toward Mokha and Bab al-Mandab.
Efforts were underway, he said, to strengthen coordination among the various anti-Houthi formations and forces, adding the prediction that the results would become apparent in the next phase.
Yemen’s Defense Ministry has not announced the start of a large-scale military operation toward Hodeidah or Sana’a, nor has it specified a date or scope for the battle described by Saleh.
Any shift to a broad offensive would require a political decision by the Presidential Leadership Council and other Yemeni forces, as well as support from Saudi Arabia and the unification of anti-Houthi factions. The participation of southern forces in any new battle would also depend on reaching understandings and obtaining guarantees over the future of southern Yemen.
Retired Maj. Gen. Abdullah Ghanem al-Qahtani, a former air force officer, said Saudi Arabia would not hesitate to support Yemen’s internationally recognized government and the Yemeni people in confronting the Houthis, whether along the Red Sea coast or elsewhere in the country.
Hussein, the Yemeni political and military analyst, outlined three scenarios for the next phase. The first would involve a Houthi advance along the western coast or in Marib and Taiz; the second, a government offensive toward Hodeidah; and the third, a continuation of the war of attrition without any major change to the map of territorial control.
The course of the confrontation in the next phase will be determined by troop movements on the ground, the cohesion of state institutions and their ability to unify military and political efforts, as well as the position of residents in Houthi-controlled areas.
Adapted and translated from the original Arabic.
