Jordan has spent years investing in the Palestinian Authority and its chairman Mahmoud Abbas.
Amman has supported the PA as the institutional anchor of Palestinian political legitimacy while pushing Abbas to reform it – and with even greater urgency since Hamas launched its attacks on Israel three years ago. Jordanian officials are well aware that Abbas, 90, will not be around for much longer. But they are keen to see the institutions that represent the Palestinian people preserved.
Now Abbas’s arch-rival is back.
Mohammed Dahlan, the former Fatah security chief in Gaza, was expelled from Fatah after a bitter break with Abbas, who accused him of corruption. Dahlan, who during his tenure faced allegations of torture and abuse, remains deeply controversial.
From his exile in Abu Dhabi, however, Dahlan has rebuilt himself into a powerful regional player with close access to the UAE and Egypt, a channel to Hamas, and increasingly direct links to the Trump administration. “We do not trust Dahlan,” says a senior Jordanian official. “His agenda is pro-Israeli and anti-Jordan. Nothing with him is guaranteed.”
Jordan is especially concerned about the unlikely coalition Dahlan has formed around himself. It encompasses disgruntled ex-Fatah members, local political dignitaries, popular elected figures such as the jailed Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti, and, most controversially, Palestinians associated with Hamas.
It is a coalition of old enemies brought together by new opportunities. Jordan fears what could happen if it wins.
The Election Jordan Fears
Palestinian legislative elections are scheduled for Nov. 28, and presidential elections in early 2027. On paper, this is exactly the kind of political renewal Jordan has long called for. But the Jordanians are worried that holding the elections under current conditions could produce the opposite of what they want.
The fear is that Dahlan’s broad coalition could win a parliamentary majority, challenge Abbas’s Fatah camp, and eventually undermine the political legitimacy of the existing Palestinian leadership.
Jordan has spent years defending the Palestinian Authority and the PLO framework as the institutional expression of Palestinian legitimacy cemented by the Oslo accords. It fears that a Dahlan-led coalition, particularly one that incorporates Hamas-linked figures, could create a competing center of legitimacy.
That is why Amman is uneasy about the election timetable and what it could now produce.
Dahlan’s Extraordinary Rise
The significant turning point came on July 12, 2026, when UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed met Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to discuss the latest developments in the Middle East. What followed was a striking emergence of Dahlan at the center of Gaza diplomacy.
By the end of July, Dahlan had received a Hamas delegation in Abu Dhabi “to establish trust.” He then travelled to Egypt, where he met Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Rashad and subsequently acted as an intermediary between Palestinian factions and Trump administration envoys. Dahlan proposed Palestinian technocrats for the postwar administration of Gaza to Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff after they turned to him for advice following the Oct. 2025 ceasefire between Israel and Hamas.
His influence rests on an unusual combination of assets: access to Abu Dhabi, longstanding Egyptian connections, a channel to Hamas, and relationships with members of the Trump team.
Two Palestinian Routes to the Day After
The struggle over Gaza’s future is increasingly developing along two Palestinian tracks.
One runs through Abbas and the institutions of the Palestinian Authority. The other runs through Dahlan and his network linking Gaza and Hamas to Egypt, the UAE and Washington.
Both envisage a Gaza no longer governed by Hamas in its present form. But they differ fundamentally over how to get there and who should control what comes next.
Abbas’s route is institutional. His argument is that Gaza should ultimately return to a reformed Palestinian Authority, backed by Arab and international support. Hamas would be excluded from governing and would have to surrender its independent military capability, with Palestinian security forces unified under a single command.
That is the model broadly favored by Jordan and by international actors such as France and Saudi Arabia: reform the Palestinian Authority rather than replace it.
For Dahlan, the route to a new Palestinian political order increasingly runs through Gaza itself – and through his ability to deal with Hamas.
The Bargain with Hamas
The relationship is extraordinary because of where these two sides started.
Dahlan was once one of Hamas’s fiercest Palestinian enemies. Hamas, in turn, helped drive him from Gaza. But they now need each other. Hamas is seeking a way to survive politically after the devastation of Gaza. It may no longer be able to govern the Strip as it did before, but it does not want to disappear from Palestinian politics. Dahlan can offer a route back. Hamas, meanwhile, gives Dahlan something he lacks: an organized constituency and political reach inside Gaza.
The emerging bargain is therefore one of convenience rather than trust. Hamas could accept an arrangement under which it gives up direct control of Gaza and disarms while retaining political influence through a broader Palestinian coalition. Its candidates would not necessarily have to run openly as Hamas. They could enter through wider electoral lists.
Dahlan gets Hamas’s political reach. Hamas gets Dahlan’s regional and international access.
Jordan sees this as precisely the combination that could make the coalition powerful enough to challenge Abbas and win between 50-60% of the vote.
Why Jordan Sees Hamas as a Red Line
Jordan accepts that Hamas may be prepared to make tactical concessions after the war. But Jordan sees no fundamental change in Hamas’s ideology. The movement could retreat from formal government, enter politics through allies and proxies, and rebuild its influence – all while remaining true to its extremist ideals. That possibility is particularly dangerous in the West Bank, which has immediate relevance to the kingdom’s security. It is directly adjacent to the kingdom, and any expansion of Hamas’s political or security infrastructure there would have consequences far beyond Palestinian politics.
This is why Amman is wary of any Gaza formula that could eventually migrate to the West Bank.
Israel Is Changing the Equation
Jordan’s concern cannot be separated from what it sees happening on the ground. Amman believes Israel is doing everything possible to discredit and weaken the Palestinian Authority while simultaneously changing the geography of the West Bank in ways designed to preclude the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Around Jerusalem, the expansion of Israeli settlements is threatening the city’s link to the rest of the West Bank, further dividing Palestinian territory and undermining the possibility of a contiguous state.
Farther north and south, settlement expansion and bypass infrastructure are making the West Bank increasingly fragmented. The Jordan Valley is even more sensitive.
Israel is expanding settlements there and deepening its strategic presence. New settlement construction has continued, while Palestinians face increasing pressure over land and water. A new Israeli barrier in the Jordan Valley threatens to sever more Palestinian communities from their land.
From Amman’s perspective, these are not isolated settlement projects. They are gradually creating a different West Bank: Jerusalem separated from its Palestinian hinterland, the northern and southern parts increasingly disconnected, and the Jordan Valley becoming a strategic Israeli security zone. And Palestinians are being driven deeper into poverty and desperation.
That is why Jordan sees the weakening of the PA as especially dangerous. Israel is changing the facts on the ground while the Palestinian political system is fighting over who has the right to speak for the Palestinians.
The Risk of Palestinian Strife
Jordan is especially worried that a Dahlan election victory could lead to internal conflict among the Palestinians. Hamas-linked figures could become the focus of internal confrontation. Fatah could refuse to accept the result. Rival political and security networks could emerge. The infighting could spill across the river and impact Jordan, where many Jordanians are of Palestinian origin and embrace the notion of armed resistance against Israel.
Israel would likely benefit. If Palestinian political competition turns into Palestinian disorder, Israel could present the resulting chaos as evidence that Palestinians cannot govern themselves or produce a credible political partner.
While Palestinians fight over legitimacy, Israel could continue consolidating its control over the West Bank. Amman wants to avoid such a nightmare.
Jordan’s dilemma is therefore not simply Abbas versus Dahlan. It wants a controlled transition that strengthens Palestinian institutions rather than destroying them. But it is increasingly worried that its friends in the West are not paying attention.
Seen from Amman, the storm clouds are gathering.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect MBN’s editorial stance.
