Iran is a dilemma.. a real dilemma.
When you speak about Iran, you must distinguish between several overlapping circles – and that distinction is the key to true understanding.
These circles are: Iran as a country, a people, and a civilization; then Iran as a sect, with Shiites as Muslims; and finally, Iran as a state and the regime that rules it.
Mixing these circles, says Egyptian writer and journalist Ibrahim Essa, fuels confusion and makes it impossible to evaluate the regime’s political actions independently of the sect or the people.
In this article, Essa analyzes these circles, showing how “political Shiism,” embodied in the doctrine of Velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), has hijacked the first two circles to serve its own interests.
This article is based on a video of Ibrahim Essa’s “Debatable” on Alhurra’s digital platforms, re-edited for reading.
The Three Circles: Untangling Iran’s Dilemma
Each of the three circles represents a layer of Iranian identity. These circles do not always coexist peacefully—often they clash, and one seeks to dominate or hijack the others.
First Circle: Iran the Nation:
Iran is a great country with a great people—descendants of an even greater past, the Persian civilization. This first circle is vital and must never be ignored or dismissed as irrelevant. To overlook this historical and civilizational depth is to fall into dangerous oversimplification, reducing Iran to nothing more than a religious or political entity. In truth, at its core, Iran is an ancient nation with a long history and immense contributions to humanity.
Second Circle: Iran the Sect:
Iran is also a Shiite state. Shiism is an Islamic school of thought, and recognizing this fact is both essential and clarifying, it pushes back against voices of hatred, sectarianism, and intolerance. To treat Shiites as infidels is not only theologically wrong but also serves narrow political agendas.
Third Circle: Iran the Regime:
The third circle is the Iranian regime. Since 1979, the Iranian Revolution—initially broad and diverse—was steadily reduced to a one-man rule. When Khomeini took over Iran, he was surrounded by militants and leaders from across Iran’s political spectrum: Marxists, liberals, secular democrats. But soon after, Khomeini seized absolute power. The outcome was not only the sideline of revolutionary factions but their elimination, through imprisonment, assassination, or exile.
Thus, when we speak about Iran, we are not dealing with one entity but with overlapping circles: the nation, the sect, and the regime. Together they form Iran’s real dilemma. Confusing them leads to false conclusions—and makes any attempt to engage with Iran fraught with risk, because the boundaries blur between politics and creed, between nationalism and sectarianism.
Hijacking the Sect: Velayat-e faqih and the Claim of Divine Mandate
The central idea here is that Iran’s current rulers have not only hijacked the Iranian people—they have also hijacked Shiism itself. This hijacking is embodied in the imposition of Velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamist Jurist) as both creed and constitution of the state. The doctrine was never an authentic pillar of Shiite thought; it was, at best, marginal.
Shiism has never been a single monolith—it encompasses overlapping sects and diverse schools such as Zaydis and Ismailis. The branch followed by Iran’s rulers is Twelver Shiism. Yet even within this school, leading clerics historically did not believe in anything resembling Velayat-e faqih.
When Khomeini introduced the concept, it was confined to a narrow circle—an anomaly within Shiite jurisprudence. Twelver doctrine traditionally holds that authority rests with the “Hidden Imam,” the Twelfth Imam, whose return alone would resolve the world’s affairs. Until then, Shiites were to await his return and refrain from engaging in politics.
Velayat-e faqih, then, was a radical innovation. By enshrining it as the official creed of the Iranian constitution, Khomeini institutionalized a system of priestly rule, a form of government rooted in divine delegation. In this framework, the jurist assumes the role of the Hidden Imam’s deputy—functioning as if he were the Imam himself. This makes the Supreme Leader a figure who cannot err, cannot be held accountable, and cannot be challenged.
This transformation was not a mere theological interpretation; it was a political project to legitimize absolute power for the guardian of the Vali-ye faqih (The Islamic jurist). Once the ruler is cast as the embodiment of divine will, opposition or accountability become tantamount to heresy. This is why Khomeini turned on his own former allies—because the very existence of political or intellectual rivals contradicted the logic of unlimited authority claimed from heaven.
“Political Shiism”: Iran’s Strategies of Domination
Velayat-e faqih did not simply place all power and destiny into the hands of one cleric—it also turned Iran into a state with an explicit mission: exporting the Revolution. This is the essence of what is known as “political Shiism.”
Political Shiism is the tool the Iranian regime uses to expand its influence and dominance across the Arab world. It is not rooted in theology or religious doctrine, but in extreme pragmatism serving purely political agendas. Sometimes it exploits Shiite identity; at other times it goes beyond it.
Iran has pursued this export project through three main strategies:
First: Building Shiite Proxies
Tehran created armed wings, militias, battalions, factions, across the Arab and Islamic world to project Iranian power into largely Sunni-majority societies. The clearest example is Hezbollah in Lebanon. Its birth came out of a brutal, bloody struggle in which Shiites fought and slaughtered each other in horrific massacres, until Hezbollah, loyal to Velayat-e faqih, eclipsed Amal Movement, which opposed clerical rule and rejected direct Iranian allegiance.
The same model spread to Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Even the Houthis—who are Zaydis, not Twelvers—were funded, armed, and propped up by Iran.
Second: Exploiting Palestine to Enter Sunni Communities
“How do I bring Sunnis closer?” Iranian strategists asked. The answer: by presenting the regime as the true defender of Palestine, the one confronting Israel and America. In this way, Tehran could lure and recruit Sunni Islamist groups.
This is how Hamas was drawn in. Early on, Hamas members refused even to shake hands with Iranian officials, seeing Shiites as infidels. But the Iranians worked hard to break down that hostility, stressing shared interests and a common Muslim identity. From the start, it was an opportunistic alliance—Iran wanted to advance political Shiism, using Palestine as the banner to penetrate Arab and Sunni societies, ultimately aiming for regional control.
Third: Aligning with Arab Leftists and Nationalists
Iran also forged alliances with Arab leftists and nationalists who oppose America and reject peace with Israel. These groups—who still describe themselves as Nasserist, nationalist, or Marxist—see armed struggle as the only solution to the Palestinian question. They too became part of Iran’s coalition.
The contradiction is stark: the Arab left allies with Iran, while the Iranian regime jails, tortures, and kills its own leftists. Arab nationalists and socialists turn a blind eye to clerical authoritarianism and theocracy, overlooking repression and political imprisonment in Tehran—because they see Iranian financing and weapons as fuel for their fight to “liberate Palestine by the gun.”
Historical Roots
To trace the origins of political Shiism, we must go back to the 16th century – when Iran was not yet a Shiite state. Certain regions, like Qom, were predominantly Shiite, but Iran was not.
When the Safavid dynasty seized power and established dominance over Iran, it found itself in confrontation with the Sunni Ottoman Empire. To give this rivalry and hostility a religious and sectarian cover, the Safavids adopted Shiism as the official doctrine.
From that moment, sectarian identity became a political instrument. The spread of Shiism in Iran was not a purely religious process, but a deliberate political project designed to serve the Safavid state in its struggle against the Ottomans.
This historical pattern casts a long shadow over the present. It shows that Iran’s regime today, in exploiting the sect to expand power, is not innovating but reviving an old tradition—a recurring cycle of using religion as a political weapon.
