The Houthis have shocked the world with the speed and scale of their offensive to seize control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Equally surprising, however, was the restrained American reaction: The Trump administration has declined to defend Saudi Arabia from the Houthis despite at least two direct requests from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
The American decision has far-reaching implications. Washington’s failure to come to the aid of the Saudis sends a powerful signal about its reliability as an ally. It also threatens to tip the balance of power toward Iran, the Houthis’ most important backer.
More than one reason has been offered for the lack of an American reaction. The recent news of a U.S.-Houthi meeting in Oman confirms that the Americans and the Yemeni insurgents have made a deal: As long as the Houthis abstain from attacking American maritime commerce in the Red Sea, the Americans will refrain from attacking them.
Some have speculated that Trump’s real aim was to punish Saudi Arabia for refusing to grant American forces permission to use its territory to attack Iran. Other observers claimed that Washington was willing to tolerate the Houthi action because it could potentially inflict pain on the Chinese, who send some $300 billion of trade through the Bab al-Mandeb annually. (Why the U.S. would do this even though closure of the waterway would also impact the American economy went unexplained.)
The reality is more straightforward. Trump and his advisers correctly interpreted the Houthi move as a trap. So far, at least, they have managed to dodge it.
The Iranians clearly thought hard about the timing of the offensive carried out by their Yemeni proxy. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is aware that Republicans cannot afford a new war on the eve of the midterm elections. The American voter is already furious at the administration because of the rise in fuel prices, which reached unprecedented historic heights due to the war with Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Any American military intervention in Yemen would undoubtedly entail a major electoral gamble that neither the Republican leadership nor its base could accept.
Iran is also keen to hold the Bab al-Mandeb card in any forthcoming negotiations — especially now that the Strait of Hormuz has diminished in value because of the success of the American naval actions in the Gulf, which have allowed hundreds of oil tankers and millions of barrels to pass through Hormuz despite Iran’s efforts to stop them. At the same time, the Americans have maintained their blockade of Iranian seaborne trade (which accounts for the lion’s share of all Iranian foreign commerce). Iran had previously threatened that its allies would close the Bab al-Mandeb strait if the U.S. continued attacking Iran.
Trump and his advisors are convinced that they must stick with their strategy of choking the Iranian economy until Tehran submits.
Finally, the Iranians were keen to pre-empt a fresh American attack on their sensitive nuclear sites at Pickaxe Mountain, which Trump has been threatening. The IRGC regards the nuclear program as a strategic guarantee of Iran’s security and is keen to revive it despite the American and Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear installations. Iran fears that renewed American attacks could destroy the program entirely. Tehran sees playing the Houthi card as a way to divert American attention from this critical vulnerability.
Spurring on the Houthis could also offer a way to paper over divisions at home. The collapse of the economy has produced a visible split within the Iranian leadership. Important voices in Tehran, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, former president Hassan Rouhani, and former foreign minister Javad Zarif have been calling on the IRGC to seek diplomatic solutions to the war because of the dire state of the economy. The Guard seems to have recognized the precariousness of its domestic position and decided on a flight forward: opening a new war front by tempting the Americans into a war with the Houthis. The IRGC knows that U.S. attacks on the Houthis would further deplete American military assets already exhausted by the war. The Americans likely also understand that defeating the Houthis with airpower alone is likely impossible.
The Americans have declined to take the bait. So far they have opted to stay the course with their strategy of strangling Iran economically and militarily, maintaining the focus on Tehran and refusing to squander its forces with a new war on the Houthis. The Americas understand perfectly well the importance of the Bab al-Mandeb to global trade, as well as the strategic gains Iran stands to reap from Houthi control of it. And they also understand the intensity of Saudi frustration over the U.S. failure to come to their aid.
But the Americans also know that the costs of such an intervention, whether for the midterm election battle in November or for the ongoing war with Iran, far outweigh the benefits of direct involvement in a war with the Houthis.
Admittedly, such promises, coming from a militia backed by the IRGC, are hard to believe. But the Trump administration is trying to keep its eye on the ball. Trump and his advisors are convinced that they must stick with their strategy of choking the Iranian economy until Tehran submits. It’s a big gamble. But it may be the best Washington can do under the current circumstances.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect MBN’s editorial stance.
