Federalizing Syria?

What might a future Syrian state look like? A renewed debate on this topic is surfacing in different parts of Syria: in the northeast, where the Kurdish “self-administration” runs its territories, in Suwayda in the south, where the Druze seek to shield their areas from sectarian tensions, and along the coastal region, where Alawites live under the shadow of massacres.

Nearly fifteen years have passed since the uprising began against the regime of the now-ousted Bashar al-Assad, and nearly ten months since Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the Syrian Sunni Islamist political and paramilitary group led by Ahmad al-Shara, took power, and the question of rebuilding the Syrian state is no longer a theoretical one.

Minorities are openly discussing federalism as a means of securing greater safety, political representation, and local governance. But this push toward decentralization clashes with al-Shara’s insistence on preserving a unified, centralized state—a collision course that could determine whether Syria continues to exist as one country.

The Stakes

Kurds dominate the northeast, with Syria’s main oil fields under their control. Druze in Suwayda depend on agriculture near the Israeli border. Alawites dominate the coast, home to Syria’s key ports at Latakia and Tartous.

Historically, minorities in Syria were subjected to a rigid central system, with Damascus controlling most resources and services, fostering feelings of marginalization and threat.

With the state’s collapse in December 2024, the need for more effective local governance grew urgent, particularly in areas ravaged by conflict. In the northeast, Kurds developed a model of local administration for services and infrastructure; in the south, Druze communities relied on limited self-organization to protect themselves.

Former U.S. Special Envoy for Syria James Jeffrey told Alhurra: “At the domestic level, Syria’s minorities broadly want two things: a reasonable governing structure that does not oppress human rights, levy arbitrary taxes, or persecute them militarily, and some degree of control over their local administration, as they have already been accustomed to—whether in Kurdish areas in the northeast or in the Druze south.”

In contrast, Jeffrey told Alhurra that the main demand of al-Shara’s government “and of the Sunni majority” is the preservation of a “centralized, unified state that does not fragment.”

New Federalist Demands

The Kurds

With roughly 10% of Syria’s 23.8 million people, the Kurds live in regions stretching from Hasakah and Qamishli to rural Aleppo. Since the war began, they have run a semi-autonomous administration with a local parliament, security forces, and service structures.

“Today Syria is fragmented regardless of its official borders. On the ground, the dynamics are those of quasi-statelets,” says Zozan Alloush of the Syrian Women’s Advisory Board, speaking to Alhurra. “There is no longer a single governance model that can fit all of Syria. Some form of decentralization is unavoidable.”

The Druze

In Suwayda, growing sectarian violence has left hundreds dead in clashes between Druze factions and government-aligned forces, intensifying calls among the Druze – about 3% of the population – for federalism. They see it not as secession but as protection: local control over security, resources, and services.

Political activist Malik Abu Khair, founder of the Syrian Brigade Party, told Alhurra: “Federalism can safeguard communities and allow each region to function under a system that balances central authority with local autonomy, especially given the central government’s failure to build a viable democracy.”

The Alawites

Forming about 15% of the population, the Alawites have also leaned toward a federalist solution following the March 2025 “coastal massacres” in which some 1,400 civilians were killed – over 1,500 according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. This has fueled calls for autonomy to shield the community from retaliation.

Last week, an organization calling itself the Political Council for Central and Western Syria announced plans for a federal region spanning Tartous, Latakia, Homs, and parts of Hama. “Alawites want to minimize central government forces in their areas. At a minimum, they want control of local police, similar to arrangements in the U.S. or Germany,” U.S. Special Envoy Jeffrey told Alhurra.

Models of Governance

To grasp the federalism debate, one must distinguish among three governance models: the first is political federalism: sharing legislative and decision-making power between the center and the regions. The second is aministrative decentralization: local management of services only, without influence on national policy. And Finally, centralization: full control by the central government, with minimal autonomy for local areas.

Damascus rejects all forms of federalism. Shortly after taking power, Ahmad al-Shara declared, on December 29: “There will be no division of Syria in any form, and no federalism.” Days later, he added: “The Kurds should not demand federalism now, as Syrian society is not prepared to understand it and sees it as part of a project to divide Syria.”

Still, activists like Alloush told Alhurra that a return to pre-2011 centralism is impossible, at least in Kurdish areas that have resources, armed forces, and deep-seated fears of massacres.

Jeffrey told Alhurra that the central government still holds two “leverage cards”: services (electricity, infrastructure, etc.) and external legitimacy through ties with neighbors and the international community. These factors may prevent recognition of separatist zones, but leave space for informal arrangements.

“The middle ground could be informal understandings – laws or agreements that give local minorities some sense of control over their fate while reassuring the central government that no outright secession is imminent,” Jeffrey told Alhurra. “In exchange, the center provides services and infrastructure on which all regions depend.”

One Syria or a Decentralized Country?

Does it matter? Is Syria’s system of governance just a question for political scientists, theorists, and analysts? Hardly. How this question is resolved – a strong central government vs. a federal Syria with separate, autonomous areas – will decide key questions affecting the daily lives of millions of Syrians: how they conduct their daily lives, who provides their services, and which authority provides them security.