A lightning offensive by the Iran-aligned Houthis in September gave the group control over most of Yemen’s Red Sea coast and leverage over a key chokepoint along one of the world’s busiest waterways. Experts warn the Houthis’ conquests could also benefit two of al-Qaida’s most dangerous affiliates: al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Shabab in Somalia.
In a five-day offensive, Houthi forces captured the port of Mocha and overran the coastal town of Dhubab and the island of Mayyun, also known as Perim Island, in the Bab al-Mandab Strait. By Sept. 14, the Houthis controlled the Greater and Lesser Hanish islands, a strategic archipelago in the Red Sea.
Reportedly guided by Iranian advisers, the rapid Houthi advance broke through the defensive lines of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, which is closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, and which has played a leading role in counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida. Tehran’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which, along with the Houthis, the U.S. State Department has designated as foreign terrorist organizations, celebrated the victories as “a divine triumph.”
Experts say AQAP and the Horn of Africa’s al-Shabab, both of which are U.S.-listed terrorist groups, could benefit from the Houthi advance, which has pushed the Yemeni government from the Red Sea coast.
“This territorial advance is granting AQAP and al-Shabab unprecedented operational breathing room and direct access to Houthi-controlled logistics nodes,” said Summer Ahmed, a Yemen conflict analyst based in Washington.
With traffic in the Strait of Hormuz disrupted by the Iran War, the Bab al-Mandab has become even more important a chokepoint on one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. About 5.6 million barrels of oil a day passed through the strait in the first quarter of 2026, up from 3.9 million a year earlier, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Roughly 14% of global maritime trade and 30% of container traffic move through the Red Sea, according to a 2024 report from the OECD’s International Transport Forum.
Whoever holds the strait’s shores has a hand on one of the world’s economic arteries. On the Yemeni side, that is now the Houthis, to the possible benefit of al-Qaida’s affiliates as well.
Transactional Alliance
Because of al-Qaida’s historical animus toward Shiites, the two groups are not natural allies. But since 2023, U.N. experts have described a growing transactional relationship between the Houthis and al-Shabab, one of al-Qaida’s most dangerous affiliate groups. Houthi trainers have traveled to Somalia, while al-Shabab fighters have gone to Yemen for training. Al-Shabab has also gained access to routes, networks, intelligence and more sophisticated weapons, particularly drones.
“The Houthi–al-Qaida relationship is a transactional alliance of convenience rather than an ideological merger,” said Ahmed.
The presence of de facto al-Qaida leader Sayf al-Adl in Iran for more than two decades likely reinforces these ties, she said, reflecting the Houthi playbook of making agreements with long-term ideological adversaries for immediate tactical gains.
She said the Houthi capture of strategic western areas such as Mocha, north of the Bab al-Mandab, could strengthen smuggling routes and cooperation with AQAP and al-Shabab.
Houthi leaders have previously criticized al-Qaida, though the Iran-aligned group has acknowledged prisoner exchanges with the militant organization.
Iran has consistently maintained that the Houthis are an independent movement and not its proxy.
The nexus between the Houthis and al-Qaida affiliates could create a two-front maritime threat across the Bab al-Mandab and Gulf of Aden, Ahmed argued, combining Houthi ballistic missiles and unmanned surface vessels from Yemen with enhanced al-Shabab capabilities from Somalia.
“The Houthis are now funneling advanced drone and explosive technology to al-Shabab to establish an IRGC-coordinated, dual-shore maritime pincer across Bab al-Mandab,” she told MBN.
“This asymmetric technical transfer upgrades al-Shabab’s capabilities from basic surveillance to deploying offensive, weaponized one-way attack drones and coastal standoff weapons against near-shore commercial and military vessels,” Ahmed said.
Daniele Garofalo, a terrorism analyst based in Italy, however, warned against reading too much into September’s Houthi advances. He said there is not enough evidence to conclude that territorial gains have specifically led to increased cooperation.
“Territorial expansion creates new opportunities for cooperation,” he said. “But it does not by itself demonstrate that such cooperation is already taking place.”
Evolving Opportunities
Greater Houthi control over ports, coastal areas and maritime routes could expand the space available to networks moving weapons, personnel, technology and funds between Yemen and Somalia, said Garofalo, adding that the largely transactional and ad hoc cooperation between the groups “could now evolve into a more stable transregional logistical infrastructure connecting Yemen and the Horn of Africa.”
“Renewed conflict and further fragmentation of the Yemeni security environment could create additional operating space for AQAP,” he said.
In August, a U.N. Security Council sanctions monitoring report said the relationship between the Houthis and AQAP had developed into a “stronger field partnership based on intelligence coordination” that enabled AQAP to acquire weapons previously unavailable.
“AQAP fighters were noted to be present in Houthi-controlled areas fighting alongside Houthis against the Government of Yemen,” the report said.
Fatima Abo Alasrar, founder of The Ideology Machine, a publication focused on authoritarian ideological warfare in the Middle East, sees the Houthis’ transactional ties with Sunni extremist groups as part of a broader pattern transforming the once-small tribal militia into a major force.
“No ideology stands in the Houthis’ way of expansion and taking root inside the country and achieving its long-term objectives,” she said, referring to the group’s quest to gain more power.
Unlike Sunni groups such as AQAP and al-Shabab, the Houthis have pursued a more strategic approach and learned from the mistakes of Sunni jihadists by avoiding confrontation with major regional and global powers, Alasrar said.
“Their long-term strategy is to impose economic costs on other countries by fighting asymmetrically through the economy, through limited escalation against U.S. partners,” she said.
She also sees tactical reasons for the Houthis to cooperate with Sunni extremist groups. Since its emergence in the 1990s, al-Qaida has opposed and attempted to topple the Saudi monarchy.
“Houthi and the Sunni threat should be seen almost interchangeably given the widespread attacks that Houthis have been conducting recently on the kingdom and on its allies in Yemen,” she said. The Houthis, AQAP and al-Shabab follow distinct sectarian and ideological traditions. The Houthis emerged from Yemen’s Zaydi Shiite tradition, while AQAP adheres to an extremist Sunni ideology deeply hostile to Shiites.
Garofalo said ideological hostility should not be confused with an unwillingness to cooperate.
“AQAP and the broader al-Qaida milieu remain ideologically hostile to the Houthis, but that hostility does not preclude tactical accommodation or transactional cooperation when interests converge,” he said.
He said that counterterrorism officials and experts are now concerned that militant groups that are not formally united are now building robust logistical networks they can use while pursuing similar goals.
Opposing religious beliefs would limit cooperation between the Houthis and Sunni jihadists, said the Washington-based analyst Ahmed, “but have not overridden their strategic interests.”
“Iran mostly coordinated this alliance,” she said. “And as long as it’s benefiting Iran and the Houthis, it will continue.”
