Nearly two years into U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term, one of his administration’s main Middle East foreign policy goals remains incomplete: establishing diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
The main obstacle is Riyadh’s demand that Israel commits to a path to Palestinian statehood, a pledge that neither Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu nor his rival Gadi Eisenkot, who is trying to form Israel’s next government, has been willing to make.
A deal would be a diplomatic breakthrough between Israel and the kingdom that is home to Islam’s two holiest sites. It would expand Trump’s signature Abraham Accords, which established ties between Israel, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco during his first term. Saudi recognition of Israel could also widen trade and security cooperation among U.S. regional partners and encourage other Arab and Muslim-majority countries that look to Riyadh for leadership.
“Normalization of relations between Israel and its neighbors remains a priority of this administration,” a State Department spokesperson told MBN on Tuesday when asked about the prospects for a Saudi-Israel deal to formally establish ties.
“Expanding the Abraham Accords will strengthen regional security, economic integration, and deterrence against malign actors,” the spokesperson said.
To encourage Saudi participation, the U.S. has offered a U.S.-Saudi nuclear agreement, which would grant the kingdom access to American nuclear technology for electricity generation. It was signed in July and submitted to Congress in August, but Trump has conditioned its final approval on Riyadh recognizing Israel.
But the deal’s text does not include that condition, and Riyadh has repeatedly linked recognizing Israel with Palestinian statehood, calling for a state according to the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital.
“Normalization is still going to require an explicit commitment to Palestinian statehood,” Michael Ratney, the former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, told a Center for Strategic and International Studies panel last week. “Without that, it really doesn’t matter who the prime minister of Israel is.”
Saudi Arabia’s Calculations
The UAE’s experience under the Abraham Accords shows why normalization with Israel appealed to some Gulf states and why Saudi Arabia faces a harder decision.
Abu Dhabi saw Israel as a partner facing familiar security challenges: small populations and limited territory that made military technology particularly important, Hussein Ibish, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI), told a panel hosted by the institute last week. Israel was “engaged in answering similar problems with similar solutions,” Ibish said, providing the impetus for the UAE to normalize ties in 2020.
Proponents of the Abraham Accords say that Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth, cultural influence and religious leadership in the Arab and Muslim world means it normalizing ties would lead to a far larger change in the Arab world’s relations with Israel.
Both countries would benefit from security arrangements, access to new markets and a united front against regional challenges such as Iran. Saudi Arabia would especially benefit from Israeli technology and intelligence sharing in the kingdom’s decade-long conflict with the Iranian-backed Houthis, which the U.S. State Department has designated a foreign terrorist organization. Saudi’s leadership, in turn, would bring the rest of the Arab world along, proponents say.
But Israel’s war in Gaza has sparked outrage in the region, and recognizing Israel without getting a commitment to a path to Palestinian statehood could open Saudi Arabia to external criticism and internal dissent.
“Saudi Arabia had to recalculate and consider that normalizing with Israel had become potentially much more costly domestically and regionally,” Ibish said.
Before the war, Riyadh’s conditions centered on strengthening the Palestinian Authority and improving conditions on the ground, he said. The war in Gaza has hardened its position, and it now demands that Israel formally recognize the Palestinians’ right to a state, a position the government spelled out in a February 2024 statement.
But Ratney noted that distinction – recognition of a right to a state, rather than the creation of a state – left room for normalization to occur before a state exists, provided Israel commits to such an outcome and winds down the Gaza war.
“It doesn’t mean the Palestinian state needs to be formed tomorrow,” he said, “but it needs to be articulated as a matter of government policy.”
Israel’s Next Government
Whether Israel’s next government could make that commitment remains uncertain.
Neither Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc nor the bloc led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot secured a majority in the Oct. 27 election and Eisenkot is now holding coalition talks to form a government. His options include forming a minority government that relies on Arab parties for support, or reaching agreements with other parties outside his bloc.
Netanyahu campaigned on preventing the formation of a Palestinian state, and Eisenkot all but ruled it out as well.
“Anyone who is thinking about a two-state solution after October 7 is just delusional,” Eisenkot said in an Aug. 27 interview with the Israel Hayom newspaper, In the same interview, though, he also criticized the Netanyahu government’s support for some settlement projects in the West Bank, which he said was damaging Israel’s international standing.
The Israeli embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment.
Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, a Middle East Institute senior fellow, argued at the AGSI panel last week that any Eisenkot government would be an inherently weak government, with little appetite for risking its survival over Palestinian statehood.
Only 26% of Israelis support the formation of an independent Palestinian state, according to a Gallup poll published Oct. 6, while 65% oppose it.
Saudi diplomatic ties also may not offer enough incentive for Israelis to accept a commitment to Palestinian statehood in return, given some regional coordination and cooperation with Riyadh already takes place, she said.
“Maybe from an Israeli perspective, that’s good enough for right now,” she said.
Kurtzer-Ellenbogen did see potential for an Eisenkot government to cooperate more closely with the Trump administration’s plans for Gaza, including on humanitarian access and arrangements for Palestinian administration.
A Step-by-Step Approach
With neither country so far willing to budge on its conditions for recognizing the other, the United States’ options are limited.
Celine Touboul, co-executive director of Israel’s Economic Cooperation Foundation, said that U.S. pressure and regional incentives could, over time, help an Israeli government build domestic support for policy changes.
She identified curbing settler violence and preventing the Palestinian Authority’s collapse as areas where the next Israeli government could make changes. While right-wing parties would not be pleased, the government could cite security reasons which might make it more palatable to a skeptical Israeli public.
“It can be a process that is synchronized between Israeli-Palestinian progress with progress on normalization,” Touboul told CSIS.
If Washington can convince the next Israeli government to make these incremental improvements in Palestinians’ lives, it might be able to convince Saudi Arabia to make its own progress toward recognition.
The Saudi embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment on what it would take to open discussions with Israel on normalization.
But Ratney warned that without an explicit statehood pledge, even more pragmatic Israeli policies on Palestine might not be enough.
“I think that would be fine, but it wouldn’t get you to normalization,” he said.