In a new era of conflict in the Middle East – defined by protracted, open-ended wars of attrition – traditional measures of military strength are being upended, and power is increasingly defined by who can keep fighting the longest.
The emerging reality means a weaker military actor can achieve significant political by forcing its adversary into a prolonged and costly state of readiness, presenting a dilemma for Gulf security.
While a state may intercept most attacks on its territory, it can still be forced to devote burdensome resources to protecting airports, ports and other critical infrastructure. In turn, an armed group may suffer heavy losses to its leadership and arms caches and missile launching platforms but retain enough capability to disrupt maritime navigation and harm the economy, securing it an outsized place at the negotiating table.
It is a battlefield where endurance is paramount and time is a weapon. The contest of wills now increasingly revolves around the cost of maintaining security, keeping flights operating, safeguarding export routes and maintaining investor confidence. Armed groups calculate that a persistent threat will pressure governments whose economies depend on stability.
For them, not every strike needs to hit its target to have an impact. Merely the prospect of repeated attacks can prompt an airline to reconsider its flight schedules or an investor to postpone a project.
The Houthi Example
The case of Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels, who have intensified attacks on Saudi Arabia’s airports and infrastructure in recent weeks, illustrate the depth of the shift. The missile threat from the Houthi shut down flights from Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport for two weeks. Shipping through the vital Bab al-Mandab Straight waterway has also been disrupted by Houthi attacks, while Saudi was last week forced to postpone its flagship Future Investment Initiative conference, known as “Davos in the Desert.”
For Saudi and others, simply responding to each attack in isolation allows the attacker to dictate the rhythm of the crisis. The new battlefield realities demand a more comprehensive approach.
First, to judge the group’s strength, one must look beyond their attacks to their stockpiles, technical expertise, outside suppliers, local assembly and procurement networks. Together these determine how quickly they can replace what they lose, and how much any strike against them really achieves.
This gets to the most important question in any military campaign: How long until the enemy regroups?
Here, the tempo of attacks can be a misleading indicator. Continued launches may come from old stockpiles, while a lull could be a political calculation or an effort to conserve ammunition.
Tehran remains an important source of weapons designs, technical knowledge, and support for its proxies overseas, including the Houthis. But Iran-backed networks have developed their own local expertise, interests, and supply chains, giving them greater room to act independently.
Consequently, any understanding reached with Tehran must be assessed against how effective it is across the arenas where Iran exercises influence. While Iran’s may be able to encourage armed factions it backs to escalate, its ability to ensure that all its partners adhere to a long-term settlement is another matter.
The situation in Iraq, where Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is attempting to disarm the country’s powerful network of militias, highlights the complexity. Iraq’s territory has been used by Iran-backed factions to launch attacks on the Gulf. But under pressure to give up their weapons, armed factions may scale back their visible military activity while retaining financing, organizational structure, training facilities, and weapons depots. Operations may shift to smaller cells or front organizations, allowing the faction to have a degree of plausible deniability over the use of force.
Assessing whether groups are genuinely deescalating therefore requires a deep look. Can the state enforce its decisions? Are armed factions and their weapons coming under a unified command? Or are they just building power within state institutions?
The answers to these questions determine how sustainable any lull in attacks is likely to be.
A Path Forward for the Gulf
The predicament for Gulf states boils down to a single problem: malign actors can disrupt regional security without necessarily bearing an equal share of the costs.
In the test of whether states turn military superiority into lasting security, those capable of protecting their economies, restocking and organizing alliances will have the advantage.
Military pressure alone won’t do. It requires diplomatic, financial, and commercial tools aimed at procurement and financing channels, disrupting the supply chains that allow adversaries to regroup. Success becomes evident when replacement costs rise, deliveries are delayed, and weapons grow less reliable.
Gulf states also need to strengthen their own capacity to bounce back. Faster repairs, ready stocks of spare parts and ammunition, more flexibility in airport operations and export routes all influence an enemy’s calculations. The faster a state can restore essential functions, the lower the political and economic returns an attacker gets from hitting it.
Alliances are also key. Their value lies in their ability to share early-warning intelligence, secure supplies and maintenance, and divide the load during a prolonged crisis. Internal divisions only create openings through which an adversary can restore its influence and supply networks, squandering gains that have come at considerable cost.
In the test of whether states turn military superiority into lasting security, those capable of protecting their economies, restocking and organizing alliances will have the advantage.
Gulf security may begin with intercepting threats, but it becomes established when societies and economies become better able to endure. At that point, attrition loses its appeal.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect MBN’s editorial stance.
