Meet the Middle East’s New Soft Power Superpower

As Beijing quietly deepens its economic, diplomatic, and media footprint across the Middle East, its influence is increasingly felt in capitals from Riyadh to Rabat. With billions invested in infrastructure, culture, and storytelling, China’s “soft power” campaign is reshaping perceptions of power and partnership in a region long dominated by the United States.

This week, MBN CEO Jeff Gedmin sat down with Min Mitchell, a veteran journalist focused on China who will spearhead our coverage of Beijing’s influence push into the region. In their conversation, Jeff and Min unpack China’s soft power strategy in the Middle East—and what that means for the U.S. and its allies.

Jeff Gedmin: Min, China has been deploying a wide-ranging soft power strategy to win over countries in the Global South. Is it working?

Min Mitchell: In many ways, yes. Beijing’s messaging about “Global South solidarity,” multipolarity, and resistance to “neo-colonial” cultural imperialism (i.e. from the West) has found a receptive audience. You see this reflected in the latest Pew polls on global attitudes toward China — many countries in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East hold increasingly favorable views of China.

China’s approach is simple but effective: emphasize trade, infrastructure, and shared development goals rather than ideology or political reform. That resonates, particularly with governments that are weary of Western lectures and conditions.

How is China actually doing this? What are the main tools they’re using?

It’s a full-spectrum strategy — media, culture, education, and diplomacy all working in sync. In the Middle East and North Africa, you see it through China Global Television Network’s Arabic-language content, China Media Group’s local partnerships, all pushing themes like “mutual respect” and “development for all.”

At the same time, China also invests heavily in people-to-people and cultural exchanges, from Confucius Institutes to scholarships for Arab students. This month, Beijing inaugurated its first Chinese cultural center in the Gulf in Kuwait, presenting itself as a modern, non-colonial partner distinct from the West. And, of course, the Belt and Road Initiative ties it all together by turning infrastructure projects into political goodwill.

The idea of “soft power” comes from Harvard scholar Joseph Nye, who famously described it as a country’s ability to get others to “want what it wants.” People have debated for years how to measure that kind of influence — and how it actually shapes foreign policy.

So what does China want in the Middle East?

China’s goals in the Middle East are practical: stability, access, and influence. It wants a stable region to protect its energy supplies and investments; access to markets and infrastructure through the Belt and Road; and influence to help shape a world order that’s less U.S.-centric.

Beijing wants Middle Eastern states to view it as a reliable, non‑interfering partner and a viable long‑term alternative to the United States and Western powers. Through its rhetoric of “win‑win cooperation,” it fosters alignment with its vision of a multipolar world — where U.S. primacy gives way to shared influence.

Ultimately, China aims for the region to gradually lean toward its model: prioritizing economic engagement with Beijing, accepting its narratives of sovereignty and development, and quietly backing — or at least not opposing — Chinese positions on sensitive issues like Taiwan and Xinjiang.

Media influence is clearly a big part of that. President Xi Jinping often talks about the need to “tell the China story well.” How is Beijing actually doing that through international broadcasting?

China has poured huge resources into expanding its foreign-language media operations — it’s all part of Xi’s push to control the global narrative and project a more positive image of China. CGTN, for instance, now broadcasts in six languages and reaches audiences across Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Analysts estimate that Beijing spends several billion dollars a year on everything from media infrastructure and content production to digital outreach.

Chinese state outlets also work closely with local partners — producing joint programs, offering journalist training, and pushing content on platforms like TikTok to showcase China’s development story, governance model, and “win-win” vision of global cooperation.

More recently, we’ve seen a new layer of media expansion inside China itself. Provincial and city-level International Communication Centers are popping up to create localized, targeted content for different regions—often in partnership with universities and propaganda departments. The idea is to make China’s message sound more relevant to local audiences.

At the same time, Beijing is experimenting with AI-generated content, social media influencers, and even anonymous online accounts to spread its narratives more subtly. All of this is backed by an active diplomatic campaign to push back whenever China’s image is challenged.

This brings to the question that how does China view the United States as a competitor for influence in the Middle East? And Russia, Iran? Are they rivals or allies?

As China broadens its global reach, the Middle East has emerged as a focal point for its quiet but calculated diplomacy. Beijing increasingly views the United States as its key competitor for regional influence, even as it avoids direct confrontation. Washington still dominates the security landscape through military partnerships and defense networks, yet China’s steady advance has come through economic and diplomatic means — trade deals, infrastructure financing, and the Belt and Road Initiative. Its pitch to regional capitals remains consistent: cooperation without political conditions, a contrast to the Western model of alliance-building.

Is this a one-size fits all approach? Or are the Chinese taking local differences into account?

Relations with Russia and Iran illustrate Beijing’s nuanced approach. With Moscow, China shares an interest in curbing U.S. dominance and promoting multipolarity, but each power pursues its own path — Russia through defense and security, China through investment and diplomacy. Ties with Tehran center on energy trade and shared resistance to Western pressure, yet Beijing carefully manages its stance to protect key relationships with Gulf monarchies and Israel alike.

Again, Beijing is playing a long game in the Middle East. It competes subtly with Washington, coordinates selectively with Moscow and Tehran, and seeks to entrench itself as the region’s reliable, nonideological economic partner — anchoring influence through pragmatism rather than power politics.

A more differentiated view for our region if you would. Who are the priority countries for Beijing?

Beijing’s engagement across the MENA region is carefully targeted to prioritize energy security, market access, and geopolitical influence. In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, and Oman are central to China’s strategy. Saudi Arabia alone accounted for about 14-15% of China’s crude oil imports in 2024, cementing a partnership that now includes energy transition, digital infrastructure, and defense cooperation. The 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement, facilitated by China, highlighted Beijing’s growing role as both an economic and diplomatic player.

In North Africa, Egypt and Algeria remain key allies, hosting major Belt and Road projects that connect the Mediterranean to sub-Saharan Africa. Morocco is emerging as a priority, attracting Chinese investment in electric vehicle manufacturing and renewable energy. Western powers. It promotes a vision of “win-win cooperation,” hoping to align local governments.