China already wields considerable power and influence in the Middle East. For many years it has been the top trading partner of almost all the countries in the 22-member Arab League. Since 2013 it has been the region’s largest buyer of oil and gas.
That clearly isn’t enough for the leaders in Beijing. In the Middle East as elsewhere, China is employing a wide array of diplomatic and military tools to diminish the influence of the United States and other democracies. Its goal is a new world order more tractable to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Until recently, China has lacked the ability to project decisive military power into the Middle East. So it has adopted a strategy in which proxies play a vital role – above all the clerical regime in Iran.
Over the years China has systematically worked to help Iran defy the wide array of sanctions imposed on it by the West. Flouting existing restrictions, Beijing has mastered the art of supplying Tehran with increasingly sophisticated military technologies, creating the basis for Iran’s “indigenous” production of armor, ballistic missiles, artillery rockets, cruise missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, and tactical and strategic-range drones.
Iran then used these (largely China-aided) weapons to arm its own proxies in their wars against Israel. This includes some 4,000 missiles used by Hezbollah to strike Israel in their 2006 war, as well as the drones, rockets and small arms used by Hamas to start its Oct. 7, 2023 war against Israel. The Houthis have also benefited from Chinese technology-sharing. Over the past two years, the Houthis have fired some 200 missiles and 170 drones at Israel, and has used others to attack some 100 international ships operating around Yemen and the Red Sea.
China has also used strategic proliferation to gain influence. In 1988, it began selling DF-3 liquid-fueled medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi elite, grateful for the capability granted them by Beijing, effectively allowed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to become a major pillar of the Saudi security system. This same template has since been applied to others, such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.
China has also worked hard to enable Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Beijing has provided continuous economic support to Iran while thwarting or undermining, wherever possible, Western attempts to sanction Iran’s nuclear program. In some cases, the Chinese have even provided direct and indirect nuclear technology assistance.
The latter includes Chinese nuclear weapon designs and nuclear reprocessing technology obtained via Pakistan in the 1980s—as revealed by Israel in 2018.
In March 2023, China began to advance political-military strategies aimed at undercutting the U.S.-led order in the Middle East. Beijing promoted an initial diplomatic rapprochement between longstanding enemies Iran and Saudi Arabia—somewhat ironically, considering that it had spent years exacerbating the mistrust between the two countries. Now China re-positioned itself as a new source of “mediation” and “balance,” separate from Washington’s influence.
Given China’s support for the nuclear programs of Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran, it is not beyond reason that China would quietly offer Saudi Arabia both direct or indirect access to Chinese nuclear technology, via its longstanding security partner Pakistan, to advance its goal of displacing U.S. influence in the region.
Now, however, China’s ambitions in the region have suffered a serious setback—perhaps because the CCP seriously underestimated Israeli resolve.
In early 2025, Israel took action against Iran’s nuclear program. Over twelve days in June, the Israelis struck Iranian nuclear facilities and individual military and political leaders. The U.S. followed up with B-2 bomber strikes against deep underground nuclear facilities.
Yet China soon showed that it had other cards to play. In September, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA). Though the text of the agreement does not explicitly mention the sharing of nuclear capabilities, some observers saw it as opening the way for Pakistan to offer some of its technology to the Saudis.
Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif stated in a Sept. 18 interview: “Let me make one point clear about Pakistan’s nuclear capability: that capability was established long ago when we conducted tests. Since then, we have forces trained for the battlefield… What we have, and the capabilities we possess, will be made available to [Saudi Arabia] according to this agreement.”
The reality is that Pakistan’s nuclear weapon and nuclear missile capabilities have been enabled almost entirely by China. China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) has been the main partner helping Pakistan to produce most of its ballistic and cruise missiles.
President Trump has for now preserved Washington’s key position in the Saudi security system with his recent announcement that the U.S. will sell advanced fifth-generation F-35A strike fighters to Saudi Arabia.
Even this move, though, would be overshadowed by a Pakistani deployment of nuclear warhead-equipped Shaheen ballistic missiles or Babur land-attack cruise missiles to the Saudis.
Washington has yet to formulate a real response to the China-enabled Pakistan-Saudi nuclear SMDA.
When it does, it should probably start by thoroughly documenting China’s longstanding use of proxy power and weapons proliferation to promote conflict and to risk nuclear war in the Middle East.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks.
Richard D. Fisher, Jr.
Richard D. Fisher, Jr. is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.
