What looks like a collapse of Kurdish power in Syria is better understood as the final phase of a gradual U.S. downgrade.
A Kurdish official close to the Washington Kurdish Institute told MBN’s Joe Kawly that the shift did not begin in January. “This wasn’t abandonment,” the official said. “It was a slow withdrawal of guarantees. The Kurds were still partners but no longer protected.”
The United States, the official said, had been signaling for months that counter-ISIS was no longer the primary organizing principle of its Syria policy. Managing risk with Turkey, limiting Iranian influence, and avoiding great-power escalation had moved ahead of Kurdish autonomy. “Once those priorities changed,” the official added, “our position became structurally weaker.”
That change became decisive in mid-January, when Syrian government forces moved against the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish-led coalition that partnered with the U.S. against ISIS. Arab tribal fighters joined the advance, accelerating the loss of territory the SDF had controlled for years.
From Washington’s perspective, the decision was less about approval than tolerance.
A U.S. congressional staffer familiar with internal deliberations told MBN that the administration did not view the offensive as crossing American red lines. “The limits were narrow,” the staffer said. “Protect U.S. troops, prevent ISIS prison collapses, and avoid escalation between states. If those held, the U.S. was not going to intervene.”
Those conditions were met. U.S. personnel were not threatened, detention facilities remained under control, and the fighting stayed localized. That restraint, the staffer said, mattered more than the identity of the forces losing ground.
The Kurdish official described the outcome as the realization of a long-feared scenario. “We were essential when ISIS was the priority,” he said. “Once the mission changed, we became a complication.”
The long-term risk, he warned, is a strategic blowback. The erosion of Kurdish autonomy may simplify relations with Ankara and Damascus in the short term, but it leaves unresolved questions about governance, minority protection, and the durability of counter-ISIS arrangements once U.S. forces eventually draw down.
From Washington’s side, the staffer acknowledged the tradeoff. “This is burden management,” he said. “It’s not cost-free. But the calculation is that the alternatives are worse and we are always assessing the situation on the ground.”
When asked to explain the change, a State Department official said, “This aligns with our broader National Security Strategy: reducing open-ended military commitments, managing escalation among regional and great powers, and pushing local actors to assume security burdens once U.S. core interests are secured.”
Joe Kawly
Joe Kawly is a veteran global affairs journalist with over two decades of frontline reporting across Washington, D.C. and the Middle East. A CNN Journalism Fellow and Georgetown University graduate, his work focuses on U.S. foreign policy, Arab world politics, and diplomacy. With deep regional insight and narrative clarity, Joe focuses on making complex global dynamics clear, human, and relevant.
