On Jan. 27, Donald Trump issued an ultimatum to Baghdad. Noting that Iraqi lawmakers were considering “reinstalling” Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister, Trump delivered an uncompromising verdict: “Because of his insane policies and ideologies, if elected, the United States of America will no longer help Iraq.”
These words were enough to end the prospects of Maliki, who had secured the nomination of the largest parliamentary bloc, the Coordination Framework (CF), to form the next government. This came more than two and a half months after the parliamentary elections on Nov. 11. That spell of political paralysis was not unusual. Under Iraq’s system, elections do not grant the party that wins the highest number of seats the automatic first opportunity to form a government. Instead, this right goes to the largest parliamentary bloc formed after the elections.
Maliki’s State of Law Coalition came in third, with 29 seats. Thanks to intense behind-the-scenes deal-making, Maliki outmaneuvered current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani (whose party had gained the largest share of the vote) and managed to secure the nomination. This triumph seemed even more improbable given Maliki’s deep unpopularity and his divisive politics. Initially, though, it seemed that none of this would be enough to block his path to the premiership.
Trump’s intervention immediately changed everything. So why was it so effective? The reality is that the U.S. still has ample leverage over the government in Baghdad. Washington could start by simply closing the account at the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of New York where Iraqi oil revenues are deposited and protected from the enforcement of numerous compensation judgments stemming from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait – protection granted under a U.S. presidential order issued in 2003 and renewed annually. Closing this account would deprive Iraq of access to the oil revenues it earns from global markets, quickly triggering a financial collapse. According to 2025 figures, these revenues account for about 88 percent of Iraq’s federal budget. Even if the Trump administration refrains from such a drastic step, it has other, more gradual options with similar effects, such as imposing sanctions on Iraqi institutions and officials involved in supporting Iranian influence and violating the U.S. sanctions regime against Iran.
There is now a broad consensus in the Iraqi political scene that Maliki has lost any hope of returning to office. Yet he continues to press ahead with his candidacy, claiming a populist mandate to resist “American interference” even while promising to appease the Trump administration. He has signaled a willingness to dismantle Iran-aligned armed factions, distance Iraq from Iranian influence, and build positive relations with America’s new regional ally, post-Assad Syria. Iraqis remember well, however, that it was Maliki who played a central role in creating the militias and drawing Iraq into Iran’s sphere of influence. He was also, at first, scathing about the rise of ex-jihadi Ahmed al-Sharaa to the Syrian presidency – until he wasn’t.
Trump’s stance echoes an earlier (though subtler) American rejection of Maliki. In 2014, the Obama administration declared that it would halt military aid to Iraq if Maliki won a third term as prime minister. The Americans blamed Maliki’s polarizing politics for weakening Iraq amid the threat from ISIS, which ultimately managed to conquer a third of the country. Washington’s position effectively sidelined Maliki. Over the following four years, under the U.S.-backed premiership of Haider al-Abadi, Iraq managed to regain some stability and liberate its territory from ISIS control in 2017, creating a general sense that the country had overcome the worst and that better years lay ahead.
It soon became clear, however, that the ruling Shiite alliance continued to allow the Iran-aligned militias to expand their political, economic, and institutional influence – not least thanks to Maliki. Today, as a result, members of these factions run ministries, contest elections, and secure increasing parliamentary representation. Iran has effectively achieved dominated Iraq’s political institutions. This is not only bad for Washington; it is bad for Iraqis, too.
The Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023, the strong Israeli response, and Trump’s return to the presidency have all driven a shift in U.S. policy toward Iraq. Until 2025, Washington pursued a strategy of patient – and ultimately futile – cooperative investment in successive Iraqi governments in order to help them thwart Iranian influence. That effort did not bear fruit. Now the Americans have abandoned that supportive approach in favor of peremptory demands: Iraq must dismantle Iranian influence within its borders and can expect negative consequences if it fails to do so. This is precisely the message Secretary of State Marco Rubio conveyed to Al-Sudani in a series of phone calls last year. Trump’s public no-confidence measure represents the culmination of this pressure-based strategy, one that places full responsibility for Baghdad’s choices squarely on Iraq itself.
Although Maliki remains committed to his candidacy, the Iraqi political class understands that defying the Trump administration would amount to political and economic suicide. The ex-prime minister’s chances have evaporated.
Yet the latest news has merely served to obscure the deeper question: Is there any potential prime minister actually capable of dismantling Iranian influence? The natural addressee of this question is none other than the Shiite alliance itself. Only by agreeing on this objective would it be in a position to provide the necessary political cover and institutional support for the next prime minister to carry out this task. The key question, then, is whether Trump’s rejection of Maliki will finally push the alliance to do the right thing.
Akeel Abbas
Akeel Abbas, a nonresident senior fellow at the Iraq Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, focuses on national and religious identities, modernity, and democratization in the Middle East.
